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ABSTRACT
A frequent question asked by policy-makers worldwide is what is it that makes 
government work well? The overall aim of my inquiry is to identify factors that make 
government institutions in Melanesia effective. In order to do this the experience of 
provincial governments in Papua New Guinea (PNG) over the past quarter of a century 
is used as a case study.
Civil society is often seen as a means of strengthening government. It may do this by 
providing interest groups that can effectively influence the formulation o f policy, that 
can challenge and exert pressure on government to uphold standards of policy 
implementation. Furthermore civil society may act as one of several key checks and 
balances crucial to the consolidation of strong government. Where this influence is 
based on broad participation it is believed to encourage ‘values and behaviour’ 
necessary to maintain democratic government institutions. In recent years social 
scientists have been increasingly referring to society’s confidence in its institutions as 
the stock of ‘social capital’. Generally the term ‘social capital’ is used to refer to the 
institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s 
social interactions. There is now significant quantitative and qualitative evidence, from 
a number of studies, to show that the level of trust and norms of co-operation, crucially 
impinge on the effectiveness o f government institutions
It is often assumed that less developed societies are much less likely to be characterised 
by a strong civil society given the importance of “personalistic patronage style 
relationships” and the significance of ethnic associations. However, it may be argued 
that all kinds of associations should be considered part of civil society as long as they 
connect individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity and facilitate the exchange of 
views on matters of public concern -  economic, political, cultural and social. The 
population of PNG speaks more than eight hundred languages and live in small-scale, 
decentralised communities. These often isolated communities were bound by kinship 
connections, a common language and communal landholdings. One of the most 
important characteristics of social capital in PNG has therefore been the “bonds” that
exist within these communities. This research shows that the distinctive character of 
social capital in PNG has had a significant impact on the development performance of 
the provinces.
Development efforts in PNG have been traditionally dominated by the National and 
Provincial governments. However this research shows that the development 
performance of the provinces cannot be explained purely in terms of the performance of 
the respective provincial governments. Rather, an examination of the available 
evidence suggests that the nature of civil society and social capital in PNG has had a 
much more profound impact on development over the longer term. It is therefore 
recommended that development policies, and strategies in PNG rather than focus on 
narrow “performance” issues need to take into account the specific characteristics of 
civil society and social capital.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The problem with these Pacific states is not so much that they are prone to falling apart, but rather that
they have never really been put together.’1
1.1. Introduction to the problem
In the late 1980s I worked as an Economic Planner for the Solomon Islands Ministry of 
Provincial Government. I was seconded to the Western Provincial Government where I 
had a unique opportunity to experience the functioning of decentralisation in a 
Melanesian country, and the potentially important role of local level government. 
Following this I worked in a large statutory authority in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
which was well resourced but unable to deliver the service for which it was responsible. 
More recently I worked in a government department in the Fiji Islands, and which has 
been the subject of an institutional strengthening project. Although the Department has 
received considerable inputs of resources, and technical assistance, it seems that little 
progress has been made in terms of improving its effectiveness. Recently in March 
2003 the main offices of the Gulf Provincial Administration in PNG were completely 
destroyed in an apparent arson attack. The reasons for the fire are widely known 
although no one has been brought to justice. However the underlying causes for the act 
are far less well understood, and relate to a high level of mistrust in the community and 
especially between the population and the provincial administration. This situation can 
be compared with the relatively higher level of trust between the community and the 
provincial administration in East New Britain. My experiences working in Pacific 
Island countries have led me to ask the question what makes a government institution 
effective?
The overall aim of my inquiry is therefore to identify the factors that make a 
government institution in Melanesia, but in particular PNG effective. In my analysis 
‘institution’ refers primarily to those organisations that comprise the public sector, and 
includes statutory bodies. In order to do this the economic, and political history of 
Melanesia over the past decade is briefly outlined to show that institutional 
strengthening, based on western social and economic concepts with its emphasis on 
‘efficiency’ has failed to produce the anticipated benefits. As a result the ‘effectiveness’
of the state structures continues to decline. Here I use these terms to mean that 
‘efficiency relates to the time and resources required to produce a given outcome; 
effectiveness relates to the appropriateness of efforts undertaken to the production of 
desired outcomes.’ The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) refers to 
effectiveness in that it ‘requires competence; sensitivity and responsiveness to specific, 
concrete, human concerns; and the ability to articulate these concerns, formulate goals 
to address them and develop and implement strategies to realise these goals.’3 While 
efficiency may be considered relevant in assessing these programs the focus here is on 
effectiveness, in terms of national wellbeing and in meeting peoples’ real needs. The 
future development outlook for Melanesia appears bleak, and a major re-appraisal of the 
performance of government institutions is urgently required.
Pacific islands culture is diverse, and the region is most often divided into Polynesia, 
Micronesia and Melanesia. Melanesia is by far the largest major cultural group 
accounting for about 75 percent of the total population embodying great diversity but 
with some shared social characteristics.4 It is generally recognised that the countries of 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and the Fiji 
Islands constitute Melanesia. The focus of my research is primarily on PNG as a case 
study, but its experience should be applicable to other Pacific Island countries.
The economy of Melanesia has been well researched over recent years, but the 
relationship between its economic development strategies, and political and institutional 
processes, is less well understood. Overall, despite its abundant natural resources, and 
low level of absolute poverty, it has failed to establish itself on the path to long-term 
sustainable development. Unfortunately the Pacific’s experience with structural 
adjustment and institutional strengthening is fairly recent; hence there is a lack of data 
on the actual economic and social impacts, and the outcomes. PNG has been the subject 
of a World Bank and International Monetary Fund (World Bank-IMF) Structural 
Adjustment Program following an economic crisis during 1994, which, amongst other 
economic effects, produced a 30 percent depreciation of the currency. The Solomon 
Islands Government commenced its own Policy and Structural Reform Program (PSRP) 
with assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the late 1990s. Fiji 
initiated its Economic Reform Program (ERP) following the military coups in 1987; the
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subsequent balance of payments problems, and the program, share many similarities 
with programs initiated by the World Bank-IMF. In 1998 Vanuatu initiated its 
Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP) also with support from the ADB. Each of these 
programs has had its particular degree of country ownership. PNG has previously 
embarked on reform programs (for example the Structural Adjustment Program of the 
early 1990s, following the closure of the Bougainville Copper Mine, and the adjustment 
measures during the 1981 reform program) but rarely has it been able to effectively 
achieve the desired outcomes. The Fiji Government continues to reaffirm its 
commitment to the Economic Reform Program, but ‘it can be argued that the 
performance of Fiji’s economy between 1989 and 1992 demonstrated some fundamental 
strategic weaknesses that adjustment did nothing to address.’3 The Solomon Island’s 
reform program came to an abrupt end with the coup in June 2000.
The Melanesian countries generally have had limited experience with adjustment and 
reform programs supported by the World Bank-IMF because ‘macroeconomic 
imbalances generated through external and domestic shocks and fiscal laxity have in the 
past been attenuated through aid receipts which the islands are fortunate enough to 
receive in relative abundance.’0 This situation has changed significantly as the 
traditional aid donors trim back their bilateral aid programs in the region.7 Dependence 
on conditional overseas multilateral aid funding (mostly in the form of loans) is 
increasing in the Melanesian countries, whether it is from the World Bank, the IMF, or 
the ADB. These loans have come with ever increasing requirements, and to a large 
extent it appears that economic and social policy is now being decided by these 
international lenders, rather than by the recipient governments. This may undermine the 
economic and social policy priorities preferred by national governments.
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP’s) are defined here as those programs which 
relate to the policy of tying aid to reforms in domestic economic and social policy. 
Development aid has been traditionally based on a premise that developing countries do 
not grow because they lack financial resources; however the structural adjustment 
programs traditionally provide substantial payments from the lending institutions on 
condition that the recipient governments undertake some specific domestic, economic, 
and financial policy reforms.
Early structural adjustment programs focussed on the goods-producing sectors of 
agriculture and industry. Subsequently programs were expanded to deal with more 
complex issues in the social sectors, such as education, health, water supply, food 
security and subsidies. Most recently, during the 1990s, structural adjustment programs 
have been further broadened to include institutional reforms, and there seems to be 
general agreement on ‘the proposition that the nature and performance of public sector 
organisations are critical elements in determining developmental success.’ Both the 
World Bank and the IMF have now developed guidelines regarding ‘good governance’ 
issues based on the assumption that ‘reducing the size of the state and restricting the 
operations of the state would bring considerable savings. Programmes to increase 
bureaucratic capacity and efficiency and to encourage private sector growth through 
market mechanisms would then ensure that development would take place.’9 
Institutional strengthening was seen as ‘the process of improving an institution’s ability 
to make effective use of the human and financial resources available.’10 However 
‘effectiveness’ has been used interchangeably with ‘efficiency’.
The New Public Management (NPM), based on the latest principles in private sector 
management was transferred and the dissemination of this model to developing 
countries was undertaken by influential multilateral financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF. An important component of the focus on good governance is the 
‘institutional strengthening’ of key government agencies. Differences in the 
performance of public sector organisations are usually obvious and it is generally 
recognised that they have clear effects on development. However, what might explain 
those differences? The ‘New Institutionalism’ in economics and political science has 
emphasised the importance of formal and informal rules, but are there ‘universal rules’ 
for effective organisations?
Historically, the Melanesian countries have been the recipients of substantial aid flows, 
but overall their recent economic growth performance has been poor. For example, Fiji 
has achieved an average annual growth rate of a little over 1 per cent per annum since 
independence in 1970.11 Partly as a result of the overall failure of traditional bilateral 
aid, assistance to the Melanesian countries is being increasingly tied to domestic
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reforms. There is now a view that The manifest lack of enthusiasm for policy reform in
the islands is a function of the level of aid flows into the region. Aid underwrites the
external sectors, and finances the bulk of capital budget expenditures in the island
economies. There is still, even now, an expectation in these countries that aid receipts
will continue to grow in real terms, certainly in the medium term. It is often argued that
that this comfortable scenario enabled island governments to postpone or avoid much-
12needed policies for adjustment and reform.
1.2. Justification for the research
Some Western policy advisers have speculated about the powerful ways in which 
sociopolitical and cultural factors can impact on development in the Melanesian 
countries. In particular culture is most often referred to in a negative way to portray 
elements of traditions that are harmful to the practice of good public sector 
management. The effectiveness of the traditional structural adjustment program is 
very much dependent upon the effectiveness of the public policy agencies within the 
implementing government. This is now recognised with the introduction of institutional 
strengthening. However, generally, institutional strengthening projects focus on the 
process of increasing the ‘capacity of institutions to perform their functions.’14 
Institutional strengthening is very much about capacity building and organisational 
structure, but how transferable are institutions? Will an ‘effective’ organisation in a 
particular economic and sociopolitical context necessarily produce the same outcomes 
in a different context? A key issue that needs to be addressed is whether it is realistic to 
model institutions in these Melanesian countries along the same lines as similar 
institutions in the developed ‘western’ economies and
although the air-conditioned, high rise accommodation of public service 
agencies in some developing countries may appear to divorce them from society, 
organizations are not closed technical systems. They are necessarily involved in 
multiple relationships with other organizations and individuals. Complex webs 
of relationships are thus woven and have profound effects on the operation o f 
organizations.15
There is evidence of an inherent incompatibility between the World Bank-IMF
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development model (a model which incorporates the market economy characteristic of 
the advanced western economies) and the circumstances of these Melanesian countries. 
The traditional economic systems of Pacific Island countries are extremely diverse; they 
are for a very large part built upon non-market transactions such as redistribution and 
reciprocal exchange. In particular the social relationships of kinship, rank and 
community are primary and the flow of goods and services are often merely part of 
these complex relationships. 16 It is often argued that the prospects for effective 
government depends on the level of economic and financial resources, but it is also 
clear those cultural and social factors affect the performance of institutions. The 
question of why some countries are more successful than others in managing to develop 
their economies, and establish democratic government is still a pressing puzzle, which 
decades of exercises in cross-country econometric analysis has not been able to solve. 
It is apparent that the issue is not the amount of sheer resources pumped into a country, 
but the existence of certain conditions for resources to be channelled effectively into
17priority goals.
Robert Putnam in Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy provides
an array of evidence from his Italian analysis to argue that good governments were
found where civil society was most developed. Those regions without this 'social
capital’ - in his study, the regions of Southern Italy (with a few exceptions) - could do
little about it, and ‘some regions of Italy, we discover, are blessed with vibrant networks
and norms of civic engagement, while others are cursed with vertically structured
politics, a social life of fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of distrust. These
18differences in civic life turn out to play a key role in explaining institutional success.’ 
Putnam seeks to identify the factors, which account for the differences in performance, 
and to ‘explore the connection between economic modernity and institutional 
performance. Even more important, we examine the link between performance and the 
character of civic life - what we term ‘the civic community’. As depicted in 
Tocqueville’s classic interpretation of American democracy and other accounts of civic 
virtue, the civic community is marked by an active, public - spirited citizenry, by 
egalitarian political relations, by a social fabric of trust and cooperation. ’ 19 Putnam 
identifies three possible reasons for explaining government performance - institutional 
design, socioeconomic factors and socio-cultural factors. Although he found a general
6
association between performance and socioeconomic factors, his major finding was that 
socio-cultural factors seemed the most important explanation for government 
performance.
In recent years political scientists have begun referring to society’s confidence in its 
institutions as the stock of ‘social capital’. UNDP now recognises the importance of 
social capital and defines it in terms of the ‘features of social organisation - such as 
networks and values, including tolerance, inclusion, reciprocity, participation and trust - 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Social capital inheres in 
the relations between and among actors. ’20 Similarly the World Bank defines social 
capital as ‘the informal rules, norms and long-term relationships which can explain 
differences in the nature and intensity of popular collective activity in different 
communities or nations.’ Social capital therefore refers to two sets of issues; on the 
one hand to the norms, values and traditions which promote cooperation and on the 
other hand to networks, relationships and organisations that bring people together to try 
to promote development. I adopt the broadest view of social capital, which includes the 
social and political environment that shapes social structure and enables norms to 
develop. Social capital is now generally recognised to be as important as human capital 
and natural resources, and ‘despite limitations of proxy indicators for social capital, the 
patterns of results which emerge point to the importance of cross-cutting ties across 
social groups for engendering co-operation, trust and social and economic well being
99and better government performance.’
More recently it has been recognised that there is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ social capital and the 
role of social capital, as a characteristic of ethnic groups has become a focus. Collective 
ethnic identities can have great social value. Ethnic groups can defend their members’ 
property rights, help members mobilise to build local public works, promote human 
capital by securing investments in education for their members, and help overcome 
obstacles to collective action. In these and other ways ethnic identity can help to build 
trust and social capital between people in a given ethnic group. But it can also 
undermine social capital in society as a whole. Although ethnic identity helps members 
of the same ethnic group work together for common goals, the goals they work toward 
might not be beneficial for society. Rather than encouraging public goods production
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that benefits everybody, groups might instead find themselves in conflict with one 
another for scarce resources. In this way ethnic groups might actually reduce a 
country’s social capital by undermining trust between groups and reducing the
23effectiveness of government institutions.
There has emerged literature investigating social capital as a contributor to economic 
growth in Asia. John Helliwell in Economic Growth and Social Capital in Asia 
undertakes a preliminary investigation of the role of social capital and institutions.24 
However the various measures of social capital and institutional quality tested were not 
found to add explanatory power. Helliwell suggests this is because of the shortage of 
comparable data for the Asian economies. In contrast Stiglitz in Some Lessons from the 
East Asian Miracle attributes the high economic growth rates in the East Asian 
economies, relative to other parts of the world, to particular government policies which 
“provided an enabling environment, characterized by institutional arrangements and 
organizational designs that enhanced efficiency, exchange of information and 
cooperation between government and industry... (This case) displays an aspect of social 
capital and its contribution to economic growth.”25
Tendier shows that civil society is not an unmitigated good. She found in her study that 
important fractions of it perpetuated poor government, while others were pressuring 
effectively for better government. When local civil society played a role in bringing 
about better government, it was sometimes because central government had made it 
possible for alliances to form across the government -  civil society divide. This enabled 
reformist fractions of civil society to unite with reformist fractions within government, 
sometimes at both the local and central levels. Overall Tendler’s research reveals that 
civil society organisations can play an important role in improving the performance of 
local government.
Therefore it can be seen that ‘several influential studies have focused on social capital 
as a central element in social problem-solving, but suggest its roots are buried in 
centuries of cultural evolution (e.g. Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). Other 
investigators suggest that social capital can be created to support political and 
economic development (e.g. Tendier and Freedheim, 1994; Fox, 1994).’27 This is a
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critical point that will be returned to in the concluding chapter. Clearly there are 
sociopolitical and cultural factors, which influence government policy decision making, 
and in my view the Melanesian countries are characterised by sets of beliefs, and 
customs, which render conventional economic analysis not necessarily applicable. 
Generally the cultural factors have been regarded as a hindrance to development but this 
view ‘tends to lead to either a fatalism that nothing can be done against such an
overwhelming force or that the removal of the cultural obstacle will necessarily lead to
28improved performance.’
The specific aim of this research is therefore to evaluate the usefulness, or not, o f the 
concepts of civil society and social capital in explaining the performance of government 
institutions in PNG.
1.3. Overview of the Study
To achieve the above aim, in this study the role, if any, of civil society and social capital 
in determining the performance of government institutions in Papua New Guinea is 
investigated. This introduces the concept of political culture or the set of political 
beliefs and values that prevail in a society at any given time. Political culture can be a 
major determinant on the performance of government institutions because ‘those who 
have studied the problems of development have stressed that no political system can 
survive unless a certain harmony exists between the political practices, the rules of the 
game, on the one hand, and what people expect, what they recognize as legitimate, on 
the other.’ It can be argued that the prevailing cultural values and practices have 
influenced the functioning of the PNG political system.
A detailed explanation of the research design is provided in Chapter 5; however in 
undertaking this research the following approach is adopted:
• A thorough study is undertaken of the literature on the explanations for government 
performance with a particular focus on Melanesia and PNG;
• Case studies of three selected provinces are undertaken to investigate any significant 
relationship between civil society, social capital, government performance, and 
development; and
• A quantitative analysis is undertaken of the data across all nineteen provinces to 
replicate the Putnam methodology, and to analyse the relationships.
A model is therefore needed by which the evidence may be tested, to establish the 
extent to which the stock of social capital may be an important determinant of 
provincial government performance. To compare combinations of causes, the same 
general questions must be addressed in each case, the same concepts used and a similar 
methodology, with appropriate measures adapted to local circumstances.
The relationships between social capital, ethnicity, government performance and 
development are complicated and likely to be reciprocal. The starting point is a 
simplified model to help to illustrate the relationships. Causation is difficult to identify 
and the flows may in fact go in both directions. The relationship may be -  from social 
capital through performance to development or from social capital directly to 
development. Furthermore there are influences from ethnicity and from the political 
system. Figure 1, below, illustrates these possible relationships which are the subject of 
this study.
I have chosen to use a combined quantitative and qualitative research design because 
my case study analysis is focusing on real-life situations, and embedded in a particular 
social and political context. In my research selected provinces are used as case studies 
to qualitatively investigate the roles of civil society and social capital as they may relate 
to provincial government performance. The context for the case studies is the 2002 
National Elections in PNG, and the supplementary elections held in the Southern 
Highlands subsequently in early 2003. The reason for this is that the electoral contest in 
PNG provides a very good environment for observing social capital in the respective 
provinces.
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FIGURE 1
Social Capital and Development
Ethnicity
Social Capital Development
Political System
Provincial Government Performance
The 2002 Elections have been widely recognised as the most violent since PNG gained 
independence in 1975. The Government was reluctantly forced to call in armed troops 
for election security duty in the Highlands after the police were overwhelmed by 
politically inspired violence. By the close of polling around sixteen people died as a 
direct result of poll related violence. In the Southern Highlands tribesman stole ballot 
boxes, and in Enga ballot boxes were set alight. Supporters of a loosing candidate led a 
rampage at the Mount Hagen airport. The elections were extended by two weeks as 
tribal tensions rose, and finally the elections were abandoned in most parts of the 
Southern Highlands. Throughout the Highlands tribes turned to cheating and violence 
to boost the election chances of there own clansman. For example, in Simbu Province 
Standish writes how
candidates seek to ensure the unity of their clan or tribe, emphasising traditions 
of unity in peace and war. Since the first council votes in 1959 Simbu has had 
“haus lain ” (village or clan) consensus based voting, in effect a clan-based pre­
selection or pre-poll. Often in the past -  when there were slightly fewer 
candidates -  Simbu people have presented over 90 percent voting solidarity in 
ballot boxes. That means that at least 90 percent of all those in each polling 
place, men and women (and some children!), vote for the same candidate. Such 
block voting is an assertion of a clan’s strength, but it restricts the freedom of 
choice of all, especially the married women -  who were bom into different 
clans.31
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Chapters 6, 7 and 8 replicate Putnam’s methodology in the context of provincial 
government in PNG. The available data at the provincial level are discussed, and some 
preliminary quantitative analysis of the relationship between social capital (the 
independent variable) and provincial performance (the dependent variable) is given. 
Statistically, the way in which we account for variance in a dependent variable (i.e. 
government performance) is to identify the independent variables to which it is related. 
Therefore a group of independent and continuous variables have been selected for this 
purpose, and correlation analysis is used here to describe the strength and direction (if 
any) of the linear relationship between two or more variables. Basically a simple 
correlation between two continuous variables, and therefore the Pearson product- 
moment correlation shows the direction and strength of relationships. Pearson 
correlation coefficients (r) can only take on values from -1 to +1. The sign at the front 
indicates whether there is a positive correlation (as one variable increases, so too does 
the other) or a negative correlation (as one variable increases, the other decreases). The 
size of the absolute value (ignoring the sign) provides an indication of the strength of 
the relationship. A perfect correlation of 1 or -1 indicates that the value of one variable 
can be determined exactly by knowing the value of the other variable. On the other 
hand a correlation of 0 indicates no relationship between the two variables.
Chapter 1 has introduced the research problem and explained why research on 
understanding the performance of government institutions in the Pacific Island countries 
is important. Chapter 2 provides the overall background to the problem by describing 
the traditional forms of governance in Melanesia, and the role of ethnic identities. The 
fairly recent advent of the ideas of governance and ‘institutional strengthening’ for 
development are discussed. Chapter 3 discusses the performance of governments in 
PNG, and with a particular focus on provincial government. Policies to improve the 
performance of government institutions are also discussed i.e. public sector reform. The 
importance of civil society and society’s stock of social capital as a possible explanation 
for the performance of government institutions is the focus of Chapter 4. Here I discuss 
the concept of civil society and nature of social capital, the overall theory, and introduce 
the PNG context. Chapter 4 describes the research methodologies that may be 
applicable to analysing the relationship between social capital and government
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performance, while Chapter 5 explains the approach in this study. Chapter 6 provides a 
qualitative study of the three selected provinces. In Chapter 7 the Putnam methodology 
is replicated in the context of provinces in PNG to test if social capital may explain 
some of the reasons for their development performance. If the performance of 
government institutions depends on the strength of social capital (i.e. Putnam) how does 
ethnicity impact on social capital in PNG? To what extent are other factors, such as the 
political process impacting on social capital? How is social capital different in PNG to 
the ‘modem’ nation-state? These questions are the subject of Chapter 8. Finally 
Chapter 9 discusses the results and examines the implications of the study for the 
theory, policy and practice.
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CHAPTER 2
GOVERNANCE, ETHNICITY AND THE NATION STATE
From early colonial days central government, an imposed concept in the Melanesian context, was 
regarded as a foreign enclave, the legitimacy of which was sustained more by the weight of metropolitan 
backing and sanctions than by village need for a national authority. ’32
2.1. Introduction
The issue of governance came to prominence in development studies and policy in the 
late 1980s, after a realisation that inefficient administration, and poor quality public 
policy, was major contributing factors in the failure in a significant number of 
developing countries to achieve long term sustainable development.33 As a response in 
most cases structural adjustment programs now seek to ‘strengthen’ good governance in 
the recipient countries. The World Bank’s definition of ‘governance’ includes public 
sector management, accountability, the legal framework and transparency in 
government decision making.34 Governance is similarly defined by the UNDP as ‘the 
exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s 
affairs at all levels, comprising the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through 
which that authority is directed. Good Governance is, among other things,
o r
participatory, transparent, accountable, and efficient.’ The essential elements of good 
governance as agreed by most donor organisations may be given as:
• a capacity within government to establish appropriate policies with an efficient, and 
accountable public administration to carry them out;
• democratisation and participatory development; and
• respect for human rights and the rule of law.
An important component of this focus on good governance is the ‘institutional 
strengthening’ of key government agencies. A review and analysis of the experiences 
with the first generation of structural adjustment programs in countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa drew attention to the central importance of the capacity (primarily institutional
'Xfxcapacity) in a country to manage development on a sustainable basis. However a
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recent World Bank report found that the Bank had been mostly ineffective in pursuing 
reforms of government institutions.37 The study looked at a sample of 124 loans 
approved in 32 client countries, as well as economic and sectors work from a sample of 
11 countries, over the 1980-97 period. The results showed that only 33 per cent of 
completed interventions and 38 per cent of ongoing efforts achieved satisfactory 
outcomes and that these outcomes were often not sustainable. The study makes some 
recommendations to improve the Bank’s performance in supporting institutional reform:
• develop a system of categorising interventions into three classes based on their 
primary objective (i.e. downsizing, capacity building or institutional reform) and 
standardise performance indicators in order to monitor impact;
• link capacity building interventions to job descriptions and monitorable performance 
of civil servants and their respective units;
• precede interventions with institutional assessments of administrative systems and 
design interventions as stand-alone projects, supporting them with lending 
instruments that allow adequate time for implementation;
• employ participatory processes to nurture reform constituencies in government, the 
private sector and civil society;
• use ongoing evaluations of civil service reform supported by other multilateral and 
bilateral donors as a basis to more clearly define the World Bank’s strategic role; 
and
• explore the feasibility of promoting results-based management by supporting 
comprehensive civil service reforms in several pilot countries.
Of particular importance in the above recommendations was the recognition that the 
process needed to include the participation of civil society. Although aspects of 
institutional strengthening had been already incorporated into a broad range of projects 
after this time they became a particular focus. Consultancy reports regularly
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recommend the restructuring of government, the strengthening of old institutions, or the
T O
introduction of new ones. For example Mick Moore's report on institution building 
‘identifies a shift in thinking about development, from the idea that what developing 
countries lacked was capital, to the idea that what they lacked was the right policy 
environment that would encourage public sector efficiency, and private sector 
investment.’ The thrust of this approach is explained in terms of the “vital linkages” 
between governance, sustainable development and civil and political rights. It is now 
frequently argued that good governance creates the environment in which civil and 
political rights are respected and promoted. At the same time it is also seen that the 
exercise of civil and political rights through participatory processes is essential to the 
achievement of sustainable development because it helps to ensure government 
accountability and effectiveness. However it is argued that developing countries often 
lack the institutional capacities and resources, in both government and civil society, to 
ensure that these important linkages are made and maintained.40
The focus of this chapter is firstly on the traditional forms of governance which 
characterise Melanesian society, and secondly discusses the most common approaches 
to establishing ‘good’ governance and strengthening government institutions. The 
primary purpose of the discussion is to consider the appropriateness of these approaches 
for the PNG context. The question is asked are these policies and strategies likely to 
promote sustainable institutions and hence sustainable development in Melanesian 
countries?
2.2. Ethnicity and the Nation-State in Melanesia
Most research on governance in Melanesia has been concerned with the shortcomings of 
government. In the case of PNG most writing has been ‘more concerned with ideas 
about, the state, its capacity, role in the economy, inability to provide law and order, and 
irrelevance to indigenous ‘stateless’ political traditions. ’41 The approaches taken have 
been essentially an analysis of how the ‘Western Model’ should function rather than 
questioning the applicability of the model imposed, but ‘Melanesian societies were 
famously stateless, maintaining order within themselves. According to the political 
theorist Michael Taylor, who investigated the empirical conditions for anarchy by 
reading Melanesian anthropology, these societies maintained internal order by a mixture
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of face to face interactions, multistranded relationships, common norms and values, self 
help retaliation and gossip, shaming and supernatural sanctions/ 42
Generally, Melanesian cultures are still very much alive today in terms of influencing 
societies governing systems, and it is sometimes argued that this influence is growing. 
Especially in Melanesia, traditional communities remain highly cohesive, with 
widespread kin-based ownership of land, and a quite strong community spirit. 
However,
in places where the colonial powers willingly accepted decolonization, it was not 
always obvious where the boundaries of the emerging political entities should be 
drawn. In the Pacific, as elsewhere in the colonized world, the more or less 
arbitrary borders established by the colonial powers tended to endure, even 
though they seldom reflected any strong internal sense of community. The 
Melanesian entities of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, 
were the most problematic in this respect, each embracing literally hundreds of 
separate cultural and linguistic communities that had little or nothing to do with 
each other until the time of independence.43
The idea of the nation state is an introduced concept in these societies. It is generally 
acknowledged that a 'nation’ consists of a people, sharing a common language (or 
dialects of a common language), inhabiting a fixed territory, with common customs and 
traditions, which may have become sufficiently conscious to take on the aspect o f law 
and who recognise common interests and a common need for a single sovereign. There 
are various views about the origins of the ‘nation-state’. For example some researchers 
consider that the nation state is the result of the rise of industrialisation, for others it is 
the manifestation of ethnicity, the diffusion of European ideology, the advancement of 
technology, or the need of the capitalist state to insure internal cohesion.44 Anthony 
Smith argues that
while we can no longer regard the nation as a given of social existence, a 
‘primordial’ and natural unit of human association outside time, neither can we 
accept that it is wholly a modem phenomenon, be it the ‘nervous tic of 
capitalism’, or the necessary form and culture of an industrial society. While the 
revolutions of industrial capitalism, the bureaucratic state and secular mass- 
education represent a watershed in human history comparable to the Neolithic 
transition, they have not obliterated or rendered obsolete many of the cultures 
and identities formed in pre-modem eras.45
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Anthony Smith therefore argues that the modem nation state is still a product of 
traditional societies, and in these societies ethnicity has had a particularly important 
role. There are essentially two main ways in which the term “'ethnicity” may be 
understood. The first and narrowest meaning attached to ethnicity is in terms of racial 
or language groups. The second and much wider meaning equates ethnicity with 
ascriptive group identities such as race, language, religion, tribe, caste etc .46 Anthony 
Smith defines ethnic communities as 'named human populations with shared ancestry 
myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense 
of solidarity. ’47 Smith places particular emphasis on the role of common history -  real, 
blending into the mythic -  in the development of ethnic sentiment. In particular his 
earlier work on “ethnic revivals” emphasised the construction of ethnicity and the role 
of nationalist intellectuals in researching and reconstructing folk tradition.
Alternatively Lijphart argues that an ethnic group can be defined as a group of people 
who see themselves as a distinct cultural community. This community will most often 
share a 'common language, religion, kinship, and/or physical characteristics (such as 
skin color); and who tend to harbor negative and hostile feelings towards members of 
other groups.40 Esman, on the other hand, uses a narrower definition of ethnic identity 
that denotes a community that claims common origins possesses distinctive and valued 
cultural markers such as customs, dress and, especially, language, and that expects to 
share a common destiny.50 Reilly believes that ‘this definition may be more applicable 
to PNG, where groups are divided less on overt ascriptive criteria such as race or 
religion than on kinship, language, and region. ’ 51 In Ghai’s view ethnicity is a broad 
concept ‘covering a variety of factors which distinguish one group of people from 
others. Important contemporary distinctions are language, race, religion and colour. 
When these markers cease to be mere means of social distinctions, and become the basis 
of political identity and claims to a specific role in the political process or power, ethnic 
distinctions are transformed into ethnicity. ’52 He shows how there is now considerable 
literature on why and how the transformation takes place - varying from theories of 
primordialism and socio-biology to the deliberate mobilisation and manipulation of 
differences for political and economic reasons.
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Despite this broad range of views it is generally recognised that ethnic groups and 
ethnic minorities exist by virtue of long-standing association across generations, 
complex relations of kinship, common culture and usually religious uniformity and 
common territorial attachments. For the most part Papua New Guineans define their 
ethnicity in terms of kinship, language and sometimes their region. Ethnicity can also 
be analytically conceived to contain two dimensions: objective and subjective.
It is the subjective factor, the beliefs of group members that serve the critical 
function of establishing group identity, uniqueness and boundaries. Most groups 
in competition or conflict with others develop collective ethnic consciousness. 
Despite ethnic group loyalties, ethnic group boundaries are notoriously unstable 
and tend to change and be manipulated over time and even situationally. In 
PNG, all persons are carriers of multiple ethnic identities.54
The population of PNG speaks more than eight hundred languages and live in small- 
scale, decentralised communities. Members of PNG society were bound for the most 
part by kinship connections, a common language and communal landholdings. As a 
result Premdas argues that ‘the PNG government faces formidable difficulties of 
disunity, much of it derived from its ethnolinguistic and ethnoregional fragmentation. ’55 
However ethnic identity in PNG seems to be a mixture of “primordial” and 
“constructed” factors.5̂  Many analyses of ethnicity in PNG emphasise the extent to 
which ethnic identities are both a salient feature of traditional society and a reaction to 
colonialism, modernisation and independence. However, the position of many 
researchers is that ethnicity is not primordial, in the sense that the emotive power of
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ethnic distinctions inevitably leads to political conflict and demands. It can be seen 
that the importance of ethnicity may vary over time as a result of a number of political, 
social and economic factors, but a particularly important factor is the nature of the 
government institutions. In particular many studies show that ‘identities may also be 
forced upon the people by the state. The colonial experience provides many examples 
of how the formation of identities was facilitated by the way in which the government
co
drew administrative boundaries or categorised people.’ In the case of PNG it appears 
that ethnicity is primarily constructed.
The role of the state in PNG for creating ethnic identities has been important because 
for countries such as PNG ‘the transition from a colonial state to a nation-state is far
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from culturally neutral. The nation-state as a political form is quite inseparable from 
Western culture and capitalism became the concept, “nation state”, is fundamentally 
founded on Western notions of the relationships among the individual, state, and civil 
society.’54 In PNG the colonial experience provided for the formation of ethnic 
identities as a result of the way in which administrative boundaries were established by 
the colonial government. Questions of ethnicity, as distinct from race, frequently arise 
in discussions about local and provincial government boundaries. Papua New Guinea’s 
nineteen provinces are based on colonial administrative districts that did not necessarily 
correspond to pre-existing political, cultural, or linguistic divisions.60 In PNG an ethnic 
map has emerged around artificial administrative boundaries and
large numbers of Papua New Guineans were caught up in this radical 
transformation process that would modify and recast their ethnic and class 
identities. From a simple traditional society, a complex and highly differentiated 
social and economic order had emerged. Ethnic claims to new identities, 
malleable and improvised became pervasive, serving as defence mechanisms 
and stabilisers in a turbulently changing world. The ethnic dimension emerged 
as a salient prism through which most development efforts were interpreted and 
directed. In some instances, the ethnic factor became a formidable force in 
defining national issues and allocating scarce resources.61
Given its social order it is almost inevitable that economic, political and social change 
will disrupt the traditional patterns of power relations and cause conflict in a society 
such as PNG.
2.3. Governance and Institutional Strengthening
As explained earlier the issue of governance came to prominence in development 
studies and policy in the late 1980s, after a realisation that inefficient administration, 
and poor quality public policy, was major contributing factors in the failure in a 
significant number of developing countries to achieve long term sustainable 
development. In particular also an important component of this focus on good 
governance is the ‘institutional strengthening’ of key government agencies because of 
the belief of the proponents of good governance that the design of institutions makes a 
difference for development.
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Firstly, what do we mean by institutions in this context? In its broadest meaning 
institutions may refer to a ‘network of structures, procedures and shared values within a 
social system, of a relatively permanent nature, which is concerned with some social 
function or group of functions.’63 Douglas North describes institutions as ‘the rules of 
the game in a society or, more formally, (as) the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, 
whether political, social, or economic.’64 Sometimes institutions are divided into four 
general types, namely: political; economic; cultural and kinship. There are also some 
generally recognised important features of institutions including: they may contain 
‘members’, but are not identical with any member; they have independent agency; they 
may endure beyond the life of any particular member; and they manifest their existence 
through the intentional acts of their members.65 There are therefore an enormous 
number of ‘institutions’ in any society and in this study we are interested in both formal 
and informal institutions. A crucial distinction is also made between institutions and 
organisations in North’s work, and he argues that like institutions,
organizations provide a structure to human interaction. Indeed when we 
examine the costs that arise as a consequence of the institutional framework we 
see they are a result not only of that framework, but also of the organisations that 
have developed in consequence of that framework... Organizations include 
political bodies (political parties, the Senate, a city council, a regulatory agency), 
economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social bodies 
(churches, clubs, athletic associations), and education bodies (schools, 
universities, vocational training centres). They are groups of individuals bound 
by some common purpose to achieve objectives. Modeling organizations is 
analyzing governance structures, skills, and how learning by doing will 
determine the organization’s success over time. Both what organizations come 
into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the 
institutional framework.66
The focus of my research is broader than mere ‘organisational performance’; rather I 
focus on the interactions between institutions and organisational performance. North 
argues that ‘institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence 
is the key to understanding historical change.’ In Chapter 3 I consider social change 
and institutions, and in particular how institutions have evolved over time in PNG. The 
huge cultural diversity which characterises PNG is recognised, and ‘the difficulty in 
generalising about society in New Guinea applies throughout the area loosely referred to
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as Melanesia. It is perhaps easier to say what Melanesians do not have, in contrast with 
the world which impinges on them, than what they have in common.’68 However PNG 
has been characterised as basically a stateless society in which the imposition of 
Western style institutions has had a profound impact. The modifications to the 
traditional political system have been particularly disturbing because the dominated 
polity was stateless, as it was everywhere in Melanesia.69
Why is it important to consider institutional change in PNG? Experience over the past 
quarter of a century ‘confirms that sustainability of development projects has been 
affected by weak institutions and inadequate management capabilities. There is strong 
evidence that institutional and managerial problems have had a pervasive impact on 
project implementation despite continuing efforts by multilateral and bilateral agencies 
to provide enhanced support to strengthening institutional capacities in developing 
countries.’70 As a result of this recognition aid donors have invested in ‘institutionally 
strengthening’ government organisations with the intention of more effectively using 
aid funds and delivering government services. However, generally the results of this 
approach have been very disappointing.
In PNG concern with the appropriateness, efficiency, and effectiveness of public 
administration was first expressed in the ToRobert Report 1979 and then in a 1983 
World Bank overview of public administration in PNG, and ‘further initiatives followed 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s such as the UN -  backed Resource Management 
System and the World Bank -  supported Public Sector Training Project. Neither proved 
successful.’ Turner concludes that ‘the organizational structures in the public sector in 
Papua New Guinea have been major impediments to development. Organisations have 
been typically characterized by structures that are ideally bureaucratic in nature but 
which are highly dysfunctional versions of the ideal type. They are concerned with 
control over functional areas and with internal matters. They do not encourage focus on 
results and outcomes, or on the efficient pursuit of routine tasks.’ 72
Why is public sector management reform important? There are a number of reasons but 
one reason is that institutional change (i.e. which is the primary purpose of public sector 
reform) is
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a complicated process because the changes at the margin can be a consequence 
of changes in rules, in informal constraints, and in kinds and effectiveness of 
enforcement. Moreover North argues that institutions typically change 
incrementally rather than in discontinuous fashion. How and why they change 
incrementally and why even discontinuous changes (such as revolution and 
conquest) are never completely discontinuous is a result of the imbededdness of 
informal constraints in societies. Although formal rules may change overnight 
as the result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to 
deliberate policies. North believes that these cultural constraints not only 
connect the past with the present and future, but also provide us with a key to
73explaining the path of historical change.
Of the many issues deriving from the good governance discussions there are two that 
are particularly relevant for understanding the approaches that have been used applied in 
PNG. The first is that in both its political and technical forms, good governance places 
improved public sector management as a key developmental goal for donors. Secondly, 
although there are some differences in the detail, the major donors are agreed that what 
developing countries must do to improve public sector management is to sweep away 
the traditional public administration paradigm that underpins their bureaucracies and 
introduce the New Public Management (NPM).74 However ‘introducing the minimalist 
notion of the state in many developing countries may have been helpful in addressing 
problems of overcentralised decision making, inappropriate incentives for public 
enterprises and distorted markets, it failed to give enough attention to the need for 
capable states if markets are to operate effectively and efficiently.’75 Shick argues that 
having an established ‘formal’ public sector is an essential precondition for adopting 
elements of the NPM model. In other words, the less suitable the NPM model is if the 
country’s management practices are not highly developed. He shows that in New 
Zealand formal contracts and internal markets were feasible because the country had a 
robust market sector and established mechanisms for enforcing contracts - conditions 
that are often absent in developing countries. Instead most developing countries tend to 
have an informal economy with relatively weak specification of property rights and
76other formal processes (and institutions) to regulate economic activity.
During the 1990s an Expert Group on Aid Evaluation established by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) undertook a study for the Organisation for Economic Co-
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operation and Development (OECD). The study’s purpose was to synthesise the 
experiences of donor agencies in achieving good governance objectives in five theme 
areas (i.e. legal systems, public sector management, decentralisation, human rights and 
participation) analysing which intervention approaches and strategies worked well and 
which did not in different country contexts. The study found that there is an emerging 
consensus among donors, and in the literature, regarding which approaches to 
institutional strengthening are the most successful. The following are the main
78recommendations of the DAC study on IS.
• Avoid simplistic, supply-sided approaches that inject technical assistance, training, 
and equipment as the sole solution. Instead, apply a demand-oriented approach that 
emphasises locating and encouraging stakeholders who have an interest in the 
organisation, and who place on its performance demands, pressures and discipline.
• Evidence suggests that organisational performance be also improved by factors such 
as high-specificity of the task (i.e. clear and focused objectives); built-in 
performance incentives and sanctions against poor performance; and increased 
competition between and within organisations.
• It is important to understand the country-context. Many of the factors influencing 
organisational performance are situation-specific, and lack ‘blueprints’ and 
predictable patterns. Thus more emphasis is needed on country-oriented analysis.
• Support networks of organisations, promote pluralism and co-operation. Involve 
different types of organisations, which can contribute in a complementary way to 
the overall goal of an intervention.
• Recipient commitment and ‘ownership’ is a key factor influencing the success of 
institutional strengthening efforts. Therefore it needs to be carefully assessed. In 
some cases, lack of commitment may be an immutable constraint, and institutional 
development should not be promoted.
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• Use existing institutions wherever possible, and avoid the temptation to establish 
parallel 'project management units’ if the aim is institutional development. 
Experience indicates that while establishing PMUs may enable faster project 
implementation than if existing bureaucratic structures are used, they usually do not 
provide a sound basis for long-term institutional development or for sustainability of 
project activities after donor involvement ends
Turner explains that generally institutional strengthening with a public sector focus 
looks to make the state work better through innovation in management. It potentially 
involves a wide range of activities including: organizational structures and processes, 
management information systems, monitoring and evaluation systems, accountability, 
performance measurement, planning, staffing and personnel policies, staff training, 
organizational culture, financial performance, participatory mechanisms and inter­
agency relations.79 A serious problem has arisen, however ‘in attempting to address the 
dual objectives of satisfying the needs of structural adjustment programs on the one 
hand and those of institutional capacity building on the other. Reductions in public 
expenditure have inevitably focused on reducing the cost of the civil service including 
salary costs. Yet, the changing role of the state and with it the changed functions of the
SOcivil service has increased the need to strengthen policy management capacity.”
However despite the incomplete study of experience to date, it is possible to identify
o  1
some elements common to successful reform programs:
• the provision from the top of explicit political support for reform measures;
• a need for clearly defined goals of reform and realistic strategies to achieve these 
goals - the means, the timing and the sequencing of actions;
• a need for an operationally effective implementing agency with sufficient prestige 
and authority as well as the necessary intellectual and technical capacity, to 
formulate and execute the reform program;
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• effective communication among all those affected by or with a contribution to make 
to the process of civil service reform; and
• civil service reform must be ‘owned’ by the national authorities if it is to be 
successful.
To date only fairly limited attempts have been made to evaluate institutional 
strengthening (IS) projects. Major areas that have received little attention in the past 
comprise, among other things, the lack of discussion of the broader administrative 
framework and the macro-economic policy environment that conditions the pace and 
process of development. Also the organisational structure, staffing and leadership 
potential, planning and monitoring capabilities, the level and size of organisational 
controls, including delegation of authority and responsibility, the overall management of 
human and financial resources and inter-institutional linkages have not been 
considered.83 Instead evaluations have focused primarily on technical aspects, and 
criteria that a ‘successful IS project should also start with a simple design which aligns 
country and institutional capacity with realistic time-frames and objectives, allows for 
close monitoring, and will have the flexibility to facilitate adjustment of the projects as 
required.
A successful IS project should include appropriate delivery mechanisms, and careful 
selection criteria plus clear Terms of Reference for technical assistance personnel. ’84 
The evaluations consider only the impacts on ‘stakeholders’ and there has been a 
tendency to view bureaucracies as purely technical instruments of administration. In 
such a model, inefficiency and ineffectiveness are recognised but are ascribed to 
rational capacity problems such as lack of skilled human resources or ‘to the existence
or
of irrational elements grouped under the residual category of culture.’
However too properly evaluate institutional strengthening projects; it is not sufficient to 
focus only on the way in which the project increased the capacity of the institution to 
perform its functions. In particular Turner argues that ‘reformers in the South 
Pacific countries might do better to leave institutions alone (assuming they have 
been well designed) and focus on improving the socioeconomic and sociocultural
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factors that determine their performance. They may be disappointed that the 
changes they make to structures of government have no effect, as they are overwhelmed 
by these underlying factors’. For example
in Papua New Guinea accountability has traditionally focused on ‘regularity' 
where public servants are expected to follow the formal rules and regulations of 
a bureaucratic type of organisation. They should turn up on time, do their work 
in specific ways, and observe the formally prescribed authority pattern. Such an 
ideal has not been evident in much practice although it is clear that 
accountability is largely an internal matter with public servants being 
accountable to superiors and the minister. They are rarely accountable to the 
constituencies that they are supposed to serve and there has been little or no use 
o f ‘performance accountability’ in which effectiveness and goal achievement are 
prominent/ 7
Also it is sometimes suggested that institution building should not be considered a 
priority area of intervention only by the government. The role of non-governmental 
organisations in this regard should be recognised, particularly in developing 
participatory skills and in the decision-making processes affecting beneficiary-oriented 
projects. Civil society organisations may enhance participation by providing 
beneficiaries a mechanism that they ‘own’ and can support sustainability by becoming 
an entity that can continue appropriate functions after project completion.
Colin Jacobs undertook case studies of institutional development projects in Southeast 
by British aid. Jacobs develops three models which look in turn at the relationship 
between the institution and its environment; the relationship between donor and 
recipient; and best practice at each stage of the project cycle. His research found that 
while the project approach incorporates features that are valuable across different 
disciplines and situations, insufficient attention has been given to the processes 
involved. In particular he found that quite often projects were designed by the donor 
without sufficient involvement of the host organisation and other stakeholders. The 
original design was then implemented without adequate review to re-assess progress, 
goals and if necessary change direction. Methodologies were also borrowed from 
engineering and construction projects that which may have served their ends well, but 
have proven too inflexible where changes in human behaviour and organisations are 
required. Therefore he found that despite considerable investment the end results have
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been disappointing.90 Jacob’s emphasis is therefore on the importance of the ‘enabling 
environment' and the need for participation by the recipient of aid. His model 
recognises five key stages: assessment, project design, implementation, local capacity 
building and monitoring and evaluation, and the model proposed is one that must:
• provide an accurate and in depth assessment of a recipient’s capacity to manage a 
project;
• emphasise the need for a shared understanding of the purpose and nature of support 
among the various project stakeholders;
• stress joint implementation which is flexible and allows donors and recipients to 
raise awareness, clarify ownership, commitment and leadership;
• encourage recipients through maximising participation and support, and the use of 
local skills, systems and resources;
• design monitoring and evaluation systems which can keep managers up to date on 
progress and allow timely interventions where necessary; and
• include questions of sustainability by taking into account the needs of the people 
and their ownership of the project; understanding the local social context and 
cultural dimensions of development; the delivery systems and required 
improvements; and, by ensuring sufficient resources are available to at least 
minimise the risk of failure.
In particular Jacob’s found that in his case studies ‘the project design was to varying 
degrees imposed by ODA as a blueprint on recipients who had no obvious role at the 
outset in shaping its outcome. This meant that there was often insufficient commitment 
on the recipient’s side. Neither was there the in-built flexibility to change design, or 
speed up or slow down implementation as required. ’ 91 In Melanesia the social, 
economic, political and cultural contexts in which institutional strengthening have been 
undertaken differ significantly. A central question is whether the sociopolitical
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culture in a given context is more important than good design or economic/financial 
resources in explaining the performance of institutions, because ‘too many development 
change agents, whether nationals or foreigners, have had a single-image formula for the 
structure of organisations. Some advocated decentralization; others bureaucracy; still 
others structured flexibility. Each of these approaches has advantages but none is 
adequate or even desirable in all situations.’ Also ‘new institutionalist’ varieties of 
economics that underpin some of the ideas of what is called the New Public 
Management, and the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report, are more 
sympathetic to country specificity. Their notion o f ‘path dependency’ means ‘where 
you are’ depends, in part, on ‘how you got there’. History constrains opportunities, and 
opportunities foregone lead individuals, and countries, down divergent paths. The 
implication for ADB, and other donors, is that different solutions will suit the different 
circumstances that have emerged in each country.93
In particular there is a general absence of analytical studies of management issues in the 
Pacific island countries. Most recent studies emphasise human resource development as 
the key issue. The assumption appears to be that improvements in general standards of 
education and training providing increased numbers of trained specialists will overcome 
the problems of public sector management in these countries. While improvements to 
the formal education system; particularly achieving improvements to the overall level of 
education among the population through linking resource allocation to return on 
investment is certainly a partial solution, it is a long term one. It does not address the 
immediate problem.94
Hage and Finsterbusch focus on the organisational forms and managerial technologies 
that are the most effective in developing countries. They examine twelve case studies 
of organisational change in Third World countries in terms of an analytical framework 
that is based on the organisational change literature o f the Western developed 
countries.95 The elements of the analytical framework used by Hage and Finsterbusch 
are:
• Synopsis of the case;
• Performance and output gaps;
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• Environmental context: opportunities and constraints;
• Structural, design and environmental changes;
• Nature of the approach;
• Results; and
• Conclusion.
Hage and Finsterbusch reach the conclusion that Western literature on organisations is 
relevant to developing countries, but which is a conclusion that seems to ignore the 
relevance of the local situation. Furthermore, the need for grassroots participation has 
become almost a matter of faith in development policy and ‘many donors retain faith in 
the idea that the inefficiency of the state apparatus can be compensated for by designing 
community-managed, participatory development projects, and that more effective 
development processes might be achieved by working directly with communities. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence to show that community-managed development 
projects are more efficacious than those managed by the state. ’96 However the evidence 
does suggest that part of the problem of institutional performance does reside in the 
links between the organisations and the local community where services are delivered.97
What can be concluded from the above arguments is that the process of institutional 
development is very complex and there are numerous variables that may determine 
institutional effectiveness. An important element is that effective institutions depend on 
the existence of links with the community and that the nature of these links depends on
the socio-political and cultural context. Rondinelli suggests that successful institutions
98have some important characteristics, namely:
• they must be responsive to diverse problems and conditions found in developing 
countries;
• they must be mutually reinforcing and interlocking in order to stimulate local 
development;
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• they must be built on culturally accepted arrangements, practices, and behaviour. 
Understanding traditional institutions that have served people in developing 
countries for decades or centuries -  their strengths, inadequacies, limitations, and 
potentials for transformation -  is essential for modifying old institutional 
arrangements and introducing new ones;
• while they must be “culturally acceptable” the institutional network must be 
designed to transform traditional practices and behaviour into more suitable 
arrangements for economic growth and equitable income distribution; and
• they must be designed in conjunction with the beneficiaries and open to local 
participation and leadership.
He further argues that there is the need to learn as much as possible about the 
organisation’s culture and its complexities before the commencement of project work. 
Also there is the need to obtain and maintain constant maximum involvement of all 
concerned in the process of change, whilst at the same time allowing on-going normal 
work to continue without disruption. The recipients of the changes should also be given 
as much time as needed to assimilate the new ideas and changes."
2.4. Conclusions
The Melanesian countries (i.e. PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Fiji Islands) 
are each experiencing very similar problems in trying to establish sustainable economic 
growth, despite the fact that each has inherited abundant forests, mineral resources and 
vast ocean resources. Each of these countries has at one time or another embarked on 
structural adjustment programs but rarely have they achieved substantial results. It is 
now recognised that the effectiveness of the traditional structural adjustment is very 
much dependent upon the effectiveness of the public policy agencies within the 
implementing government. For this reason increasingly the focus for multilateral and 
bilateral aid donors is strengthening government institutions. However the results from 
these reform programs are still generally disappointing.
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The idea of the nation state is an introduced concept in Melanesian societies. Anthony 
Smith argues that the modem nation state is still a product o f traditional societies, and in 
these societies ethnicity has had a particularly important role. It is generally recognised 
that ethnic groups and ethnic minorities exist by virtue o f long standing association 
across generations, complex relations o f kinship, common culture and usually religious 
uniformity and common territorial attachments. For the most part Papua New Guineans 
define their ethnicity in terms o f kinship, language and sometimes their region. The 
population o f PNG speaks more than eight hundred languages and live in small-scale, 
decentralised communities. Members o f PNG society were bound for the most part by 
kinship connections, a common language and communal landholdings. Many analyses 
of ethnicity in PNG emphasise the extent to which ethnic identities are both a salient 
feature o f traditional society and a reaction to colonialism, modernisation and 
independence. It can be seen that the importance o f ethnicity may vary over time as a 
result o f a number o f political, social and economic factors, but a particularly important 
factor is the nature o f the government institutions.
The lessons form the experience thus far in institutional development is that successful 
reform requires a strong level of local participation, and needs to be "culturally 
sensitive’. Planners will rarely succeed when they try to impose their schemes on 
communities (or nations) without paying attention to the practices, customs, rules, laws, 
beliefs, values and organisations o f the people to be affected. Any program or policy 
aimed at changing human behaviour, be it participatory development or conservation 
and development requires culturally informed and pragmatic negotiations with political 
and economic interests at the local, regional, national and international levels . 100 
Furthermore there is evidence that the existing institutional capacity is influenced by the 
prevailing institutional culture, which is becoming increasingly subject to political 
pressures and influence, short term agendas o f self interest, and the frustrations o f  
working in an unpredictable environment. 101 This raises the question as to the 
suitability o f the conventional institutional reform program to the Melanesian countries. 
The relationship between intent and outcome can be extremely complex, ambiguous, 
and difficult to unravel in this context. This may explain why researchers on 
governance can become preoccupied with conceptual issues in isolation from how those
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concepts translate, or fail to translate, into reality. In PNG over many years provincial 
government has been the object of the types of capacity building described above, but 
how effective have these reforms been?
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CHAPTER 3
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN PNG
Long before the winds of independence blew across the islands Pacific, villagers of different island 
groupings possessed at least one thing in common: they knew themselves as the first, at the time the only 
sector of society. There was no question of assigning the state as primary since it did not in fact
exist. . . ’ 102
3.1. Introduction
With a population now over five million people, Papua New Guinea (PNG) occupies 
roughly half of the world’s second largest island, New Guinea, and about 600 smaller 
islands. It shares its western border with the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya or West 
Papua. It was a colonial possession of Australia from the early years of this century 
until 1975, when it became independent. PNG was formed by the merger at 
independence of the Territory of Papua, which had been under Australian rule from 
1906, with the Trust Territory of New Guinea, which had been a German colonial 
territory from 1884 to 1914, and had thenceforth been administered by Australia -  first 
under military rule, then under a League of nations mandate granted in 1920, and later 
under United Nations trusteeship from 1945. Australia jointly administered the two 
territories as an administrative union until 1975. PNG became self-governing in 
December 1973 and attained full independence on 16 September 1975.
In PNG a system of provincial governments was established following independence 
primarily in order to account for the diversity in the country and to give a voice to the 
‘grassroots’. By establishing the system of provincial and local government the central 
authorities sought to take into account local and ethnic factors which inevitably 
manifested themselves with the conflict on Bougainville. If not for the threat of 
secession by Bougainville the provincial system may well have not been established. 
Also during this period of the 1970s decentralisation had become popular as centralised 
systems of government, in a number of developing countries, had failed to achieve the 
level of economic growth and “national unity” that was expected. The original 
provincial government system was substantially reformed and a new system was 
established during 1995 and after. The preamble to the PNG Organic Law on 
Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments (OLPGLLG), enacted in June
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1995, states that the law’s purpose is ‘to maintain the sovereignty of the nation; to 
promote equal opportunity and popular participation at all levels of government; to 
provide the basic human needs for water, health, education, transportation, 
communication, accommodation, and social order through self-reliance, and promote 
responsible citizenship through self-management, control and accountability for one’s 
actions.’103 There is now a widely held view that the new Organic Law has failed to 
meet expectations and there is again a discussion about the need for reforms.
One important issue to be addressed in this chapter is how we might assess the 
performance of government institutions? The most pervasive assessment of 
performance in economic discussions is “efficiency”, which links inputs and outputs: an 
efficient outcome is one that gets the most out of a given set of inputs.104 However the 
discussion will focus on the wider issue of “effectiveness”. First I consider the nature of 
the institutions that have traditionally maintained social order in PNG. Second I analyse 
the impact of western bureaucratic norms on traditional Melanesian institutions. This is 
important in the context of the situation in Melanesia described in Chapter 2, and in 
particular the strategies that have been used to improve “governance” in these countries. 
This includes a brief discussion of decentralisation and its strengths and weaknesses. 
Finally in this chapter 1 am seeking to answer the question as to what extent are 
provincial governments addressing the goals as provided in the OLPGLLG?
3.2. Institutions and Melanesian Culture
What kinds of institutions have traditionally maintained social order in PNG? The 
question to consider here is ‘what is it that makes human beings, as social creatures, 
behave themselves? We may do so out of fear of the consequences of police action, 
courts and prison but what about societies that do not have these institutions?’I(b 
Historically Melanesian societies had no formal government as understood in Western 
terms and this determined the nature of the political leadership which characterised 
Melanesian society because as Rowley explains the New Guinea village had to maintain 
itself in a world without imposed order, or protection from state power.106 All 
traditional Melanesian societies are stateless, and the question is how they maintain
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order without the elements of state apparatus, which in the Western experience are 
necessary for orderly social life. 107 Colin Filer points out that ‘Melanesian communities 
have always been on the verge of disintegration, even in pre-colonial times, and it has 
always taken special qualities of leadership, in each succeeding generation, to prevent
1 OXthem from splitting apart at the seams.’
As in most of the Pacific island countries PNG has both inherited and adopted modem 
western government institutions to fit what is essentially, a communal social and 
economic structure characterised by a decentralised political structure. Traditional 
Melanesian society was based on consensus, gift giving, exchange and obligations. The 
notion o f ‘reciprocity’ was central, and involves in various forms a complicated, shifting 
network of reciprocal obligations that continues over time. Such a network can operate 
on an intra-village or inter-village basis, and involve reciprocal obligations between 
individuals or groups. 109 However surprisingly little research has focused on the 
relevance of the centralised state to Melanesian society, and it appears that ‘a critical 
problem with enduring “traditional” forms of governance in the Pacific is that they no 
longer operate in “traditional” ways. ’ 110
PNG has been experiencing a period of rapid transition in terms of social, political and 
economic relations, generating a transformation from a society characterised by a 
subsistence and barter economy, towards a gradual integration into a predominantly 
capitalist cash economy. This transformation has involved the gradual emergence of 
centralised power structures, both economic and political, which contrast and sometimes 
conflict with traditional society in which ‘local’ attitudes were predominant and there 
were few if any political unions outside the clan. It has been described how ‘when we 
were young in the old days we leamt first to trust our mother and father and those of our 
household, then those of our own village, and then those of our clan or line in another 
village; but all others were strangers who might harm us and might be our enemies. We 
did not trust others of our island, even if they spoke the same languages and people of 
other islands we thought of as enemies. This feeling, once so deep, makes it hard for us 
to become One People. ’ 111 In most traditional Melanesian societies there was no 
hereditary class of rulers and generally headmen were either elected at village councils, 
or they ‘bought’ their way up in society by giving feasts and pigs. Fundamental to
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Melanesian society were notions of reciprocity and family obligations, and
ceremonial exchange institutions are central to the ordering of relations among
human beings in Melanesian society. We find them throughout Melanesia; they
lie at the very core of social life... Sociopolitical exchange is the giving and
receiving of wealth, frequently between kin, on prescribed social occasions. The
events at which Melanesians exchange valuables vary from one place to another;
some of the commoner ones are important life-cycle events such as birth,
marriage and death, and important cultural events such as rituals, festivals and
peace ceremonies. They are governed by a code of rules to which all
participants subscribe, rules specifying who should give and receive what from 
112whom and when.
Reciprocity, commonly illustrated in the exchange of food and gifts, was carried over, 
as it were, into the realm of external affairs, so that the way to have wrongs redressed 
was through reciprocal ‘pay-back’, perhaps in warfare, or in seizure of property, or its 
destruction, individual reciprocal killings and the like, according to relative power and 
other circumstances. Where power was not adequate a common recourse was and still 
is to sorcery, fear of which may often discourage or limit aggression.11’ Therefore of 
most importance for most Papua New Guineans their world was closely prescribed. 
Generally beyond there own tribe they were surrounded by neighbours perceived to be 
hostile or suspicious, who often spoke a completely different language. It has been 
described how traditional life in Papua New Guinea fear of one’s enemies and, more 
importantly, fear of the spirits dominated. The ancestors and spirits of dead relatives 
were active players in everyday life and great effort and attention went into placating 
them so as to ward off ill fortune and death. However it was not too difficult to 
maintain social order with small social groups, and
whereas we must exchange to subsist and these transactions need not have any 
significant social component, Melanesians produce for themselves enough to 
subsist, and exchange is something engaged in pre-eminently for sociopolitical 
reasons. Melanesian society in some important senses reverses the assumptions 
of a money-centred market economy. Whereas with us the majority of 
transactions are purchases, commonly from strangers, and we obtain few goods 
and services as gifts (presents on certain anniversaries, the occasional gift from 
one’s spouse and so on), in Melanesian societies the opposite applies... The 
articulation between material economic issues and the society at large is of a 
different order: the inhabitants of Melanesia display a concern for their own 
flesh and blood, community, and sociability in their giving of things to one 
another.114
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The tendency to look for the fruits of existence in ceremony, feasting and dancing; the 
dependence of status on the gift exchange; the basic belief in non-material causes for the 
events of the material world, make it difficult to engage villagers in purely economic 
enterprises aimed at the accumulation of cash by the individual, except as ‘target’ 
workers with some immediate purchase in view for village use. The whole cultural 
conditioning is rather against the morality and the rationale of capitalist commercial
. • 115enterprise.
It is tempting to generalise about PNG traditional society but the reality is that each 
group lived out its own existence. 116 The complex exchange institutions, which 
characterised the stateless societies of Melanesia, promoted orderly political and social 
relations. The way in which exchange affected such control over behaviour was fairly 
straightforward. If a society has norms, which members observe and value very highly, 
that require them to engage in a continuous round of exchanges of valuables with 
others, then they must remain on amicable terms. They cannot wrong others wantonly 
(e.g. steal from them) or fight with them and still expect to exchange with them. Their 
personal reputation and esteem depend upon their participating to the best of their 
ability and ' 17
in Melanesia those who excel at sociopolitical exchange - who are outstanding 
competitors - commonly achieve admiration and respect: they are Melanesia’s 
big men... Any man endowed with the required qualities can aspire to big man 
status. These qualities, or the emphasis put on them, vary from one society to 
another. They range from an above-average ability to contribute to feasts and 
festivals and manipulate wealth, fearlessness in warfare and an aggressive 
temperament, skill in oratory and persuasion, specialised ritual knowledge, a 
reputation for sorcery. The prestige of a big man declines as these equalities 
wane with age: distinction depends on current ability, not former glory.
Sillitoe’s view is that the traditional role of the big man and the exchange-founded 
interaction in Melanesia ensured cooperation and social order. 119 Schoeffel shows that 
initially in Melanesia many leaders and intellectuals believed that under independent 
governments, traditional values of sharing and redistribution could somehow be 
reconciled with political and economic development. This was to be done by adapting 
colonial institutions to make them more culturally appropriate. It was hoped that local 
control would solve the injustices and distortions of development in the colonial period,
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and that local knowledge would shape more appropriate development strategies. 120
In a country of great ethnic diversity the few-shared customs have great power. The 
strongest is wantok: the obligation to support one’s kin through jobs, money and gifts. 
The system of patronage and influence creates village hierarchies headed by ‘big men’ 
of wealth and authority. However at the national level this has too often been translated 
into corruption, inefficiency and nepotism. Also too often national issues are of 
secondary importance in elections fought on the basis of clan and local needs. 
Therefore Sillitoe explains that the evidence from Melanesia suggests that the transition 
from tribe to state is difficult, and this is expectable, for it involves accommodation to a 
political order based on hierarchy, centralised power and contract relations rather than 
equality, diffused power and kin obligations.
3.3. Public Sector Reform in Melanesia
Recently public sector reform has been a major focus for both multilateral and bilateral 
aid donors in Melanesia. In particular there are some fairly commonly held views about 
the performance of modem day institutions in PNG. Politicians and public servants are 
widely perceived to be pursuing their own particular interests and in so doing are 
susceptible and amenable to influence and inducement by specific constituencies. 
Obstacles to effective administration are seen to include local practices resulting in 
inefficiency in the use of funds, ranging from slack accounting procedures through 
administrative confusion, wasted opportunities and inappropriate training of personnel, 
through to outright corruption and embezzlement. 122 However much popular 
explanations for poor state performance in PNG are framed in terms of culture, although 
this is rarely defined.
O f particular importance for the public sector is the acquisition of appropriate 
management skills, and human resource management has been an area of poor practice 
in many public sector organisations in PNG. A recent AusAID study o f aid 
effectiveness in PNG noted that ‘it is widely acknowledged by PNG, multilateral 
organisations and Australia that capacity in agencies in PNG is weak and that this
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constitutes a serious constraint to development in all sectors. Capacity shortcomings 
include inadequate or inappropriate institutional structures and organisational and 
management cultures; an inadequate, shallow or absent skills base; a shortage of 
physical infrastructure and inadequate funds for recurrent costs, from salaries to rent 
and electricity.’ Of particular note is the poor development of the human resource 
management planning process involving such activities as job analysis, forecasting 
organisational demand for human resources, and assessing the internal and external 
supply of human resources. However, ‘we appear to have very few detailed case studies 
of the ways in which organisations operate. There is certainly a multiplicity of general 
analysis and specific observations in donor agency documents while prescriptions for 
change are readily available. There are regular economic commentaries. But there are 
surprisingly few in-depth analysis of how individual organisations work. ’ 124 A fairly 
recent review of one project undertaken in a national department described how the 
overall organisation gave the impression ‘of an expatriate management using out of date 
“Australian standards of work performance” to manage non-Australian officers of a 
different culture, and of a department where there was little trust or communication 
between the two groups, with consequent low staff morale and poor efficiency. ’ 125
Schoeffel and Hughes ' have both written detailed studies on public sector reform in 
the Pacific Island countries. Schoeffel’s report on Sociocultural Issues and Economic 
Development finds that problems of administration, organisation and management are 
often greater, and exercise more constraints on development, than problems of shortage 
of financial and other material resources. 128 Schoeffel sees governance as the crux of 
the relationship between aid and performance linking it to official probity; the use of 
political office for personal gain; and the absence o f checks and balances, including 
pressure from an informed and educated public. 129 She finds that the new organisational 
structures o f the colonial state were based on bureaucratic principles in which positions 
were, at least in theory, defined and limited by laws and regulations. The powers of an 
office belonged to the office itself, and not to the person who held it. However this is at 
odds with much traditional practices. 130
An important assumption underlies Hughes approach; ‘namely that what governments 
do really matters; so it is worthwhile paying attention to the policies and capacities of
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governments. ’ 131 Hughes argues that governance, in the sense of the way authority and 
control is actually exercised in social and economic development, is strongly affected 
by cultural parameters, by the way people regard themselves and their relationships with
I TTothers. In particular he highlights the importance of institutions of civil society 
which include persons of chiefly rank, with customary titles and some forms of 
traditional authority, along with the Christian churches and other religious 
organisations, trade unions, small business associations, women’s organisations and 
other developmental or welfare-oriented NGOs. He finds that these institutions reach 
out to influence or involve virtually every person in the island communities. 133 Hughes 
therefore attaches considerable importance to the sociopolitical and cultural context of 
development.
Hughes also describes a process of ‘internal decay’, as well as changes in external 
circumstances in the Pacific island countries. He is particularly sceptical of some 
current efforts at institutional reform. The way public services are being reduced 
‘misses the real culprits, and weakens services that ought to be strengthened’ 134 while 
‘sales of public assets occur in obscure circumstances and monopoly abuse takes place 
under private ownership.’ His recommendation is that reform should be a dynamic 
process, feeding on complex interactions between systems, and its course cannot be 
precisely forecast. He believes that it seems likely that less detailed programmes, 
aiming at fewer, more critical but more generalised goals of a kind that liberate 
reforming initiative rather than fencing it in, may provide a more helpful frame for 
promoting durable progress. 136
Of the many issues deriving from the good governance agenda there are two that are 
particularly relevant to our discussions. The first is that in both its political and 
technical forms, good governance places improved public sector management as a key 
developmental goal for donors: across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the former Iron 
Curtain, aid agency personnel are placing public sector management on their agenda 
and are hunting out projects in this field. Secondly, although there are some differences 
in the detail, the major donors are agreed that what developing countries must do to 
improve public sector management is to sweep away the traditional public 
administration paradigm that underpins their bureaucracies and introduce the new public
43
management (NPM). 137
Ghai in his research explained how "autonomy can play an important, constructive role 
in mediating relations between different communities in multi-ethnic states. It can 
defuse conflicts. It is a particularly appropriate mechanism for the protection and 
promotion of the culture and values of a community... But autonomy can also be 
fragmenting, pigeonholing and dividing communities. Sometimes, in an attempt to 
preserve the integuments of a state, autonomy is so structured that it is difficult to find 
the common ground on which the communities can find a moral or political basis for 
coexistence. ’ 138 Further he shows how autonomy, particularly federal autonomy is built 
around the notion that the people of a state are best served through a balance between 
the common and the particular. If the emphasis is so much on the particular, then 
separation may be the better option, notwithstanding the proliferation of states. The 
secret of autonomy is the ‘recognition of the common; certainly it seems to be the 
condition for its success. ’ 139
3.4. Government and Administration in PNG
The economy of PNG has been well researched over the years, but the links between its 
economic development approach, the political and institutional processes, and the 
overall development path taken by PNG are less well understood. Furthermore the 
importance of the political and institutional process for national development is 
probably less well appreciated than the Government’s economic strategies. There is 
undoubtedly a strong link between the two. In particular there seems to be little 
understanding of the nature, extent and reasons for the apparent government failure to 
promote development in PNG and in PNG it is obvious that the classical Western and 
post-colonial theories about development have failed or are increasingly being 
challenged. 140 For example, it is often commented how ‘aid donors are given excellent 
written and verbal presentations by national and expatriate public servants but policy 
implementation capacity is sorely lacking. ’ 141
There are a wide variety of views as to what factors determine the performance of 
government institutions in PNG. Some of the most widely held views were discussed at
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a workshop on Policy making in Papua New Guinea which was organised by academics 
at the ANU to review the record of policy making and implementation in PNG since 
independence. 142 Participants at the workshop came from a diverse group of scholars 
from Australia and Papua New Guinea and the discussion identified a number of factors 
impacting on government performance, being:
• A lack or misallocation of funds as a result o f poor financial skills and/or poorly 
operating financial systems or simply corruption.
• A lack of administrative capacity including a shortage of skills. People with the 
required skills were not in place, were in the wrong place or lacked the supporting 
infrastructure (e.g. transport and communications) to undertake their duties properly.
• Self-interested individuals or groups have succeeded in gaining control of policy 
implementation or of blocking it.
• The intrusion of patronage into service delivery where politicians and bureaucrats 
who controlled the allocation of resources could direct service delivery to 
supporters.
• A combination of differences in priorities and difficulties in physical and verbal 
communication between central government and sub-national levels of government. 
The reforms under the OLPGLLG were blamed for exacerbating the problems.
• A lack of coordination between different departments, and agencies, with common 
policy concerns. This was seen to be a result of an organisational model, which 
focused on delineating operational territory and defending it against outside 
agencies.
• A high rate of turnover in ministers and departmental secretaries in all sectors.
An additional observation raised in the workshop was an apparent strong tendency in
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PNG that when performance is seen to be poor the situation is addressed by changing 
structures and institutions without changing behaviour. This was especially raised in 
relation to the OLPGLLG reforms which changed the structure of sub-national 
government but which apparently has done little to change behaviour at that level. It is 
fairly widely believed that the one event which contributed most to the decline in public 
service performance is the Public Services (Management) Act 1986 which reduced the 
authority of the Public Service Commission to that of basically an advisory body. 
Restructuring has been a favourite reform measure in PNG since independence but the 
version applied has been according to Turner only a partial expression of the strategy. 
He explains that
restructuring in Papua New Guinea has involved both the amputation of sections 
of departments and their re-attachment to other departments or the sacking and 
reassignment of senior bureaucrats. In fact, such restructuring involves little or 
no genuine structural change. A basic orientation to the ideal-type bureaucratic 
form of organisation has been maintained but in practice dysfunctional elements 
have increased: for example, excessive centralisation of decision-making, 
inefficient information flows, lack of control over subordinate actions, poor 
knowledge of procedures, and insufficient resources to maintain systems.143
Australia, during its period of colonial rule, had little interest in exploiting PNG, as 
most other colonial powers did in other parts of the world. Instead PNG was regarded 
as a geo-political buffer for Australia, and therefore the foundations for long term 
sustainable development in PNG were not established. There are, as a result, some 
generally accepted principles for effective government, such as the separation of powers 
and systems for effective accountability, now absent in PNG, because the institutions 
put in place by Australia never really took root, and were not widely accepted by the 
community. At independence the new PNG leadership spoke of a unique ‘Melanesian 
path’ of development modelled in part on the Tanzanian development model, but this 
remained merely rhetoric. Consultants from the University of East Anglia (a World 
Bank mission headed by Mike Faber) provided advice complementing the growing 
Papua New Guinean admiration for Tanzania’s development model of indigenous 
African socialism, and a desire for some kind of alternative ‘Melanesian’ way of 
development. As mentioned above the other major influence during this period was the 
popularity of decentralisation which was promoted by the World Bank as well as
several other international development agencies.144 The Eight Point Plan adopted in 
1973 made no explicit mention of growth, but rather its objectives were self-reliance, 
social justice and redistribution. The policies were never properly implemented, 
although are still sometimes referred to even today by the political leadership.
PNG has a Westminster style parliamentary system of government. There are 109 
members elected to the single chamber every five years, under a first past the post 
system that has led to a high turnover of members at each election. Members are 
frequently elected with less than 10 per cent of the total vote. Parliamentary terms are 
fixed for five years and only parliament itself can decide whether there should be an 
early poll. The members knowledge that there is no guarantee of being returned, and 
that half of them are destined to lose, effectively rules out the possibility that a majority 
would ever vote for dissolution.14̂ Such unstable arrangements mean that very few 
members of parliament survive more than one electoral term, leaving the parliament 
short of experience and continuity.
Parliament elects the Prime Minister who forms a cabinet of ministers who head the 
various government departments. The political parties are weak, and most governments 
are formed by coalitions of a number of parties. As a result parliamentary life in PNG 
has largely become a “numbers game”. However there are really no rules to the game, 
rather just one overriding objective which is to secure the support of enough members 
of parliament to gain and hold power. It is the pursuit o f a parliamentary majority, 
which preoccupies politicians, more than the business of policy making and 
governing.146 Political coalitions are notoriously fragile, and loyalty to one particular 
political grouping is not commonly based on a shared set of ideals or policies, but rather 
revolves around a leader. An increasing shift of attachment of citizens away from sub­
national or sub-territorial, kinship-related, primordial and ascriptive symbols to more 
national or territorial, more secular, secondary organisation-based, achievement- 
oriented symbols and criteria is widely accepted as an important variable in political 
development. However even after thirty years PNG elections continue to be essentially 
separate electorate-based contests. The politics of choosing representatives and political 
leaders continue to be very much grounded in local issues and in intricate relationships 
among local groups.147 Most citizens have only the haziest idea of what they are doing
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in an election or why. Saffu found that when asked what they think a Member of 
Parliament does, a disconcerting number of people reply that they do not really know 
except that he has some responsibility for encouraging economic development. Also it 
has been observed that when explaining what a member does, people sometimes draw 
an explicit parallel with sociopolitical exchange, in which a man needs to speak out
148strongly and argue well to secure the wealth he wants.
Stable government in PNG is therefore almost impossible, because no Prime Minister 
can be certain of the support of any government backbencher, or even as has been 
shown on numerous occasions, by any member of his cabinet. The recently introduced 
Organic Law on the Integrity o f  Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) may 
reduce the frequency of ‘party hoping’ but as yet it is still too early to draw any 
conclusions. However the absence of political stability in many ways contributes to 
institutional instability. PNG is often described as an example of a ‘weak state’ because 
it lacks administrative and service capacity, without the political strength to make 
difficult policy decisions and implement programs. Standish argues that it does not 
politically penetrate and dominate the society. Sometimes state resources can be used 
for local benefit, but politicians lack authority outside their own communities, and the 
state as a whole lacks popular legitimacy, worsened by its own excesses in the attempt 
to gain control. Standish concludes that the societies are increasingly isolated from the 
state, which is irrelevant to their needs, and then withdraw from engagement with the 
state. 149
PNG inherited a government system from Australia with similar checks and balances 
between the executive government, the judiciary and parliament. Institutions such as 
the Auditor General, the Ombudsman Commission and parliamentary committees were 
established to put a check on possible excesses of executive government. However 
today ‘Papua New Guinea is governed by the executive. The legislature plays an 
increasingly peripheral role in policy formulation and decision-making. The executive 
is decreasingly accountable to backbench MPs and the opposition. ’ 150 Following 
independence there appears to have been a gradual decline in the effectiveness of 
checks and balances on the power of the executive and ‘Parliamentarians in PNG regard 
themselves more as leaders or their people than as their representatives. ’ 151 This is
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compounded by an electoral system in which a Member of Parliament can be chosen by 
less than 10 percent of the electorate’s voters. Most importantly there has also been 
increasing politicisation of the public service, with constant changes in senior positions. 
May observes that
over the years, successive governments have had difficulties maintaining sound 
national policies, particularly economic and fiscal policies, due in part to the 
rapid turnover of ministers and departmental secretaries, and the tendency to 
place short-term expediency and the demands of individual MPs above longer- 
term national objectives. This has impacted adversely on state capacity and 
fostered cynicism among ordinary people and frustration on the part of aid
152donors and financial institutions.
At the time of independence in PNG local government was in its infancy in many 
provinces, but was well established in others. Although the Australian Government 
instituted a system of district level administration it did not lay any basis for the 
eventual creation of the nineteen provincial administrations. Australia was preparing 
PNG for only two levels of government being national and local. This policy was 
essentially consistent with the popularity of centralised administrations. Local 
government councils were set up throughout the country in the 1950s and 1960s and by 
1970 more than two million people were covered by 146 local government councils.153 
As well in many districts state functions such as the provision of health and education 
services were effectively contracted out to missions. Church leadership networks 
overlapped with local government, so that church elders, deacons and catechists were 
also councillors in the state system.154
To prepare the country for independence, a Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) 
was appointed by the House of Assembly in 1972 to seek public opinion on the 
structure of the future government. The final CPC report was released in 1974 and 
found that the colonial administration was excessively centralised and instead proposed 
a more decentralised system of provincial governments. The arguments in support of a 
more decentralised system were largely those used in other countries during that time 
namely that “political decentralisation” promotes “democratic values” and 
“administrative decentralisation” promotes greater efficiency in the delivery of goods 
and services to the people.155 This was accepted despite the critics who argued that
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“decentralisation is vulnerable to local patronage and corruption, and, that, especially 
where the capacity and experience of local politicians nor officials is weak, it gives no 
guarantee of superior administrative performance.” 156 In hindsight it seems that this 
criticism of decentralisation was applicable to the PNG context.
Political culture in PNG is based in the great number and range of ethnic, language and 
social groups, many of which are small, with little sense of commonality or community 
beyond the clan. The features of this traditional society and culture, coupled with 
modem public institutions and the economic and social pressure for change combine to 
produce a high degree of political instability; high turnover of politicians; a culture of 
exploiting the system for short term gains that benefit the incumbent, or his immediate 
clan or subclan; and a public service that has limited specialisation and is increasingly 
politicised. There are few incentives for politicians to introduce controls, to act 
rationally on distortions of the allocated distribution of resources.157
3,5. Provincial and Local Level Government in PNG
Recently more than 500 Hela people of Southern Highlands province gathered at the Sir 
John Guise Stadium in Port Moresby to petition the National Government for a separate 
province to be known as Hela province. The reason given was that the current law and 
order problems were denying the Hela people essential government services.158 The 
establishment and the continuation of the provincial government system in PNG have 
been the subject of some quite intense political struggles. Regan describes in detail the 
sociopolitical context in which the system was established and that ‘among the more 
important of the major actors involved in the period when the provincial government 
system was being established were: a range of interest groups within the national 
government; the leaders of the Bougainvillean and Tolai populations; the CPC; and 
members of various emerging elite groups in the districts/provinces.’159 However, 
today almost no province has a geographical boundary with any traditional or tribal 
relevance. The provinces were created from the district boundaries that had been 
established by the Australian colonial administration, and as in the case of the Southern 
Highlands some boundaries even divided clan groups. Furthermore, no provincial
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boundary has been significantly altered since independence. Dinnen in his studies of 
the law and justice sector in PNG finds that the subordination of local institutions within 
the larger nation-building project has prevailed throughout the post-independence 
period and conforms to a broader pattern o f neglect evident in other Melanesian 
countries.160 Ralph Premdas also in his research shows how the system of provincial 
government has encouraged particular ethnic groups to ‘capture’ the local bureaucracy, 
and how ethnicity has become almost a ‘defence mechanism’ in the face of too rapid 
change. The result is that provincial government in PNG has remained as remote to the 
people in the villages as is the national government in Port Moresby, and made a 
marginal contribution to development.
The constitutional framework, which specifies the relationship between the PNG 
National Government and provincial governments, was originally enshrined in the 
Organic Law on Provincial Government (OLPG). A key feature of the PNG system of 
government was the devolution under this law of substantial political, administrative, 
and financial powers to the nineteen provincial governments. This legislation created 
provinces with an elected assembly and premier, and a Department of the Province.161 
Originally the organic law envisaged that powers would be transferred only when 
provinces showed the capacity to administer them. However steady devolution did not 
happen and in 1978 a significant number of the National Government’s functions were 
transferred to the provincial governments. Although most national departmental 
functions were subsequently devolved to their divisional equivalents in the provinces, 
the National Government retained control over the national planning and budgetary 
strategy and national functions such as defence, police, nationally designated roads, and 
health and education facilities. Funds for the provincial governments were largely 
derived from central government grants, and were supposed to be provided according to 
a re-distributive formula that favours poorer provinces. This is because at the time of 
independence Papua New Guinea embarked on a series of policies which, among other 
things, aimed to overcome two of the legacies of the colonial experience: the high 
degree of centralisation of political and administrative power, and the great 
geographical inequality of wealth and distribution of government services within the 
country. These policies were embodied in the creation of a national planning system 
with mechanisms of redressing spatial inequalities, and the creation of a decentralised
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162political system to provide a basis for wider participation in the political process.
A survey of the various objectives which were explicitly or implicitly behind the 
decision to decentralise government activity in Papua New Guinea included: the return 
of power to the people as part of the process of decolonisation; a move to a system more 
appropriate to the ‘Melanesian way’ of doing things; creation of institutions that 
increased political participation and responsibility; adoption of a more effective process 
of decision making; accommodation of regional diversity; introduction of a means for 
flexible response to demands for change; the ability to experiment with different 
institutional approaches to government; more rapid development in response to local 
needs and priorities; pursuit of alternative strategies of development in response to local 
conditions; the more effective gathering of information; and a means to provide training 
for leadership.163
However in reality the introduction of a decentralised system of provincial government 
in the late 1970s led to a gradual decline in the quality and coverage of these services, 
despite the rapid expansion in the size of the state. The rationale behind the provincial 
government system was to improve delivery of services at the local level. While the 
number of schools and aid posts increased, there is little doubt that the quality of 
services declined. This was due largely to a shift of resources away from local 
government, and from sub-district mission and state services, to the provincial centres, 
government headquarters and also to the discretionary budgets of politicians. Only in 
provinces where local government was already well developed was there a reasonably 
effective integration of provincial and local government. The main result was a series 
of provincial government suspensions during the 1980s and early 1990s, and by the 
early 1990s no fewer than ten provincial governments were under suspension.164
An important political development in the early 1990s was the reform of Provincial 
Government introduced by the National Government. The Wingti Government 
commenced a process of reviewing the Provincial Government system, and a 
Parliamentary Committee proposed a new structure o f provincial and local level 
government.165 In reality it can be seen that political rivalry between national and 
provincial politicians was the central focus of the reforms proposed by the committee.
The committee perceived that this competition had adversely affected governance in 
Papua New Guinea and had been responsible, directly and indirectly for the failure to 
deliver services to the people.166 The new Organic Law passed in July 1995 introduced 
a revised system of provincial and local level governments which was the result of 
several years’ deliberation by the Constitutional Review Committee. It was also 
justified by the widespread disillusionment with a system of provincial governments 
that had failed to improve service delivery and had been subject to widespread misuse 
of public funds.167
The essential features of the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level 
Governments (OLPGLLG) were the abolition of the elected political arm of provincial 
government and the transfer of sizable additional funds from the national Government 
to the lower level governments for the purpose of better service delivery. Those who 
supported the reforms argued that the system under the OLPG had failed to deliver 
improved goods and services to the villagers and in particular the local level had 
suffered. Instead they believed that the 1995 OLPGLLG would improve cooperation 
between the national, provincial and local level of governments and the abolition of 
separate provincial politicians and elections would save the country resources, which 
would be made available at the local government level.16* The new Organic Law set up 
a political system, which was supposed to reach right into the communities. It is meant 
to bring about even greater participation by local communities in deciding what kind of 
development they wish to see in their own areas, through their ward committees.169
The bipartisan committee proposed a total rejuvenation of the local government 
councils. The law established structures, functions and financial arrangements for 
provincial and local government and administration. There are four administrative 
levels: national, provincial, district and local, and three political levels, as the district 
have an administrative function only. In particular, there has in theory been increased 
funding and increased powers extended to the local governments. Provincial assemblies 
now comprise elected national Members of Parliament, heads of local governments 
(also elected) and certain appointed members (for example, paramount chiefs in 
provinces where chieftaincy systems exist). Provincial governments are headed by the 
national Member of Parliament (called Governor), who represents the provincial
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electorate. Governors are answerable to the national parliament through the Minister 
for Provincial and Local-Level Government Affairs. The provinces in turn encompass 
89 districts (represented by the national Member of Parliament for the open electorates) 
and 284 local governments.170
The head of the public service at the provincial level is the provincial administrator, 
with responsibility for all staff working in the province. The new Organic Law 
abolished provincial departments and placed their operations under the relevant national 
departments through the provincial administrator. The Provincial Administrator is 
chosen by the National Executive Council (NEC) from a list of nominees of the 
provincial executive council (PEC). The staffs of provinces consist of officers of the 
national public service assigned to the province, members of the teaching service 
assigned to the province and other personnel engaged to carry out provincial and local 
responsibilities. Provincial administrators have supervisory powers over all officers and 
employees carrying out functions of the national government (other than law 
enforcement officers), the provincial government and local governments within the 
province. They are responsible for coordinating policy formulation and for planning 
and implementing policies, including coordinating and monitoring the roles and 
functions of national departments and agencies.
The new Organic Law also created for each district the position of District 
Administrator. The District Administrators are the chief executive officers of local 
governments and are responsible for functions of national and provincial governments 
in districts, as approved by provincial administrators, including coordinating policy 
formulation and implementing local government policies and plans. The 
administrative functions that are specifically transferred to the provinces include:
• maintenance of roads, bridges and infrastructure;
• urban roads, public facilities, the environment and waste disposal;
• health facilities and programs;
• education facilities and curriculum;
• housing; and
• water supply.
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Under the new Organic Law there are four types of financial grants from the national
1
government to provincial and local governments:
• unconditional administration and staffing grants (for costs associated with offices of 
provincial and district administrators, extended services of national departments and 
agencies, teachers and other staff);
• conditional development grants (for provincial infrastructure development, local 
government and village services and possibly ‘complementary’ grants as determined 
by the National Economic and Fiscal Commission);
• conditional town and urban services grants; and
• economic grants (including derivation grants designed to encourage exports, special 
support grants provided for in existing agreements relating to the development of 
natural resources and possibly other grants).
These grants are based on formulas that incorporate population, land area and the length 
of coastline. The derivation grant is based on the value of exports originating in a 
province. There is provision for annual adjustments to grants to compensate for 
inflation, however
cooperative decentralisation, which was the expected outcome of the 1995 
OLPGLLG, has failed to materialise to date, reflecting partly the 
misunderstanding with regard to the resources to be transferred to the provinces. 
Provincial Governors expected much larger amounts than they actually received. 
The net fiscal situation for the provinces, after their new expenditure 
responsibilities were taken into account, was worse in a number of instances in 
1996 than before the introduction of the OLPGLLG.174
In addition to their entitlements to grants from the national government, provincial 
governments are given exclusive rights to raise revenue from motor vehicle 
registrations, road-users taxes, liquor and gambling licences, taxes on developed 
property, and court fees and fines arising under provincial law. Provincial 
administrators are required to liaise and consult with provincial treasurers on budget and
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treasury matters. Provincial treasurers are appointed by and are responsible to the head 
of the Department of Finance. Provincial treasurers are heads of Provincial and District 
Treasuries, and while the staffs of other national departments are responsible to 
provincial administrators as well as the heads of the department concerned, provincial
I 7c
treasurers and treasuries are solely responsible to the Department of Finance.
Local-Level Government
Under the new Organic Law a local government is an elective government whose role 
shall be to make laws for the purpose of governing the local community. Members of 
local governments include those elected to represent local wards, together with a 
representative of the trade union movement, and employer and women’s organisations. 
During 1998 the previous district boundaries were changed and the number reduced 
from 103 to 89. This was so the districts would correspond with electorates.176 Local 
governments have responsibility for a wide range of local matters, including labour and 
employment (but not industrial relations), provision of electricity and water, town and 
village planning, small scale industry, social services and local environmental concerns. 
However the ‘revitalisation of a largely moribund and inefficient local government 
system will be difficult, after two decades of decay.’177 The LLGs are divided into 
Council Wards, villages or groups of villages that elect a Councillor to represent their 
Ward on the LLG. Direct grants are to be made to the LLGs on the presentation of 
plans and budgets.
An important element of the organisational structure is the provision for Joint District 
Planning and Budget Priorities Committees, which is chaired by the Member of 
Parliament representing the district, and which includes the Member of Parliament 
representing the province as well as the heads of local governments in the district. 
These committees are responsible for overseeing and making recommendations on 
district planning (including budget priorities) for consideration by both provincial and 
national governments, determining budget allocation priorities for local governments 
within districts, drawing up rolling five-year development plans and annual budget 
estimates, and conducting annual reviews of development plans.
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The law provides for potential sources of revenue for local governments in the form of 
community service taxes, fees and charges, taxes on public entertainments, fees for 
licences for general trading, domestic animal licence fees, corporation and personal 
head taxes as well as court fees and fines arising from local law. However, one of the 
other problems facing the provinces has been the withdrawal of banking services from 
some of the districts. This has been caused partly by the perception of a worsening law 
and order situation in the districts. But it has made it difficult for district cash offices to 
function. If this process cannot be reversed, it is difficult to see how district treasuries,
1 7Rlet alone local-level treasuries, will be able to function.
Performance o f  Provincial Governments
Relatively little detailed study has been undertaken of provincial government 
performance in PNG. One of the first studies by Standish, Provincial Government in 
Papua New Guinea: Early Lessons from Chimbu, focussed primarily on the politics of 
decentralisation in that province, but is relevant for the rest of PNG. Standish found 
that
the creation of the provincial political arena brings the activities of government 
under political control at the level of the provinces, but that does not mean the 
end of politics below the provincial headquarters. Competition continues 
between whole sections of provinces, with districts and local government 
councils struggling for larger shares of government resources, and within them 
factions struggle for ascendancy. There is still rivalry between tribes and clans, 
and competition for leadership within them. Indeed the ancient conflicts 
between kinship groups and their allies are now more intense in the highlands 
than at any time since colonial pacification.
In PNG the provincial governments have essentially identical institutional designs and 
therefore differences between provinces in performance cannot be explained by this 
factor. There are, however, vast differences between provinces in terms of their 
economic endowments. One would therefore expect that the wealthier provinces had an 
advantage over their poorer counterparts in economic and financial resources. 
However, it seems that their respective levels of economic and human resources cannot 
explain the different levels of provincial government performance. For example, John 
Burton shows how Western Province, which is generally regarded to be one of the worst
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performing provincial governments, has received substantial funding and ‘by 1992, only 
Enga, a far more populous mining province, edged out Western for the top spot in the 
provincial rankings of overall funding.’179 A summary of external funding to Western 
Province is provided in Table 1. A recent study of Western Province undertaken by 
AusAID found that the province ‘is relatively wealthy compared to other provinces. 
But two dominant features of the provincial economy are a marked dualism and poor 
financial resource utilisation. The majority of the population is not significantly 
involved in the cash economy, receives few benefits from the province’s income, and 
gets minimal service from government. These shortcomings are attributable more too 
poor administration and planning and a limited economic base than to a lack of financial 
resources.’180
Connell suggests that the structure of development between the provinces was 
predictable ‘with development being a function of colonial contact, differences in the 
distribution of resources, transport infrastructure, plantation activity and the impact of 
urban centres.’ To some extent, during the early period of independence, this may 
have been true but the redistributive effects of National Government funding and the 
revenues flowing from natural resource projects will have altered this situation 
substantially. In his study of provincial government Axline found that:182
• the performance of provincial governments with a few exceptions ranged from 
poor to fair;
• strong political rivalry between national government and provincial governments led 
to disruptive intervention by national politicians and provincial politicians;
• skills shortages and lack of staff development programmes led to poor financial 
administration and financial control; there was a lack of any proper inventory of 
assets and inadequate maintenance of physical assets by the provincial governments; 
and
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local level governments with very few exceptions were in a very bad state, 
characterised by poor administration, misuse of funds by staff, and neglect by 
provincial government.
TABLE 1
Western Province external funding 1984-92 (Kina)
1984 1984 1992
(1984 prices) (1991 prices) (1991 prices)
Western Province 
Other Provinces
8,266,904 11,821,673 23,948,200
(excl NSP & NCD) 
Western Province
190,186,170 271,966,223 312,865,500
(per capita) 96 137 208
Other Provinces 64 92 90
S o u rce: B u rto n , J. op  c it., p. 160
However, Axline found that although many provincial governments have records of
poor financial management, it is not clear that provincial governments are by nature 
poorer financial managers than the national government. The poor record of financial 
management on the part of provincial governments is no doubt partly due to the relative 
lack of skilled personnel and the lack of support on the part of the national
183government.
There are many debates about whether administrative incapacity or financial incapacity 
is the major constraint faced by lower level governments in meeting their increased 
responsibilities. While it is true that there continue to be significant problems with the 
transfer of funds from the National Government to the provinces, financial constraints 
cannot explain the different levels of performance between provinces. AusAID’s study 
of Western Province found that ‘limited effective expenditure and results is not caused 
by a lack of financial resources so much as a largely non-fiinctioning financial 
management system. Strong administrative leadership can result in reasonable financial 
management -  such as in Balimo Urban LLG and perhaps the North Fly District 
administration.’ Table 2 shows the PNG National Government’s grants to provinces 
in 1989, under the OLPG, and in 1995 under the OLPLLG.
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TABLE 2
PNG National Government Grants to Provinces
Province Popn (1990) 1989 (Estimated) 1996 (Budget)
Western 110,420 17,880.1 27.501.1
Gulf 68,737 8,659.8 20,042.2
Central 141,195 12,958.7 17,034.6
Milne Bay 158,780 11,912.7 21,408.1
Oro 96,491 8,362.8 18,739.6
S. Highlands 317,437 18,180.8 39,779.9
Enga 235,561 14,374.0 28,853.5
W. Highlands 336,178 18,973.7 30,845.7
Simbu 183,849 14,043.1 18,395.9
E. Highlands 300,648 21,110.4 32,248.8
Morobe 380,117 25,084.0 39,995.7
Madang 253,195 18,945.8 27,226.9
East Sepik 254,371 20,337.1 27,707.5
Sandaun 139,917 13,487.8 16,344.9
Manus 32,840 6,204.5 12,318.7
New Ireland 86,999 13,498.2 20,847.0
E.N.Britain 185,459 20,245.2 21,833.4
W.N. Britain 130,190 12,519.8 18,999.3
N.Solomons 154,000 n.a. 14,436.9
Source: Gupta, D and Ivarature, H. 1996, ‘The Organic Law in Papua New Guinea,” in Pacific Economic
Bulletin 11(2), p .ll.
Often, however there are disputes between the provincial governments and the National 
Governments over the amount of funds that are supposed to be transferred. For 
example a recent newspaper article quoted the Western Highlands Administrator as 
claiming that the National Government owed his province K27 million between 1997- 
2000. The Administrator stated that provinces were entitled to receive derivation grants 
based on five per cent of the annual value of total exports produced in a province, but 
the National Government has continued to allocate less amounts to them. The 
Administrator of Simbu Province shared his comments. Similarly Saundaun 
Province is heavily dependent on the National Government which makes up 95 percent 
of the province’s total budget. However the Administrator has claimed that although 
the annual budget is over K25 million the funding allocation from the National 
Government is usually well below half that figure. Table 2 shows that as a comparison
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Gulf Province, with a population of around 70,000 received from the National 
Government about K20m in 1996, while ENB Province, with a population of almost 
190,000, received just K22m. In particular there are substantial National Government 
funds being provided to provinces which have a reputation for gross mismanagement 
e.g. East Sepik and Southern Highlands.
Under the previous OLPG the ‘opposition to the notion o f provincial government on the 
part of some national politicians, as a challenge to their power base, and especially 
financial mismanagement and corruption, led to the suspension of many provincial 
governments.’186 However, the answer as to whether a lack of financial resources or 
administrative capacity is responsible for poor performance will probably vary 
considerably according to the provincial or local government in question. Clearly a 
large number of lower governments are ill equipped to handle the increased 
responsibilities they have been allocated, and in particular the setting up of district 
treasuries is a formidable task. These include difficulties associated with recruiting 
qualified staff being exacerbated by lack of housing and other infrastructure, including 
the supply of electricity for computers, communications equipment and other 
purposes. 18' It will take time to enhance administrative capacity and, in the interim, 
funding may not necessarily be the binding constraint. In contrast, for the more 
administratively advanced lower level governments, funding relative to responsibilities 
may well be a binding constraint and the accusation that they are not receiving sufficient
i oo
financial support from the National Government may be well based. However there 
is evidence that in the Eastern Highlands as more functions have been transferred to the 
province without the necessary funding from the national Government, the delivery of 
services has suffered. For example, there is a virtual absence of agricultural extension. 
Ironically, the creation of additional positions such as District Officers and local-level 
government officers has reduced the funds available for staff.189
The original provincial government system had a very chequered and controversial 
history with a large number of the governments being suspended amid allegations of 
corruption and mismanagement. Probably the major reason for this was that the original 
decision to decentralise government in Papua New Guinea was based in large measure 
on the great diversity of the country. For reasons explained elsewhere, the system of
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provincial government that had arisen out of the demands of one province 
(Bougainville) was generalised to eighteen other provincial governments, and applied 
uniformly to them. All provincial governments were given the same powers and 
authorities regardless of their capacity to exercise them in a competent manner.190 
Sillitoe argues that provincial government "foundered on the rocks of gross 
incompetence which allowed corruption to flourish.’191 The PNG Auditor-General’s
1 Q?1992 audit report of fourteen provincial governments also found that:
• most provincial governments had performed poorly and many had failed to deliver 
goods and services to the people;
• most provincial governments had experienced deterioration in matters relating to the 
control of accounts as well as in the maintenance of financial records and also in 
their presentations of financial statements;
• most provincial governments also displayed a tangible evidence of lack of proper 
management as well as a lack of financial discipline. Furthermore, many provincial 
public servants were said to have contributed to some of the delays experienced 
with the implementation of various government policies and projects. The overall 
negative consequences of these failures was the impact which was experienced by 
the national government’s general macro-economic policies; and
• a number of schemes which some provincial governments undertook either failed to 
produce the desired results of suffered from lack of proper accountability.
Overall it seems that in line with the increased funding, the Organic Law also increased 
the responsibilities of the lower level governments at a time when a large number 
seemingly could not cope with their existing administrative and financial 
responsibilities. The changes brought about have further increased the opportunities 
and power of individual national politicians, who now chair the key committees at 
district and province level that approve local plans and budgets. The OLPGLLG is 
likely to increase rather than decrease the demand for scarce accounting, administrative, 
planning and implementation skills. The Minister for Provincial and Local
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Government Affairs told Parliament in June 1998 that the "reforms implementation 
seems to have slowed. This appears due to a number of reasons, chief amongst them the 
fact that provincial reform action plans formulated by the provinces themselves are 
unrealistic and impractical. Some provincial reform committees, which were 
established to coordinate and drive the reform in the provinces, have become defunct 
and need to be resuscitated and revitalised. Other reasons are related to financial 
difficulties, political instability and ineffective administration.’194 The lack of financial 
procedures and systems means that it is impossible to monitor expenditure or allocations 
across the sectors at province level and below.
Premdas argues that the "problem of political allocation of values and resources central 
to the political process substantially revolves around ethnic calculations. It is distorted 
through the prism of ethnic considerations that become so powerful, such that the threat 
of succession, that ordinary economic sense in public expenditures is sacrificed at the 
alter of ethnic accommodation.’195 In addition the grants from the national government 
are based on population data taken from the 1990 census, which significantly understate 
current population levels in many provinces. The census undertaken in 2000 may 
overcome this constraint, but there is a widely held view that this census was flawed. In 
the case of Western Province the AusAID study comments that the ‘root of the problem 
may not be the inability of provincial staff to operate an appropriate financial 
management system so much as the non-enforcement of national law and the 
consequent inability of key financial officers in the province (such as provincial and 
district treasurers and auditors) to operate in a professional fashion.’196 Finally a 
particular problem for the local-level government is that they do not have their own 
administrative machinery, and therefore they are largely responsible to the district 
administrators.
3.6. Conclusions
In PNG a system of provincial governments was established following independence 
primarily in order to account for the diversity in the country and to give a voice to the 
‘grassroots’. By establishing the system of provincial and local government the central 
authorities sought to take into account local and ethnic factors. PNG adopted modem
63
western government institutions to fit what is essentially, a communal social and 
economic structure characterised by a decentralised political structure. Traditional 
Melanesian society was based on consensus, gift giving, exchange and obligations. The 
notion o f ‘reciprocity' was central, and involves in various forms a complicated, shifting 
network of reciprocal obligations that continues over time. Such a network can operate 
on an intra-village or inter-village basis, and involve reciprocal obligations between 
individuals or groups.197 The way in which exchange affected such control over 
behaviour was fairly straightforward. If a society has norms, which members observe 
and value very highly, that require them to engage in a continuous round of exchanges 
of valuables with others, then they must remain on amicable terms. They cannot wrong 
others wantonly (e.g. steal from them) or fight with them and still expect to exchange 
with them. Their personal reputation and esteem depend upon their participating to the 
best of their ability. Sillitoe’s view is that the traditional role of the big man and the 
exchange-founded interaction in Melanesia ensured cooperation and social order.199
However in reality the introduction of a decentralised system of provincial government 
in the late 1970s led to a gradual decline in the quality and coverage of these services, 
despite the rapid expansion in the size of the state. The rationale behind the provincial 
government system was to improve delivery of services at the local level. But, while 
the number of schools and aid posts increased, there is little doubt that the quality of 
services declined. This was due largely to a shift of resources away from local 
government, and from sub-district mission and state services, to the provincial centres, 
government headquarters and also to the discretionary budgets of politicians. Only in 
provinces where local government was already well developed was there a reasonably 
effective integration of provincial and local government. Provincial government in 
PNG has been through a period of major reform. The focus of the reform has been the 
organisational design of the governments and their economic and financial resources.
However the provinces simply reinforced the administrative boundaries established 
during the colonial period. There has been wide debate about whether administrative 
incapacity or financial incapacity has been the major constraint to their performance. 
However, thus far the reforms do not appear to have improved provincial government 
performance, and ‘the people of Melanesia have governed themselves adequately for
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thousands of years according to tribally instituted political conventions, but many today 
are critical of the centralised political systems that have usurped them. They thoughtful 
worry about the future. They realise that they cannot turn the clock back to pre-contact 
tribal times, but where, they ask, are they going? ’200
Axline found that although many provincial governments have records of poor financial 
management, it is not clear that provincial governments are by nature poorer financial 
managers than the national government. The poor record of financial management on 
the part of provincial governments is no doubt partly due to the relative lack of skilled 
personnel and the lack of support on the part of the national government. The lesson to 
be learnt is that re-organising the structure of provincial governments is not sufficient, 
and such attempts thus far have not increased their effectiveness.
Notes
102 Roughan, J., 1998, Pacific Islands Non Government Organisations: Civil Society’s Political Activist, 
Macmillan Brown, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, p.l.
102 Government of PNG, 1995. Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments, 
Port Moresby, p. 1.
104 Larmour, P., 2000, “Explaining Institutional Failure in Melanesia”, paper prepared for the 
NCDS/James Cook PNG Update, October.
105 Sillitoe, P., 1998, An Introduction to the Anthropology of Melanesia, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p.84.
106 Rowley, C.D., op cit., p.35.
107 Sillitoe, P., 1998, op cit., p.92.
108 Filer, C., 1990, “The Bougainville Rebellion and the process of social disintegration”, in May, R.J. and 
Spriggs, M. (eds), The Bougainville Crisis, Crawford House Press, Bathurst, p.86.
109 Seddon, N., 1995, “Reciprocity, Exchange and Contract ” Melanesian Law Journal, UPNG, p.2.
110 Finin, G.A., and Wesley-Smith, T.A., op cit., p.10.
111 Fox, Charles E., 1975, The Story o f the Solomons, Pacific Publications, Sydney, p.65.
112 Sillitoe, P., 1998, op cit., p.84.
113 Rowley, C.D., op cit., p.37.
114 Ibid., p.85.
115 Ibid., p.52.
116 Domey, S., 2000, Papua New Guinea: people, politics and history since 1975, ABC Books (2nd 
edition), Sydney, p.35.
117 Sillitoe, P., 1998, op cit., p.93.
118 Ibid.. P.100.
119 Ibid., p.l 11.
120 Schoeffel, P., 1997, Myths o f Community Management: Sustainability, the State and rural 
development in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. State, Society and Governance in 
Melanesia Project Discussion Paper No 97/8, Australian National University, Canberra, p.6.
121 Sillitoe, P., 2000, op cit., p.219.
122 Ibjd., p.221.
123 ibid-, P-13.
124 Turner, M., 1997, op cit., p.32.
123 Devine, A.G.T., 1994, “Institutional Development in Papua New Guinea”, Training and Development 
in Australia, November, Canberra, p.7.
65
126 Schoeffel, P., 1996, op cit., p.8.
127 Hughes, A.V., 1998, A Different Kind o f Voyage: Development and Dependence in the Pacific Islands,
Asian Development Bank, Manila.
128 Schoeffel, P., 1996, op cit., p.127.
129 \b\d., p. 138.
130 Schoeffel, P., 1997, op cit., p.6.
131 Hughes, A.V., op cit., p.56.
132 M d., p.78.
133 ibid., p.98.
134 ]bid., p.50.
135 \b\d-, p-67.
136 Ibid., p.76.
1,7 Turner, M., and Hulme, D., op cit., p.230.
138 Ghai, Y., op cit., p.24.
139 \b\d., p.25.
14,1 Parkop, P., 1993, “Who should determine the development path?’ in Nowak, R and Atkinson, J (eds), 
Development in Papua New Guinea: Alternative Perspectives, Community Aid Abroad Background 
Report No 3, May, p. 11.
141 Callick, R., et al, The Papua New Guinea Handbook, National Centre for Development Studies, 
Canberra, p.8.
142 State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, 2002, Workshop on Policy making in Papua New 
Guinea, The Australian National University, Canberra.
14j Turner, M., 1997, op cit.
144 World Bank, 1975, The Assault on World Poverty, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
145 Domey, S., op cit.. p.61.
146 Turner, M.., 1990, Papua New Guinea: The Challenge o f Independence, Penguin Books, Sydney, p.59.
147 Saffu, Y., 1996, “Continuity and Change in PNG Electoral Politics”, in Saffu, Y. (ed), The 1992 
Papua New Guinea Election: Change and Continuity in Electoral Politics, Political and Social Change 
Monograph 23, Australian National University, Canberra, p.5.
148 Sillitoe, P„ 2000, op cit., p.229.
uo Standish, W.A., 1996, “Elections in Simbu: Towards Gunboat Democracy?” in Saffu, Y., (ed), op cit..
p.320.
150 Waiko, J.D., 1993, A Short History o f Papua New Guinea, Oxford University Press, Melbourne p.l 16. 
'5I Domey, S., op cit., p.53.
152 May, R.J., 2003, “Disorderly Democracy: Political Turbulence and Institutional Reform in Papua New 
Guinea,” State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 2003/3, The ANU, Canberra,
p.16.
153 ]bid-, P-239.
154 Schoeffel, P., 1997, op cit., p.7.
155 May, R.J., and Regan, A.J., “The Politics of Decentralisation in Post-Colonial States” in May, R.J. and 
Regan, A.J. (eds), 1997. Political Decentralisation in a New State: The Experience o f Provincial 
Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House, Bathurst, p.3.
156 Ibid., p.3.
157 AusAID, 1997, Australia-PNG Development Cooperation Program: Study o f Effectiveness, Final 
Report, Canberra, p.26.
158 The National, 21 September 2000.
159 Regan, A.J., 1997, “The Politics of Provincial Government”, in May and Regan (eds), Political 
Decentralisation in a New State: The Experience o f Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, 
Crawford House, Bathurst, p.57.
160 Dinnen, S., 2003, “Building Bridges -  Law and Justice Reform in Papua New Guinea”, in Jowitt, A 
and Newton Cain, T., (eds), Passage o f Change: Law, Society and Governance in the Pacific, Pandanus 
Books, Sydney, p.282.
Ifal Gupta, D., and Ivarature, H., 1997, “Restructuring decentralisation: political and economic issues”, in 
Temu, I., (ed), Papua New Guinea: A 20/20 Vision, Australian National University, Canberra, p.264.
162 Axline, W.A., 1988, “Policy Implementation in Papua New Guinea: Decentralisation and 
Redistribution”, The Journal o f Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, xxvi (1), p.72.
66
163 Axline, W.A., 1986, Decentralisation and Development Policy: Provincial Government and the 
Planning Process in Papua New Guinea, Monograph No 26, PNG Institute of Applied Social and 
Economic Research, Boroko, p.4.
164 Domey, S., op cit., p.238.
165 Axline, W.A., 1993, Governance in Papua New Guinea: Approaches to Institutional Reform, Institute 
of National Affairs, Discussion Paper No 58, Port Moresby, p.20.
166 Ibid., p.77.
167 Economic Insights Pty Ltd, 1996, The Economy of Papua New Guinea: 1996 Report, International 
Development Issues No 46, AusAID, Canberra.
168 Gupta, D., and Ivarature, H., 1997, op cit., p.265.
169 Dickson-Waiko, A. “Civil Society and development, nongovernment organisations and churches”, 
Development Bulletin 50, Canberra, p.45.
170 AusAID, 1997. Economic Survey of Papua New Guinea, Canberra, p. 129.
171 May. R.J. 1997, “Postscript: The Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local Level 
Governments,” in May and Regan (eds), Political Decentralisation in a New State: The Experience of 
Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House, Bathurst, p.393.
172 AusAID, 1997. op cit., p.230.
173 ibid., p.129.
174 Gupta, D and Ivarature, H. 1997, op cit., p.267.
175 AusAID, 1997. op cit., p. 131.
176 Allen, B., Bourke, M., Hanson, L., and McCarthy, T . , 2000, District Profiles for Papua New Guinea, 
Land Management Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, p.3.
177 Connell, J., 1997. Papua New Guinea: The Struggle for Development, Routledge, London and New 
York, p.296.
178 IMd., p.279.
179 Burton, J., 1998, op cit., p.160.
180 AusAID, 2000, Western Province, Papua New Guinea: Development Status and Prospects, Canberra,
p.8.
181 Connell, J., op cit., p.224.
182 Axline, W.A., 1986, op cit., p.97.
183 Axline, W.A., 1993, op cit.. p.87.
184 AusAID, 2000, op cit.. p.9.
185 PNG Independent, 4 July 2000.
186 Connell, J., op cit., p.294.
187 Ibid., p.295.
188 Economic Insights Pty Ltd, 1999, op cit., p.98.
189 Duncan, R., and Gupta, D., 1999, “The Economy of Eastern Highlands Province” in Economic 
Insights Pty Ltd. 1999, op cit., p.143.
190 Axline, W.A., 1993, op cit., p.93.
191 Sillitoe, P., 2000, op cit., p.224.
192 Government of PNG, 1992, Report of the Auditor General, Port Moresby.
193 Economic Insights Pty Ltd. 1999, op cit., p.96.
194 Minister for Provincial and Local Government Affairs, 1998. Status of the Provincial and Local-Level 
Government Reforms, Statement to Parliament, June, Port Moresby.
195 Premdas, R., op cit., p.251.
196 AusAID, 2000, op cit., p.26.
197 Seddon, N., op cit., p.2.
198 Sillitoe, P., 1998, op cit.. p.93.
199 Ibid., p. l l l .
200 M d., p.237.
67
CHAPTER 4
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
‘the most important implication of our research is that the relationship between social capital and 
institutional performance is characterised by complex dynamics. ’ 201
4.1. Introduction
How might we better clarify, and disentangle, the numerous issues relating to the 
performance of government institutions? Robert Putnam in Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy stresses the importance of civil society and social 
capital in developing effective institutions.202 For his analysis he uses the unique 
experiment begun in 1970 when Italy created new governments for each of its regions. 
These regions varied greatly from the standpoint of wealth, social structure and political 
leanings. The institutional performance of each region is measured by a composite 
index based on twelve elements. The index includes promptness in approving the 
budget by the regional assembly, the extent of legislative innovation, the provision of 
day care centres and of family clinics, industrial policy instruments, local health unit 
expenditures and bureaucratic responsiveness to citizens’ queries.
Putnam concludes that the regions enjoying effective government in the 1990s have 
inherited a legacy of ‘civic engagement’ that can be traced back to the early Middle 
Ages. The stock of social capital in each region is measured by means of quantitative 
and qualitative indicators; in particular, voter turnout at referenda, and lack of candidate 
preference voting in political elections, newspaper readership and density of sport and 
recreation associations. Putnam views social capital as a set of ‘horizontal associations’ 
among people who have an effect on the productivity of the community. These 
associations include ‘networks of civic engagement’ and social norms. Two 
assumptions underlie this concept. The first is that networks and norms are empirically 
associated; and second, that they have important economic consequences. In his 
definition, the key feature of social capital is that it facilitates coordination and 
cooperation for the mutual benefit of the members o f the association.203
Putnam’s study was the first of its kind to analyse institutional performance and the role 
of social capital. This chapter provides a general overview of the two key terms, civil
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society and social capital. Some of the more recent significant studies on the topic are 
then outlined. Finally the various means used for measuring government performance 
and the stock of social capital are described.
4.2. Civil Society and Social Capital
During the past two decades social scientists and policy-makers have increasingly 
referred to both the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘social capital’. One explanation given for 
this is that in different, but similar ways, the concepts of civil society and social capital 
each address perceived failings of predominant economic models for explaining the 
social and political behaviour of individuals and groups within contemporary societies. 
In a number of developed countries the popularity of both concepts comes at a time 
when rational choice theory, built as it is on the assumptions of microeconomics, is 
making a serious bid to become the dominant concept in political science. The concepts 
have also gained substantial strength within sociology and anthropology.204 There is a 
significant amount of literature seeking to define both terms and ‘as an analytical 
concept, civil society and the sectoral models to which it is attached suffer from acute 
definitional fuzziness.'20S The modem use of the term civil society came from the 18Ul 
century efforts to create a space for forms of association intermediate between the state 
and the individual. However the more recent revival of the term was in response to the 
“overgrown” states of the late 20th century.206
Although civil society has a long intellectual history, it is really only in the last twenty 
years that it has come to prominence in policy-making. There are a number of reasons 
for this, but most important has been the recognition that states and markets are but two 
components of an essential trilogy: ‘society matters, social institutions count, and 
citizens make a crucial difference to the health of the polity and to economic 
success.’ In particular the disintegration of Soviet-style socialism and the resurgence 
of civil society in Eastern Europe have revived general interest in the concept of civil 
society. Generally speaking the characteristic institutions of civil society are the trade 
unions, professional associations, the independent media and other information sources, 
and other social and economic groupings which help to integrate different sections of
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the community with one another. Many users of the term exclude private business, but 
include business associations such as chambers of commerce. Most importantly it is 
generally recognised that a ‘healthy’ civil society requires that these institutions do not 
represent mutually exclusive interests or outlooks.
Much of the current debate uses the term ‘civil society’ as it was first expressed by 
Alexis de Tocqueville, and ‘although he did not use the term civil society in his 
penetrating study of democracy in nineteen-century North America, de Tocqueville saw 
the strength of associational life, the proliferation of voluntary associations at the local 
level, as a fundamental bulwark against potential abuses by an increasingly powerful 
central authority.’ In this study the term civil society is used to describe the area 
between the state, the individual and the market where individuals can form 
autonomous and group activities of various kinds. It is therefore seen to be constantly 
changing to reflect the institutions of the state and the interests of different groups.
We should also not confine our interest to governance in government, but should look to 
how civil society can contribute to promoting governance in government, and, indeed, 
look to civil societies’ own systems of governance because209
lack of state capacity is often viewed as a ‘technical’ problem to be remedied by 
strategic inputs targeted exclusively at state institutions. The question of a state’s 
relations to its wider society and the extent to which these might themselves be a 
source of its limited capacity is rarely raised. The fragile legitimacy of the state in 
Papua New Guinea has all too often been ignored in the haste to build its institutional 
structures... Building trust and confidence in the principal agencies is an integral part 
of any sustainable institutional strengthening activities.210
We know that knowledge about public affairs and practice in everyday civic skills are 
prerequisites for effective participation.211 Civil society organisations are generally 
taken to include industry associations, trade unions, commercial associations, 
employers’ organisations, professional associations, advocacy groups, credit unions, co­
operatives, academic and research institutions, the media, community based 
organisations (CBOs), NGOs, and not-for-profit and religious groups. Some definitions 
of civil society organisations also include political parties. The mass media can play a 
critical role in informing the community, and for building trust and cooperation. The
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Department for International Development (DFID) believes that it is necessary to look 
to civil society ‘as a means of strengthening government: particularly through the role 
of providing interest groups that can effectively influence the formulation of policy, that 
can challenge and exert pressure on government to uphold standards of policy 
implementation, and that can act as one of several key checks and balances crucial to 
the consolidation of strong government itself. ’212
There are generally seen to be essentially two main roles for civil society as it relates to 
governance and the performance of government institutions. Firstly, civil society is 
seen as a means of strengthening government. It does this by providing interest groups 
that can effectively influence the formulation of policy, that can challenge and exert 
pressure on government to uphold standards of policy implementation and that can act 
as one of several key checks and balances crucial to the consolidation of strong 
government. Where this is based on broad participation it encourages ‘values and 
behavior’ necessary to maintain democratic government institutions. In other words, 
the contributions of groups and networks of private individuals to public debate helps 
shape values and standards of behaviour that become so widely accepted that they 
cannot be ignored, even by the state. Secondly, civil society organisations may act as a 
complement to government, sometimes performing roles on behalf of government or 
performing roles that it is better suited to undertake than government. It is sometimes 
argued that ‘the closer we approach the industrial era, the more civil society expresses 
itself in highly institutionalised formal organisations such as trade unions, professional 
associations, independent political parties, pressure groups and other voluntary 
associations.’ Therefore it is often assumed that less developed societies are much 
less likely to be characterised by a strong civil society given the importance of 
‘personaliStic patronage style relationships’ .214 Thus the higher degree of adherence to 
such things as democratic norms and limits on corruption in industrialised countries 
than in post colonial states is often explained in terms of a more ‘developed’ civil 
society.
As civil society increasingly received attention for its governance role there was more 
recognition of the role of social capital in facilitating and enhancing civil society. 
Particularly Putnam’s work linked the concepts of civil society and social capital.
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Generally speaking the term ‘social capital’ is used to refer to the institutions, 
relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity o f a society's social 
interactions. There are a number of fields in which work on social capital is being 
undertaken, including families and youth behaviour problems, schooling and education; 
community life in physical settings and virtual settings; work and organisations; 
democracy and governance; general cases of collective action problems; and economic 
development.215 Social capital as a concept can be seen as an attempt to rectify the 
failure o f the rational economic model to incorporate non-market factors into its 
accounts o f the economic and political behavior o f individuals and groups. However 
the concept o f social capital is still the subject o f some heated debate in the social 
sciences.
The first recorded modern reference to the term ‘social capital’ was in the context o f  its 
importance for education and local communities by Hanifan in the United States.216 A 
European sociologist, Bourdieu, in early discussions o f the term noted that social capital 
is comprised o f social obligations and he highlighted its difference from ‘cultural’ and 
‘economic’ capital.217 For Bourdieu capital can present itself in three fundamental 
guises: as economic capital, which is immediately convertible into money and may be 
institutionalised in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, 
on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the from of  
educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up o f social obligations (i.e. 
connections), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may 
be institutionalised in the form o f a title o f nobility.218 In his definition social capital, as 
a network o f connections, is not a natural given or a social given but something that 
must be worked for on an ongoing basis. His emphasis is on participation in social 
networks that provide access to the group’s resources. Social capital is, therefore, a 
means o f  getting access, through social connections, to the economic and cultural 
resources that are keenly sought in capitalist societies. His emphasis is on participation 
in social networks that provide access to the group’s resources and especially for 
Bourdieu social capital is a social product demanding social interaction.
The contemporary use o f the term social capital probably first began with Coleman’s 
work on school participation in Chicago.219 He uses different terms from Bourdieu to
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define social capital but basically constructs the same theoretical concept. Coleman 
introduced the concept of social capital into his research in order to provide a 
‘socialised’ view of human action. In other words he seeks to answer the question, how 
is social order possible if each individual is maximising their self-interest? Classical 
sociology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sought to explain the role 
of social norms in contextualising and shaping rational action. Coleman’s principal 
objective was to provide sociology with a robust explanation for human action. 
Coleman defines social capital in terms of its function as the value of aspects of social 
structure (i.e. obligations and expectations, information channels, norms and effective 
sanctions that constrain and/or encourage certain kinds of behaviour) to actors as 
resources that they can use to achieve their interests. However, unlike Bourdieu who 
allows social capital to be appropriated by individuals, Coleman regards it as a property 
of social interaction, and therefore not something that can be owned by individuals. 
Coleman uses the concept of social capital in how it works in creating human capital for 
individuals. For Coleman the difference between human and social capital is that social 
capital inheres in relations between individuals and groups, not in individuals per se. 
He illustrates the effect of social capital within the family, and in the community outside 
the family, through a study of the effect of a lack of social capital available to high 
school students on dropping out of school before graduation.
Robert Putnam uses the concept of social capital at a different scale to Bourdieu and 
Coleman; however his definition of the concept is drawn directly from Coleman. Like 
Coleman and Bourdieu he views social capital as facilitating action within social 
structures. He uses what is now regarded as a fairly narrow definition of social capital 
that refers to a set of horizontal associations between people, consisting of social 
networks and associated norms that have an effect on community productivity and well 
being. Unlike Coleman who focuses at the individual level Putnam is concerned to 
explain how social capital works at the regional level to support democratic institutions 
and enhance economic development at the national level. The focus on outcomes for 
regions distinguishes his work from Coleman and Bourdieu, but not in terms of the 
fundamental definition of social capital.
Putnam poses the question ‘does the performance of an institution depend on its social,
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economic, and cultural surround? ’220 For him the central question is ‘what are the 
conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions? ’221 His
argument is that ‘the practical performance of institutions...is shaped by the social
222context within which they operate.’ He also argues that ‘rules are undoubtedly 
important, but as a basis for development advice this insight is incomplete for two 
reasons: First, it is far from clear that any particular set of formal rules is uniquely 
superior; at least in formal terms, for example, federalism is not closely correlated with 
superior economic performance. Second, and more important, the de facto institution of 
a country often is poorly reflected in its written rules.’
Putnam poses the question as to whether ‘modernity is a cause of performance (perhaps 
one among several), whether performance is perhaps in some way a cause of modernity, 
whether both are influenced by a third factor (so that the association between the two is 
in some sense spurious), or whether the link between modernity and performance is 
even more complex. ’224 In Putnam’s analysis, the statistical relationship between 
regional variation in institutional performance and differences in the degree of civicness 
are found to be more significant than in the case of socio-economic variables. He 
concludes, ‘some regions of Italy...are blessed with vibrant networks and norms of civic 
engagement, while others are cursed with vertically structured politics, a social life of 
fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of distrust. These differences in civic life turn 
out to play a key role in explaining institutional success.” He further argues that “it is 
enough to recognize that the performance of a regional government is somehow very 
closely related to the civic character of social and political life within the region. 
Regions with many civic associations, many newspaper readers, many issue-oriented
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voters, and few patron-client networks seem to nourish more effective governments.” 
Putnam found that it is not the degree of political participation that distinguishes regions 
with more or less social capital but its character. In particular he found that political 
leaders in regions with more social capital are readier to compromise than their 
counterparts in regions with less, and that “the least civic regions are the most subject to 
the ancient plague of political corruption.” All of this is taken to suggest that an 
effective government-citizen relationship is the outcome of successful solutions to 
dilemmas o f collective action. Norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement 
favour this outcome, because they raise the costs o f defection, facilitate information
among people, reduce uncertainty and provide models for future cooperation. For 
Putnam the essential link between social capital and institutional performance is that it:
• reduces the attractions of opportunism as is the case in game theory;
• it fosters social trust which makes political and economic transactions easier;
• it assists in the flow of information; and
• It provides ‘templates’ for future political and economic collaboration.
In summary for Putnam networks of civic engagement (ie neighbourhood associations, 
choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs etc) are essential for social capital. They are 
essential because they foster strong norms of reciprocity -  nornis that in turn sanction 
those who do not reciprocate; sanctions that flow across overlapping networks via 
facilitated communication about the trustworthiness, or lack of trustworthiness, of 
particular individuals.
Applying the concept of social capital to the regional and national level raises new 
issues. In particular it raises the question of whether social capital necessarily has to 
result in outcomes that are mutually beneficial to all in the region or the nation -  that is; 
must social capital result in common-good outcomes? Studies have now shown that 
social capital has costs as well as benefits; it can be a liability as well as an asset. This 
is sometimes referred to as the ‘dark side of social capital’ .228 An early criticism of the 
social capital literature was that it failed to appreciate the forms and consequences of 
these costs. In some cases, aspects of social capital may have adverse effects. For 
example, strong group bonds can reduce tolerance of outsiders and create an undue 
focus on the group’s needs to the detriment of the broader society. Putzel argues that 
the definition of social capital must recognise analytically distinct elements because:
there is a need to distinguish carefully between what might be seen as the 
mechanics o f  trust (the operation of networks, norms etc) and the political 
content and ideas transmitted through such networks and embodied in such 
norms. We can see how the mere existence of networks and norms
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underpinning trust between individuals or groups can facilitate exchange by 
reducing risks and making behaviour more predictable. But whether or not these 
networks will contribute to democracy has much more to do with the political
229ideas and programmes transmitted through them.
For members of cults, for example, group loyalties may be so binding that attempts to 
leave result in death; some successful members o f immigrant communities have 
reportedly Anglocised their names in order to divest themselves of obligations to 
support subsequent cohorts. The idea of dark-side outcomes is integral to the original 
formulation of social capital by Bourdieu and Coleman. They focused on how social 
capital enabled individuals to gain a competitive advantage, either in economic or 
human capital terms. A broader understanding of social capital accounts for both the 
positive and negative aspects by including vertical as well as horizontal associations 
between people, and includes behavior within and among organizations, such as firms. 
This view recognizes that horizontal ties are needed to give communities a sense of 
identity and common purpose, but also stresses that without ‘bridging’ ties that 
transcend various social divides (e.g. religion, ethnicity, and socio-economic status); 
horizontal ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow interests. Bonding social 
capital can actively preclude access to information and material resources that would 
otherwise be o f great assistance to the community.
The distribution of social capital will therefore be as important as its quantity since it 
may be available to individuals on an unequal basis. One approach to reconciling social 
capital’s costs and benefits is to recognize that it is multi-dimensional, that different 
combinations o f these dimensions might yield different outcomes. For example, ‘while 
the poor may possess some forms of social capital, they may well be lacking in others,
particularly those providing access to formal institutions. ’230 Recent literature
231distinguishes between bonding, bridging and linking social capital:
• Bonding social capital refers to relations among relatively homogenous groups (such 
as an ethnic, religious or socioeconomic group), and it strengthens the social ties 
within the particular group.
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• Bridging capital refers to relations between heterogenous groups, and it strengthens 
ties across such groups. Examples of bridging social capital include the civil rights 
movement and ecumenical religious organisations.
• Linking social capital refers to relations between individuals and groups in different 
social strata in a hierarchy where different groups access power, social status and 
wealth.
Studies highlight the importance of bridging social capital in societies characterised by 
considerable ethnic diversity. Trust limited within an ethnic group may promote norms 
of social interaction that are inward looking and less oriented to trust and co-operation 
at a broader community level. A particularly strong focus on group interests can 
encourage Tent seeking’ behaviour by the group to the disadvantage of the wider 
community. In relation to bonding and bridging social capital, Putnam argues that both 
types bring benefits, but in different ways:
Bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and 
mobilizing solidarity. Dense networks in ethnic enclaves, for example, provide 
crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of their 
community, while furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labour for 
local entrepreneurs. Bridging networks by contrast, are better for linkage to 
external assets and for information diffusion. Economic sociologist Mark 
Granovetter has pointed out that when seeking jobs — or political allies — the 
’weak’ ties that link me to distant acquaintances who move in different circles 
from mine are actually more valuable that the ‘strong’ ties that link me to 
relatives and intimate friends whose sociological niche is very like my own... 
Bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas 
bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40.2 3
The OECD defines social capital as the ‘networks together with shared norms, values 
and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups’.234 Hall, in his 
UK study, preferred measures of voluntary associations and informal socialising. In a 
study that mirrors Putnam’s study of United States, Hall examined social capital in 
Britain. He utilised various indicators to gauge five dimensions of social capital, 
namely: membership of voluntary organisations; volunteer work; charitable endeavours; 
informal sociability; and levels of social trust. He found that levels of social capital —
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derived by considering all five dimensions together —  ‘have not declined to an 
appreciable extent in Britain over the post war years’. However, he also noted that the 
level of social trust declined over this time (from 56 per cent in 1959 to 44 per cent in 
1990). The OECD points out that it is possible to distinguish at least four broad 
approaches to the concept:236
• one strand of the economic literature focuses on individuals’ incentives to interact 
with others and, out of self-interest, to invest in social capital resources; while 
another explores the design and effects of formal and informal institutions;
• from a strand of the political science literature comes an emphasis on the role of 
institutions and political and social norms in shaping human behaviour;
• the sociological literature, from its analysis of the social determinants of human 
motivation, brings a focus on features of social organisation such as trust, 
reciprocity and networks of civic engagement; and
• a strand o f the anthropological literature develops the notion that humans have 
natural instincts for association, providing a biological basis for social order.
Debates have focussed on the degree to which social capital stems from individual and 
institutional behaviour or from the inherent properties o f social networks. The broadest 
and most encompassing view of social capital includes the social and political 
environment that shapes social structure and enables norms to develop. This analysis 
extends the importance of social capital to the most formalized institutional 
relationships and structures, such as government, the political regime, the rule of law, 
the court system, and civil and political liberties. This view not only accounts for the 
virtues and vices o f social capital, and the importance o f forging ties within and across 
communities, but recognizes that the capacity of various social groups to act in their 
interest depends crucially on the support (or lack thereof) that they receive from the 
state as well as the private sector. Similarly, the state depends on social stability and 
widespread popular support. Economic and social development thrives when 
representatives of the state, the corporate sector, and civil society create forums in
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and through which they can identify and pursue common goals. Community 
development takes place when individuals work together for a common goal through 
collective action, and social capital is needed to provide the trust for people to work 
together. Strengthening civil society involves more than simply strengthening the 
capacity of groups and organisations to represent and address community needs and 
interests. It involves 'the forming of some civic institutions, as well as strengthening 
their capacity to engage with each other, with the state and with the market.’ 
Typically, the idea of social capital is associated with relations in civil society. 
However, relationships of trust and networks also involve public organizations and 
institutions. Social capital is embedded in norms and institutions, which include public 
and legal entities.
Trust refers to the level of confidence that people have that others will act as they say or 
are expected to act, or that what they say is reliable. A person’s level of trust in another 
depends largely on the person’s perception of the other’s trustworthiness, although 
people can also ‘invest’ trust in others. While trust can relate to individuals, it can also 
relate to groups and institutions within a society, including governments. It is also 
possible to conceive of ‘the general level of trust’ within a particular society. While 
many authors treat trust as an element of social capital, others see it as an important 
source or outcome of social capital but caution against treating trust as social capital 
itself. Putnam shows that in the United States trust is “highly correlated with other 
measures of social capital related to civic engagement and social connectedness”.
Of particular relevance for policy makers, there is some disagreement about the role of 
government in social capital formation. The idea of social capital is most often 
associated with relations within civil society, but networks and relationships of trust 
also involve government institutions. One strand of the literature emphasises the 
potential for governments to ‘crowd out’ civil society and to weaken informal networks. 
Another strand argues that public governance based on commitment to public welfare, 
accountability and transparency provides a basis for trust and social inclusion, which 
can in turn strengthen social capital. Under this view, public governance has the 
capacity, in some circumstances, to complement rather than displace community-based 
networks and to reinforce trust. In summary there are some common features of the
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definition of social capital:239
• All link the economic, social and political spheres. They share the belief that social 
relationships affect and are affected by economic outcomes.
• All focus on relationships among economic agents and the ways in which formal 
and informal organisations of these agents can improve the efficiency of economic 
activities.
• All imply that desirable social relationships and institutions have positive 
externalities. Since individuals cannot appropriate these externalities, agents tend to 
under invest in social capital, creating a role for public support.
4.3. Application to Government Performance
Is it possible to use Putnam's methodology in other countries, and explain differentials 
in institutional performance among governments with identical organisational forms? 
Putnam’s approach, applied in the Indian context, showed that There is plenty of 
qualitative evidence from India to suggest that features such as the level of trust and 
norms of cooperation crucially impinge on social well-being and on the effectiveness of 
government actions. However, so far there has been no study attempting to assess the 
role o f measurable aspects of social capital in accounting for observed differences in 
performance across Indian states. ’240 Measuring social capital is difficult but several 
studies have identified useful proxies for social capital, using various types of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods.
Renata Serra examined the possibility of replicating Putnam’s methodology in the 
context of the Indian states.241 In this study Serra discusses the available data for India 
at the state level, constructs some new indicators, and attempts some preliminary 
statistical analysis of the relationship between social capital and Indian State 
performance. Serra emphasises the specific empirical and conceptual issues one needs 
to pay attention to in the Indian context, and recommends that ‘future research in this
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area are to interpret data and design surveys very carefully; shift the focus from states as 
units of analysis, to either clusters of states identified according to historical and cultural 
features, or to select areas for fieldwork comparison; and finally, pay attention to the 
theoretical framework, in particular to the dynamics of the institutions - social capital 
relationship and to the role of education as a fundamental intervening variable in a 
country with widespread illiteracy such as India. ’ 242 The main conclusion is that ‘even 
when there is an indication of a statistical association between measures of social capital 
and performance, this association may be spurious or the line of causation doubtful. ’243 
In the Indian context poor performances have been explained in terms of previous 
historical experiences (more exploitative colonial domination), archaic productive 
relations in the countryside, lack of social change, ideology of the state in power, type 
of family systems etc. All these elements, although sometimes studied separately, are 
inextricably linked to one another. In particular, it seems that political failures at the top 
are as important causes as corruption of the local bureaucracy, and malfeasance or 
inertia on the part of the population. There might be a common root for the observed 
government inefficiency, bureaucratic corruption and inertia of the people in some 
Indian states. The question is whether this is at all similar to the one Putnam has found 
for Southern Italy, namely low mutual trust, absence of the conditions for individuals to 
pursue collective endeavours, lack of historical experience of cooperation - in summary, 
what Putnam calls a lack o f ‘social capital244
In the study Serra addresses the problems of arriving at a measure of the degree of 
society’s ‘civicness’ in India. Serra recognises that the extensive participation of the 
masses in political life has been a notable feature in India since independence and he 
uses as a measure of political participation figures on voter turnout at assemblies’ 
elections. Serra found that the only data on membership in associations at the Indian 
State level are those available from the Ministry of Rural Development in relation to a 
number of associations constituted under government initiatives. Similarly there is no 
comprehensive survey on newspaper readership in India or on access to media in 
general, which would indicate to what extent people are able to get information on 
issues relevant at the local or state level.
Serra found that a survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies
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(CSDS), the 1996 National Election Study Post-Poll Survey, is the only one which 
allows a comparison of aspects of social capital across states. Although the survey is 
conceived as a post-poll survey, aimed at analysing voting patterns and changing 
political allegiance of the electorate, it also asks questions on social structures of 
participation and cooperation. In particular, thirteen questions are relevant to the social 
capital concept. They identify broadly two areas, the first on electors’ views about their 
community, the role of elections and their representatives and officials; the second 
covering electors’ participation in community and public affairs: membership in 
associations, extent of contact with public officials and media usage.’245 Serra 
concludes that the most important implication is that the relationship between social 
capital and institutional performance is characterised by complex dynamics. Whereas 
people’s involvement in public affairs and their civic character might be important to 
explain current government performance, these elements are also affected by education, 
which is itself a product of previous policies. Future research must therefore address 
this issue and disentangle the elements of this relationship. This might imply re- 
qualifying the frequently made policy recommendation to invest in social capital. A 
more relevant point could be that public policy, in so far as it promotes universal 
education, might have a great impact on social capital.246
A recent study of villages in rural Tanzania found that households in villages with high 
levels of social capital (defined in terms of the degree of participation in village-level 
social organisations) have higher adjusted incomes per capita than do households in 
villages with low levels of social capital.247 Although no general conclusions could be 
drawn about the impact of social capital on government performance, the study points to 
a number of important linkages, including a positive association between social capital 
and the quality of local schooling. More recently Narayan has analysed two aspects of 
social, namely ‘cross-cutting ties’ and the interaction between informal and formal 
institutions. She concludes that by applying the concept of social capital a number of 
new policy approaches are suggested which can stem from civil society, the private 
sector, or the state and cover a wide range of fields, including: changes in rules so as to 
include those previously excluded in formal governance structures, at local, regional 
and national levels; political pluralism and citizenship rights; fairness for all social 
groups before the law; public access to mediation, conflict resolution or negotiation
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councils; availability of public spaces that bring social groups together; infrastructure 
that eases communication; education, media and public information policies that 
reinforce the norms and values supporting tolerance and respect for diversity.248
Matthew Morris in his study of Social Capital and Poverty in India focuses on poverty 
at the state level in India and asks the question; have those states with larger 
endowments of social capital been more successful at reducing poverty? 249 In order to 
answer this question he constructs an econometric model of poverty that not only 
captures the effects of physical and human capital, but also includes social capital as a 
determinant of poverty. Morris concludes that there is some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that a state's endowment of social capital does affect the ability of that state 
to reduce poverty. He introduces an important distinction that ‘in conceptualising social 
capital a distinction can be made between formal and informal social capital. Formal 
social capital refers to formally defined patterns of behaviour, norms of exchange, 
networks and institutions. Informal social capital refers to those networks (between 
individuals, families and groups) which operate outside of this formal system . ’250
Putterman in his article Social Capital and development capacity: the example o f  rural 
Tanzania asks two questions; ‘how and when do cultural conditions facilitate or retard 
economic development?’ and ‘are there any cultural preconditions for development? ’251 
He sees social capital as an expanded form of human capital; broadened to consider its 
social and cultural dimensions, and the importance of informal learning. He concludes 
that ‘human capital needs to be understood as a socially embedded and multi­
dimensional phenomena that takes time to be reshaped and to be accumulated.’ 
Putterman argues that social capital augments human capital and facilitates economic 
development through increasing a country’s capacity to absorb modem technologies and 
forms of organisation. Therefore changes in attitudes, practices and knowledge, though 
not necessarily correlated with indicators of economic development, may contribute to 
the potential of such development.
Rose argues in Social Capital: definition, measure, implications, that using the number 
of formal institutions in a society as a measure of social capital are insufficient because 
it ignores important informal social networks.252 It is stressed that far more people rely
83
on informal social capital than on formal institutions of state and market resources to 
deal with these problems. Rose uses sample survey techniques to collect data about 
behaviour, including interaction with national institutions of civil society and the state.
• Types of social capital are identified by asking the question: ‘on whose help do you 
rely in the first instance when having problems?’
• The significance of social capital for coping in transition economies was measured 
by considering the ‘percentage able to get by in a year without spending savings or 
borrowing.’
• Social capital for social protection was measured by asking ‘whether a friend would 
loan as much as a week’s wages if you’re household was very short of money.’
Knack and Keefer in there study Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A 
cross country investigation use data from the World Values Surveys and other sources 
to look at the relationship between interpersonal trust and norms of civic cooperation, 
and economic performance.2̂ ’ The World Values Survey provides national data on 
basic values and beliefs in a number of developed and developing countries. The survey 
was first conducted in the early 1980s. Further surveys were conducted in 1991-93, 
1995-97 and 1999-2000. Many researchers have used responses to the ‘trust’ question 
in the World Values Survey as an indicator of the level of social capital. Survey 
respondents are asked: Generally speaking, would you say that most people could be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
In the study the measure of trust was the percentage o f respondents who replied that 
‘most people can be trusted’ and the strength o f norms of civic co-operation was 
measured by people’s attitudes, measured on a scale of 1 (always justifiable) to 10 
(never justifiable), as recorded in the survey, to the following:
• claiming benefits when you are not entitled to;
• avoiding a fare on public transport
84
• cheating on taxes if you have the chance;
• keeping money that you have found; and
• failing to report damage you have done accidentally to parked vehicles.
Knack and Keefer found evidence that social capital is a determinant of measurable 
economic performance. While they found a significant positive relationship between 
trust and civic norms and economic growth they also discovered that ‘group 
membership is not significant in either growth or investment equations. ’254 They 
explained the apparent insignificance of associational activity as a predictor of growth 
by suggesting that the positive effect Putnam gave this variable in encouraging greater 
cooperation in society would be countered by the negative effects associations might 
have on growth when they act as “rent seeking organisations”. They came to the 
crucially important conclusion that the determinants of the significant social capital 
variables are stronger in countries where Tow social polarization, and formal 
institutional rules that constrain the government from acting arbitrarily, are associated 
with the development of co-operative norms and trust.’ This suggests that social 
capital can only enhance state capacity and economic growth where it promotes social 
cohesion. There is ample evidence of communities where social ties between members 
are strong but do not enhance social cohesion. This supports Tendier’s conclusion that 
social cohesion may be strengthened where public servants strive to develop ‘bridging 
social capital’ between government agencies and the community. However one 
difficulty with such questionnaire measures is that it is not clear if respondents interpret 
the meaning o f “trust” or “most people” in the same way in different cultures.
Helliwell and Putnam in Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy use Italian data 
on social capital to test the hypothesis that some Italian regions have been able to 
establish and maintain higher levels of output per capita by virtue of greater 
endowments of social capital. They measure three variables, namely:
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• An index of civic community - made up o f a measure of political behaviour of 
citizens (newspaper readership and the availability of sports and cultural 
associations) and a measure of the breadth and depth of civic community (turnover 
in referenda and the incidence of preference voting).
• An index of institutional performance - a composite measure on the comparative 
performance of regional governments. It covers 12 separate elements from 
timeliness of budgets to legislative innovations.
• An index of citizen satisfaction - the share of respondents who were ‘very’ or 
‘rather’ satisfied with their regional government.
In Government Failure, Social Capital and the Appropriateness o f the New Zealand 
Model for Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries, Wallis and Doilery seek to 
determine the implications of the government failure and social capital models for 
policy implementation. In particular the authors evaluate the New Zealand 
contractual ist approach to public management reform from a social capital perspective. 
Wallis and Dollary found that while the New Zealand model may offer a comprehensive 
package of ‘contractual solutions’ to the problems of government failure, they may 
sometimes hinder the development of social capital, which is sometimes required to 
enhance government capacity. They conclude that ‘policies to re-invigorate state 
capacity ought therefore to give as much consideration to the role of government 
agencies in fostering social capital as they do to ameliorating problems of government 
failure.’258
La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack (2000) examined the relationship between social 
capital and governmental performance using cross-country analysis for 29 (mainly 
developed) countries. The trust index from the World Values Survey was used as a 
proxy for social capital. The authors reported that a one standard deviation rise in trust 
(holding GNP constant) was associated with a 7 percentage point increase in judicial 
efficiency, a 3 percentage point fall in corruption, a 3 percentage point increase in 
bureaucratic quality and a 5 percentage point increase in tax compliance.
The literature contains numerous suggestions for government actions to build or support 
social capital. They cover an extremely broad array of matters, including parenting 
practices, education, and urban design, working hours, volunteering and civic 
participation, welfare provision, competition policy, corporate ethics, public liability, 
home ownership, the size of government and the conduct of public policy itself. 
Different proposals reflect different theories and understandings of social capital and 
how it is created and sustained (or destroyed). While some of the proposals address 
what are seen as the broad determinants of social capital, others are intended to 
influence social capital or its sources and outcomes more directly. Some call for active 
government programs to create new social capital. Others would entail changes to the 
way governments deliver the services they provide, and/or the devolution of 
responsibilities to people and organisations at the local level, with the aim of stimulating 
latent social capital in communities. The role of government in sustaining social capital 
is less clear than in the case of human capital. It may often have the role of facilitator, 
rather than main actor. At the same time, government and other public agencies have a 
diffuse, but collectively powerful influence on social capital formation. Agencies 
whose actions have influence on social capital are spread throughout government and 
the voluntary and private sectors. Local and regional levels of government will often 
have particularly important roles.2^9 A very recent report by the Australian Productivity 
Commission suggests that:
• Understanding how proposed policy interventions will affect the power and 
political interests of the stakeholders is a vital consideration, since all policy 
interventions occur in a social context characterised by a delicate mix of informal 
organisations, networks and institutions.
• It is critical to invest in the organisational capacity of the poor and to help build 
bridges between communities and social groups.
• Information disclosure policies at all levels encourage informed citizenship and 
accountability of both private and public actors.
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• Improvements in physical access and modem communications technology can foster 
information exchange across social groups and should be emphasised to 
complement social interaction based on face-to-face interchange.
• Social networks of the poor are one of the primary resources they have for managing 
risk and vulnerability, and outside agents therefore need to find ways to complement 
these resources, rather than substitute for them.
4.4. Social Capital and Ethnicity
A number of recent studies have directly addressed the issue of ethnic diversity and 
social capital. In a World Bank study of economic growth in Africa, Easterly and 
Levine found that ethnic diversity was negatively correlated with economic growth, 
schooling attainment, and availability of infrastructure and sound government policies 
across a number of African states. They infer from their results that ethnic diversity 
may make it more difficult for the political process to come to cooperative decisions 
about the allocation of public resources. Similarly, Rodrik argued that ethnic 
fragmentation was associated with a range of negative outcomes, including economic 
growth and income inequality.261 However, the measure of ethnic diversity used in both 
of these works was drawn from a discredited Russian study from the 1950s, rendering 
the explanatory value of their results questionable. Bates, in Ethnicity, Capital 
Formation and Conflict, studies how ethnic fragmentation in Africa affects political 
institutions, the potential for political violence, economic outcomes, and resistance to 
political reform. He finds that ‘ethnicity is double edged. On the one hand, ethnic 
groups promote the forces of modernization; phrased more fashionably, they constitute 
a form of social capital ... On the other hand, ethnic groups organize politically; 
occasionally they engage in acts of violence, destroying wealth and discouraging the 
formation of capital. Ethnic groups can thus both generate benefits and inflict costs on 
societies.’264 Finally, and most recently, Varshney looked at the impact of ethnic 
bonding, social capital and communal violence in India. He argued that more 
distinction needed to be made between social capital formation within ethnic groups (ie, 
‘bonding’ social capital) and the form of cross-cutting forms of civic engagement that 
takes place between groups (‘bridging’ social capital), and that only the latter is an
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agent of ethnic peace. According to Varshney, the different effects of the two forms of 
social capital can explain why some Indian cities have been able maintain Hindu- 
Muslim peace, whereas other cities suffer endemic violence.
Collier in The Political Economy o f Ethnicity investigates the effects of ethnic diversity 
on economic performance and the risk of violent conflict. He finds that ethnic 
diversity may have various detrimental microeconomic effects, tending to reduce public 
sector performance, increase patronage, and lower the level of trust among individuals. 
Ethnic diversity can reduce income by reducing trust and thereby raising transaction 
costs. However he concludes that whether ethnic diversity adversely affects overall 
economic growth depends on the political environment. Ethnic diversity is only highly 
damaging to economic growth where there are limited political rights, and highly 
ethnically diverse countries are less susceptible to violent conflict than more 
homogenous societies. He concludes that a lack of political rights is economically 
ruinous in ethnically highly fractionalised societies.267
These studies highlight the fact that there is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ social capital, particularly 
when it comes to the interplay between social capital and ethnic group formation. 
Social capital has costs as well as benefits; it can be a liability as well as an asset. 
Indeed, an early criticism of the social capital literature was that it failed to appreciate 
the forms and consequences of these costs. One particular example of negative social 
capital examined here is the phenomenon of ethnic tribalism: the formation of political 
units based on a common conception of ethnic origin and identity that compete with 
other similar groups for resources and prestige. These groups typically evidence very 
high levels of internal social cohesion and trust, but minimal levels of these same 
desirable qualities when it comes to their relations with other groups. They evidence 
‘bonding’ but not ‘bridging’ forms of social capital. Bonding social capital fortifies 
ethnic allegiances, reinforcing exclusionary attitudes and behaviour. Bridging social 
capital promotes the formation of new links of cross-cutting behaviour which, in theory, 
‘bridge’ these ethnic differences, creating the basis for new kinds of relationships which 
promote conflict management and help to break down tribal attachments.
Putnam’s analysis of civic traditions in Italy focuses primarily on ‘horizontal'
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associations in which members relate to each other on an equal basis. Putnam’s focus is 
the relationship between civil society and the state and in particular ‘Making Democracy 
Work compels social scientists to reconsider the causes of economic and political 
development. Yet, the relationship between state performance and civil society remains 
theoretically and empirically unresolved.’ However state - civil society relations are 
crucial to understand the context of institutional conditions in which developmental 
strategies evolve. The major issue for Putnam is how social trust, that is trust among 
those lacking intimate knowledge of each other, develop and is maintained in a society, 
and the ‘answer that Putnam provides is only partially satisfying. It may be correct but 
is incomplete. He claims that trust has two sources: norms of reciprocity and networks 
of civic engagement and the first are likely to be a function of the second. ’269 Putnam 
argues that bird-watching societies, soccer clubs, choral groups and the like engender 
sufficient interpersonal trust and assurances so that citizens are able to overcome the 
free rider problem, organise, and then effectively sanction governments that are not 
performing well. Moreover, the pluralist and crosscutting cleavages of an active 
citizenry ensure that the demands will be democratic in overall effect. However Levi 
questions this idea and argues that ‘to determine whether there is a connection between 
such memberships and generalized trust requires a more precise concept of trust than 
Putnam offers... I believe trust is more likely to emerge in response to experience and
9 7 0institutions outside the small associations than as a result of membership.’
Nonetheless, it remains an empirical question, still inadequately explored despite the 
high quality of this research, that good government is the result of an interaction 
between a civic-minded citizenry and civic-minded government actors. Rodriguez 
argues that ‘while one can understand that the core of Putnam’s argument is the capacity 
of particular civil associations to socialize their members into norms of reciprocity, the 
alleged autonomy and neutrality of the associations gives false foundations -  in my
271view -  to their capacity of reinforcement of good governance.’
A growing body of evidence shows that incorporating the poor into the design and 
implementation of development projects helps not only to produce more appropriate 
projects, but also ensures that they are better targeted to reach those with the greatest 
needs. Brown and Ashman in Participation, Social Capital, and Intersectoral Problem
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Solving: African and Asian Cases, provides a comparative analysis of 13 cases of 
intersectoral cooperation among public agencies, nongovernmental organisations, 
grassroots groups, and international donors. Their analysis found that different forms of 
social capital were central to the successful implementation of participatory projects. 
They found that The creation and strengthening of social capital in the form of local 
organizations and networks is an essential task in building intersectoral cooperation that 
mobilises and utilizes local resources and energies for problem solving.’ Their case 
studies showed that social capital is both an important bases for cooperation across 
sector and power differences and that it is an important product of such cooperation. In 
the course of these programs, ‘local organizations were strengthened or created; 
bridging NGOs expanded their activities and their credibility with other actors; norms of 
reciprocity, cooperation and trust were established among previously unrelated or 
antagonistic parties.’ However, ‘the sceptics acknowledge that strong social
networks and a dense web of civic associations are likely to facilitate certain aspects of 
economic performance. However, they don’t accept that these improvements 
necessarily result in lower levels of poverty, inequality, violence and social exclusion. 
What makes the difference to those goals are particular configurations of social capital, 
civil society, state-society relations and many other factors, all acting together. These 
configurations cannot be engineered, subjected to universal prescriptions, or captured by 
the language and methods of the economist.’274 States, firms, and communities alone do 
not possess the resources needed to promote broad-based, sustainable development; 
complementarities and partnerships forged both within and across these different sectors
97Sare required.
However, the strongest critiques to Putnam’s ‘reworking’ of democracy question his 
premise on the existence of a path dependency or historical determination for the 
accumulation of social capital along with his strategic disregard of the state as principal 
actor in the experiment o f Italian regionalisation.
4.5. The Theoretical Framework
An important issue to address is how social trust develops, and is maintained within a
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society and particularly between society and government. Putnam argues that trust has 
two sources i.e. norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. In his 
argument this is the key link between social capital and institutional performance. The 
focus of my research therefore is on the relationship between these two variables. This 
involves the application of regression analysis. The approach is to focus attention on 
the dependent variable, and to study its relationship with a number of relevant 
independent variables. Specifically in this study we are seeking to determine the effects 
of the different independent variables on the dependent variable (i.e. institutional 
performance), by estimating the ‘unique variance’ each independent variable accounts 
for. We would like to be able to say which independent variable (e.g. the stock of social 
capital) are the most, and which are the least important in accounting for variance in the 
dependent variable (institutional performance). We are trying to identify which 
factor(s) bring about change in the dependent variable. If Putnam’s theory is correct 
then if we strengthen norms of reciprocitv and ‘networks of civic engagement’ then 
‘trust’ will be enhanced. Enhanced ‘social trust’ should then promote improved 
institutional performance. This is important knowledge for us if we are seeking to 
identify strategies to improve institutional performance because as Putnam states:
a society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a 
distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. 
If we don’t have to balance every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more 
accomplished. Trustworthiness lubricates social life. Frequent interaction 
among a diverse set of people tends to produce a norm of generalized 
reciprocity. Civic engagement and social capital entail mutual obligation and 
responsibility for action.276
This is not the first study of social capital in PNG. In 1998 a ‘Social Capital Working 
Group’ (SCWG) was established on the initiative o f the UN Resident Representative in 
PNG. The SCWG comprised a wide range of individuals from donor organisations and 
academia. De Renzio and Kavanamur published a paper, the draft of which was the 
subject of the group’s discussion, and which studied social capital in PNG in terms of 
the ‘wantok’ system and bigman patronage. The paper discusses the concept of social 
capital particularly emphasising the diversity of definitions. It then focuses on the 
sources of social capital such as cross sectoral linkages, political capital etc. The paper 
recognised that the ‘wantok system’ constitutes a source of social capital but that
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‘despite its positive effects and its strong “embeddedness” in Papua New Guinea 
society, the wantok system seems to lack an appropriate level of “autonomy” that would 
allow for broader and more positive development impacts.’ Significant costs 
identified include as a disincentive to work, and the negative impacts on the public 
service ‘where often appointments are made based on nepotism along kinship lines, and 
where there is a widespread lack of coordination and cooperation between groups 
belonging to different regions or clans.’ The paper suggests some broad strategies 
that might be adopted by governments to redress some of the negative effects of the 
“wantok” system. They also argue in their paper that PNG is characterised by vertical 
links of patronage and dependence similar to those existing in Southern Italy as 
described by Putnam. They explain that the lack of appropriate mechanisms for 
participation and accountability in the form of cross-sectoral linkages instead allows for 
the exploitation of public resources by individuals and reinforces the dependency and 
patronage that characterise state-society relations. What is not clear from the paper 
is why the “wantok” system was chosen as the most significant source of social capital 
in PNG. Further, unlike this study, there is no attempt to quantify the relative 
importance of the various sources identified.
Bonding and Bridging Social Capital
It was explained earlier that an important distinction in the literature has been made 
between the particular type of social capital in a particular context. Bonding social 
capital refers to relations among relatively homogenous groups (such as an ethnic, 
religious or socioeconomic group), and it strengthens the social ties within the particular 
group. Whereas bridging capital refers to relations between heterogenous groups, and it 
strengthens ties across such groups. A number of studies highlight the importance of 
bridging social capital in societies characterised by considerable ethnic diversity. Trust 
limited within an ethnic group may promote norms of social interaction that are inward 
looking and less oriented to trust and co-operation at a broader community level. A 
particularly strong focus on group interests can encourage ‘rent seeking’ behaviour by 
the group to the disadvantage of the wider community.
One particular example of negative social capital relevant in the PNG context is the
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phenomenon of ethnic tribalism: the formation of political units based on a common 
conception of ethnic origin and identity that compete with other similar groups for 
resources and prestige. These groups typically evidence very high levels of internal 
social cohesion and trust, but minimal levels of these same desirable qualities when it 
comes to their relations with other groups. They evidence ‘bonding’ but not ‘bridging’ 
forms of social capital. Bonding social capital fortifies ethnic allegiances, reinforcing 
exclusionary attitudes and behaviour. Bridging social capital promotes the formation of 
new links of cross-cutting behaviour which, in theory, ‘bridge’ these ethnic differences, 
creating the basis for new kinds of relationships which promote conflict management 
and help to break down tribal attachments.
Therefore in the case of PNG it is generally recognised that ethnicity is likely to be an
important factor impacting on social capital. For example, the PNG Human
Development Report explains how village organisations are typically divided into two
main categories - traditional and introduced structures. The traditional structures are the
tribe and clan, with elders or chiefs providing strong cultural and social leadership. The
report explains how clan groupings are very capable of organising and implementing
activities and programs. Clans encourage sustainability of values, norms, and
principles. Traditionally, clan leaders hold authority and are well respected by villagers.
The respect for elders in rural villages contributes to peace and harmony. The influence
of traditional leadership is therefore found to be strong and often overrides that of
government representatives. This is especially apparent in remote villages although it is
still an important factor in most villages. Leaders also generally mediate disputes, law
281and order issues, and rights to local resources.
Many political theorists now distinguish ‘civil society’ from ‘state’, by using the first to 
denote forms of association which are spontaneous, customary, and in general not 
dependent upon law, and the second to denote the legal and political institutions which 
protect, endorse, and bring to completion the powerful but inarticulate forces of social 
union. Li Puma argues that ‘the form and content of the contemporary nation-state were 
imported into the Pacific thanks to and as the offshoot of, occupation by European 
powers. As a result, what existed of civil society under the colonial administration was 
a form of public sphere and discourse whose function was to legitimise, underwrite, and
otherwise locate the virtues of colonial rule. The process then embarked on is one of 
‘nation building’ which refers to ‘the moulding of a common set of outlooks, 
orientations, and loyalties towards an integrated national community. The task of 
nation-building in the context is to recast the particularistic and parochial orientations of 
the subgroups in the multiethnic state so that a new unifying consciousness and 
commitment is erected around national symbols, myths, and aspirations. ’283 The 
problem for the new nation-states of Melanesia, particularly those such as Papua New 
Guinea, which is well known for its cultural heterogeneity, it is not only in trying to 
resolve the tensions between these concepts, but also in the reality that the entire notion 
of civil society is, as Chatterjie eloquently argues, ‘Eurocentric in an important way: 
there is no space or allowance for ‘community’. This concept of civil society has no 
space for regionalism, ethnicity, and the other factors that determine nation making in 
the Pacific. ’284 Ralph Premdas argues that in PNG
especially after World War II, the country was dramatically transformed as 
Australia, in hurried frenzy, pumped millions of dollars into the economy to 
prepare for self-government. Large numbers of Papua New Guineans were 
caught up in this radical transformation process that would modify and recast 
their ethnic and class identities. From a simple traditional society, a complex 
and highly differentiated social and economic order had emerged. Ethnic claims 
to identities, malleable and impoverished became pervasive, serving as defence 
mechanisms and stabilisers in a turbulently changing world. The ethnic 
dimension emerged as a salient prism through which most development efforts 
were interpreted and directed. In some instances, the ethnic factor became a 
formidable force in defining national issues and allocating scarce resources.
Also in these countries there is a general distrust of government because ‘there is a 
widespread belief that government is a form of patron-client relationship, between those 
with power and access to resources and those without.’ However, the formation of 
civil society is a critical dimension of the emergence of ‘the nation’ because civil 
society is the way in which a nation becomes a putative actor in relation to the state. 
This permits ‘the people’ to press the claim that the role of government or state is to 
serve the ‘needs’ of that nation -  that is, to act politically as if the state is separate from 
and subordinate to the citizenry.
Tony Regan examines the possibility that popular participation and civil society might
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offer hopes of increased acceptance of limits on the state in Melanesia in the future. He 
finds that there is little evidence so far for any significant impact from a Melanesian 
civil society. He concludes that in Melanesia, small pre-state structures with their own 
norms are the primary sources of identity and the main centre of loyalties of most 
individuals, often undercutting national identity and support for the state. With such 
different political and economic forces at work, it is most unlikely that either
constitutionalism or civil society will develop in the same way in the Melanesian
288countries as they have in the West.
4.6. Measuring Government Performance
In order to answer the research problem what data is needed to measure government 
performance, and how should it be collected and analysed?
In his study for each regional government Putnam sought to evaluate the policy 
processes; policy pronouncements; and policy implementation. Putnam begins with 
three measures of policy processes and internal operations: cabinet stability, budget 
promptness, and statistical and information services. Next his analysis went beyond 
‘process’ measures and considered the content of policy decisions. He did this based on 
a comprehensive examination of regional legislation i.e. reform legislation and 
legislative innovation. Finally he considers policy implementation, and he uses six 
indicators to measure a region’s capacity to carry out policy in virtually all of the major 
sectors of regional government activity, including public health, social welfare, 
industrial and agricultural development, and housing and urban policy. The first two of 
these indicators represent direct service delivery; the next one reflects the repertoire of 
policy tools deployed by each region; and finally three focus on how effective the 
regional governments were at using funds offered to them by the central government 
(‘spending capacity’). The measures were: day care centres, family clinics, industrial 
policy instruments, agricultural spending capacity, local health unit expenditures and 
housing and urban development. Putnam used as measures the promptness in approving 
the provincial budget, provision of schools and health clinics, and bureaucratic 
responsiveness to citizens’ queries amongst others.
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Between 1976 and 1989 Putnam conducted case studies on the internal politics of the 
regional institutions, and on political developments within each of the six selected 
regions. He and his colleague’s made regular visits to the six regions to meet with 
political leaders, party representatives, top civil servants, interest group leaders, and 
others, and ‘we became personally acquainted with key participants in the political and 
economic life of the region, from whom we gained an intimate knowledge of the 
internal political maneuvering and personalities that have animated regional politics 
over the last two decades.’ Figure 2 compares the results for the performance of the 
Italian regional governments during two analyses in the 1970s. The results show a high 
degree of stability in performance between periods.
To confirm his measures of institutional performance of the regional governments 
Putnam surveys the level of citizen satisfaction with regional government, and which is 
shown in Figure 3 below. The results generally provide a confirmation of the accuracy 
of his performance measures.
In general, for my analysis, I adopt the same definition as Putnam that ‘the concept of 
institutional performance in this study rests on a very simple model of 
governance...Government institutions receive inputs from their social environment and 
produce outputs to respond to that environment... A high-performance democratic 
institution must be both responsive and effective: sensitive to the demands of its 
constituents and effective in using limited resources to address those demands.’290 It 
has been argued that ‘it seems that political capital in Papua New Guinea is 
characterized by vertical links of patronage and dependence similar to those existing in 
Southern Italy, as described by Putnam.’ An important aim of my research is to test 
this theory.
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FIGURE 2
Putnam - Institutional Performance, 1970-1976 and 1978-1985.
Index of Institutional Performance, 1978-1985 
Correlation: r = .78
Source: Putnam, R. op cit., p.76.
FIGURE 3
Putnam - Institutional Performance (1978 - 1985) and 
Citizen Satisfaction (1977 - 1988)
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Correlation: r = .84
Source: Putnam, R. op cit., p.77.
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4.7. Measuring Social Capital
Social scientists have been attempting to measure social capital under different forms 
(level o f trust, extent o f inter-personal commitments, density o f social networks, number 
of tertiary associations, social homogeneity, political participation), and at various 
levels (the community, the village, the region, the state). As a result a number of 
important themes have emerged:
• The notion o f more or less dense interlocking networks o f relationships between 
individuals and groups. People engage with others through a variety o f lateral 
associations. These associations must be both voluntary and equal.
• The individual provides a service to others, or acts for the benefit o f others at a 
personal cost. They do this in the general expectation that this kindness will be 
returned at some undefined time in the future.
• We act this way based on confidence that others will respond as expected and will 
act in mutually supportive ways.
• There are social norms, which provide a form o f informal social control, that 
remove the need for more formal institutionalised legal sanctions.
• The combined effect o f trust, networks, norms and reciprocity creates a strong 
community, with shared ownership over resources known as the ‘commons’. As 
long as community is strong, it removes the problem o f the opportunist who would 
use the community resource without contributing to it.
• The development o f social capital requires the active and willing engagement o f  
citizens within a participative community.
99
Obtaining a single, true measure of social capital is probably not possible, for several 
reasons. Firstly, the most comprehensive definitions of social capital are 
multidimensional, incorporating different levels and units of analysis. Secondly, the 
nature and forms of social capital change over time, as the balance shifts between 
informal organisations and formal institutions. Thirdly, because no long-standing cross 
country surveys were initially designed to measure social capital, researchers have had 
to compile indexes from a range of approximate items eg measures of trust, confidence 
in government, voting trends and social mobility. Given that in Putnam’s analysis civic 
community in Italy is characterised by active participation in public affairs, horizontal 
relations of reciprocity and cooperation, bonds of solidarity and trust, and distinctive 
social structures and practices characterised by thriving local associations it should be 
possible to construct relevant indicators for a similar context.
For measuring social capital there is usually a reliance on secondary sources of data, but 
also the appropriateness of conducting surveys, and field observation is relevant. Some 
of the possible measures include:
• data for voter turnout;
• membership in associations;
• newspaper readership; and
• surveys.
Surveys may well represent the most valid means for getting information on people’s 
views of politics, their level of trust in governments, types of associational activity and 
interest in public affairs. A survey can be designed to ask individuals about the extent 
and characteristics of their associational activity, and their trust in various institutions 
and individuals. For example the Tanzania village study, referred to earlier, has two 
areas of focus:
• elector’s views about their community, the role of elections and their representations 
and officials; and
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• elector’s participation in community and public affairs; membership in associations, 
extent of contact with public officials and media usage.
Furthermore three dimensions of social capital were measured in the Tanzanian study, 
namely:
• their membership in groups;
• the characteristics of those groups in which the households were members; and the 
individuals values and attitudes, particularly their definition; and
• the expressed level of trust in various groups and their perception of social 
cohesion.294
In regard to the elector’s views for each group in which an individual reported 
membership, questions were asked about that group’s characteristics in several 
dimensions relevant to that group’s contribution to social capital. For instance, if the 
groups membership is ‘inclusive' we assumed any given individual’s membership in 
that group contributed more to social capital than membership in a group in which 
membership is ‘exclusive’ to a particular clan or ethnic group. With this data on the 
frequency of membership and the characteristics of groups we created an index of the 
village associational life, which we argue is a proxy for social capital.295 However 
consideration should be given as to whether ‘traditional associations’ function in a 
similar way to the ‘civic associations’ which are the subject of Putnam’s analysis. This 
is particularly relevant in PNG. As a practical example a Global Social Capital Survey 
was designed by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network of the 
World Bank for use in Uganda.296 The survey includes questions on the following:
• groups or organisations, networks, associations, both formal and informal. These 
could be groups such as religious groups, sports teams or just groups of people who 
get together regularly to do an activity or talk;
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• subjective wellbeing e.g. how do the people in their community, village, or 
neighbourhood get along;
• political engagement e.g. did individuals vote in the last national elections;
• sociability or everyday social interactions i.e. in addition to participating in group 
activities or associations, people also do so many activities informally with others eg 
spend time with people outside your household in doing chores, talking, drinking or 
just spending time together;
• community activities eg number of times per month individuals volunteered in any 
community activities;
• relations with the government eg the competency and/or efficiency of government 
institutions;
• identity i.e. who they are, where they come from, and their sense of belonging;
• violence and crime eg sometimes different groups living in the same area live 
together peacefully, however at other times there is tension and disagreement 
between different groups;
• communication e.g. access to newspapers and radio; and
• demographics e.g. characteristics such as size of household schooling and 
employment.
While the use of the survey method would at first appear to be preferable Standish 
found in Simbu that ‘after two attempts at administering questionnaires, I abandoned 
this, the usual methodology of elite studies as impractical. I chose not to conduct 
formal surveys of political attitudes or awareness for three reasons: cost, lack of time to 
organize, and shortage of interviewers; the problems of sample selection and the
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difficulty in Simbu society of speaking privately with single individuals (conversations 
can become public group performances); and the danger that the questions themselves 
would influence opinion.’297 Therefore the appropriateness of surveys needs to be 
carefully evaluated according to the particular context.
Returning to Putnam’s methodology Figures 3 and 4 below summarise the overall 
conclusion from Putnam’s research. Figure 4 shows the relationship between economic 
modernity and institutional performance for the Italian regional governments researched 
by Putnam. The data suggests that there is a fairly strong correlation between the level 
of economic modernity and the performance of the regional governments. However this 
relationship is not nearly as strong as it is for the relationship between civic community 
and institutional performance. This relationship for Italian regional government is 
provided in Figure 5. According to the results from Putnam’s methodology and 
research there is a very strong positive correlation between the measured level of 
civicness and the performance of regional governments in Italy.
0
1
Source: Putnam, R. op cit., p.85.
FIGURE 4
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FIGURE 5
Putnam - Civic Community and 
Institutional Performance.
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Source: Putnam, R. op cit., p.98.
4.8. Conclusions
The widespread and interdisciplinary enthusiasm for social capital and civil society as 
outlined in this chapter indicates the very broad rang of disciplines for which narrow 
economic models, especially the “rational choice manifestation”, provide an inadequate 
basis for understanding and analysing social and political life. This chapter has 
described a methodology applied by Robert Putnam to analyse the performance of local 
government in Italy, and more recently replicated by Renata Serra to study the 
performance of Indian State governments. We have seen how there have been other 
subsequent studies to replicate Putnam’s methodology in different contexts. These 
studies are important for this research because they apply social capital theory at the 
regional and national level.
As shown above applying social capital theory at the regional and national level, 
however, raises the issue of “common-good outcomes”, and the distribution of social 
capital becomes important. Furthermore the distinction between the types of social
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capital is relevant, especially when the theory is applied in highly ethnically fragmented 
societies. A number of studies stress the importance of whether social capital is o f the 
“bonding” or “bridging type. The predominance of bonding social capital in a society 
characterised by a high level of ethnic fragmentation, along ethnic lines, suggests that 
social and political outcomes may not be to the benefit of the broad community.
It is recognised by all of the studies described that measuring social capital is difficult, 
but several studies have identified useful proxies, and apply various types of qualitative 
and quantitative research methods. Woolcock and Narayan show how ‘in unpacking the 
literature on social capital and development, a recurring message is that social relations 
provide opportunities for mobilizing other growth-enhancing resources, that social 
capital does not exist in a political vacuum, and that the nature and extent of the 
interactions between communities and institutions hold the key to understanding the 
prospects for development in a given society. ’299 Therefore applying social capital 
involves recognising the role of government. A number of studies apply social capital 
theory in explaining the differential in institutional performance among governments, 
and also many suggest ways in which governments may build or support social capital.
This study seeks to explore the existence and role of social and civic norms and 
individual’s attitudes towards others, focusing in particular on the degree of trust 
individuals felt towards social groups, such as family, village or tribe, and towards 
government authorities, at the provincial level in PNG .300 This research assumes that 
trust is an outcome of social capital.
As explained above social capital is created from the myriad of everyday interactions 
between people. It originates with people forming social connections and networks 
based on principles of trust, mutual reciprocity and norms of action, however ‘a 
minimum level of material conditions may be a prerequisite for the development of 
social capital. People who are not able to satisfy their basic material needs find it hard 
to look beyond them. Even when they can, money is still needed for material things that 
enable social capital opportunities to be taken... Once a minimal level is in place, 
material conditions, particularly income and education, are irrelevant to social 
capital. ’301 However PNG’s experiment with a provincial government structure allows
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us to replicate the basic methodology of Putnam's study of social capital in Italy. The 
focus of the next chapter is to apply the methodologies in the PNG context.
An important issue to address in the analysis is how social trust develops, and is 
maintained, in a society. For example, central to Putnam's argument is that trust has 
two sources i.e. norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. The focus of 
my research is this presumed link. In particular in the PNG context I look for evidence 
to show that The lack of appropriate mechanisms for participation and accountability in 
the form of cross-sectoral linkages... allows for the exploitation of public resources by 
individuals and reinforces the dependency and patronage that characterize state-society 
relations.’ This is a view that has not been thoroughly researched. It is critical 
because in the PNG context, governance can be broadly conceived as the improvement 
of politics, with the emphasis being put on the institutional framework of the 
decentralised political system. In this context, it is closely related to what was referred 
to in the 1960s as institution building or institution capacity building, but it also carries 
the wider connotation of the overall quality of government, including the central aspects 
of political legitimacy and accountability.303 A further empirical complexity is that 
social capital could be either a cause or a consequence (or both) of high levels of social 
and economic wellbeing. The next chapter describes the broad research design which 
seeks to address the critical issues outlined in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
‘Soaking and poking, as Richard Fenno describes it, requires the researcher to marinate herself in the minutiae 
o f  an institution -  to experience its customs and practices, its successes and its failings, as those who live it
every day do’ 304
5.1. Methodology
Here I relate the current study to the context of previous research on social capital 
described in the preceding chapters. In particular I discuss the range of research methods 
applicable and justify my choice. Firstly, 1 explain the stance I have adopted as a 
researcher including my philosophical and academic disciplinary assumptions. These 
assumptions provide the basis for determining my research method. Secondly I discuss the 
research methods used for this research.
The underlying philosophy of this study is based in applied social science, and therefore 
seeks to use sociology, anthropology, economics and political science in order to test an 
explanatory theory about people and their behaviour. It is also accepted that there is a need 
to use information and data that sometimes cannot be easily quantified, as well as, that 
which can. The other important influence on this research design was my aim to replicate 
the Putnam methodology in the PNG context to test for meaningful results. As explained 
above in his study of Italian regions Putnam used a variety of techniques, both qualitative 
(e.g. field observation and case study) and quantitative (e.g. multiple regression and factor 
analysis). Putnam also took into account the history of the various regions and how this 
may have influenced the present situation.
My methodological approach was therefore influenced by my aim to replicate the Putnam 
study but in the PNG context. However, unlike Putnam who had significantly greater 
resources available this study needed to be more limited in scope. Therefore I have chosen 
to use one qualitative and one quantitative method in this study. These research methods 
and the reasons for selecting them are discussed below.
5.2. Research Method
Here I discuss the range of research methods that could be used, and justify the method 
chosen. The research program and operational techniques are also explained. The focus of 
my research is on provincial government in PNG, because the apparent failure of provincial 
government in that country is increasingly given as a reason for the lack of broad based 
development. Axline points out that most attempts to reform provincial government focus 
on institutional structure, and financial resources, but
it is difficult to know why attention has been paid almost exclusively to the legal 
and institutional aspects of governance at the expense of looking at some of the less 
formal aspects of the political process. Perhaps it is because of the heavy emphasis 
that was put on the constitutional aspects of de-colonisation at the time of 
independence. Perhaps it is because it is much easier to undertake more 
‘mechanical’ changes to government machinery than it is to take a serious look at 
certain aspects of society and culture. Perhaps it is because the shortcomings of 
provincial government are so visible and so susceptible to stimulate outrage, that it 
becomes the natural target for explaining a wide variety of political difficulties. 
Whatever the reason, one result of the emphasis that has been put on institutional 
reform is to foster the belief that much of what is wrong with governance in Papua 
New Guinea is the result of the provincial government system/ 5
The provincial governments in PNG have essentially identical institutional designs and 
therefore performance differences between provinces cannot be explained by this factor, 
but there are vast differences between provinces in terms of their economic endowments. 
One would therefore expect that the wealthier provinces enjoyed an advantage over their 
poorer counterparts in economic and financial resources, but it seems that the different 
levels of provincial government performance cannot be explained by their respective levels 
of economic and human resources. John Burton shows, for example, how Western 
Province, generally regarded as one of the worst performing provincial governments, has 
received substantial funding, and ‘by 1992, only Enga, a far more populous mining 
province, edged out Western for the top spot in the provincial rankings of overall 
funding.’306 A recent study of Western Province by the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID), found that the province ‘is relatively wealthy 
compared to other provinces. But two dominant features of the provincial economy are a 
marked dualism and poor financial resource utilisation. The majority of the population is 
not significantly involved in the cash economy, receives few benefits from the province’s
income, and gets minimal service from government. These shortcomings are attributable 
more too poor administration and planning and a limited economic base than to a lack of 
financial resources.’307 A similar observation can be made of the other ‘resource rich’ 
provinces. The hypothesis tested in this study parallels the specific research questions that 
were discussed above i.e. that a large stock of social capital leads to better provincial 
government performance, and a higher level of provincial development.
For the analysis East New Britain (ENB) Province has been chosen because ‘the emergence 
and consolidation of one of the unarguably success stories of decentralization in the face 
not only of major cleavages in the province but also of the limited resources available to 
any provincial government offers insights into several aspects of the developing debate on 
decentralization.’ By contrast Gulf Province ‘was unprepared for provincial government. 
Its peoples did not know how to make the most of it; they were disunited and inexperienced 
in organising themselves for access to public benefits when such benefits became a ;ea! 
possibility.’309 Funding to provincial governments is supposed to be provided according to 
a redistributive formula that favours poorer provinces, and their respective levels of 
resources cannot explain the different levels of performance of these provincial 
governments.
At a workshop on PNG provincial capacities organised by the State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Project at the Australian National University (ANU) in May 2000 
a series of provincial overviews were produced. The objective of each overview was to 
provide a broad understanding of the structure and operation of a provincial economy and 
of its prospects for growth. They covered the following broad subjects:
• the key socio-economic, physical resources and political features which impact on 
development;
• the current ‘state’ of the province including the infrastructure, services, and law and 
order;
• provincial government structures and effectiveness;
• the ‘state’ of the private sector;
• the role of civil society organisations; and
• the role of aid agencies in the province.
The ANU Workshop highlighted the extreme variations in the level of economic and social 
development existing between provinces. For example, Manus was rated as the best 
performing province in terms of effective governance, reasonable income levels and near 
universal primary school education. Several other provinces, e.g. Madang and Morobe, 
have specific problems (such as deteriorating law and order), but are generally performing 
reasonably well. However, several other provinces in rapid decline were identified. In 
particular, key development indicators are dropping in Southern Highlands Province, with 
the law and order situation deteriorating. It was suggested that the sociopolitical climate in 
Southern Highlands is extending across the other Highlands provinces spreading instability. 
Sandaun, in the extreme north-west o f PNG and Western provinces are also in decline, with 
worsening governance becoming more and more apparent. The question is to what extent 
can the different levels of performance be attributed to social capital?
In addition how significant is ‘traditional association’ in this context? Robert Bates argues 
that ‘ethnicity is double edged. On the one hand, ethnic groups promote the forces of 
modernization; phrased more fashionably, they constitute a form of social capital... On the 
other hand, ethnic groups organize politically; occasionally they engage in acts o f violence, 
destroying wealth and discouraging the formation o f capital. Ethnic groups can thus both 
generate benefits and inflict costs on societies. ’ 310 The benefits are: they render credible, 
implicit contracts between the generations within their constituent family units, thus 
strengthening the incentives that enable families to serve as instruments for the formation 
of human capital and agencies for the modernisation of society. Recognising the
central role of families in ethnic organizations enables us better to grasp the 
relationship between modernisation and ethnicity. To a significant degree, 
modernization is achieved through the process o f human capital formation. This 
process is privately organized; that is to say, it is organized by families. Families 
organize the flow of resources between generations and sectors, thus promoting the 
acquisition o f skills and urban migration, and thus the modernization of societies. 
Ethnic structures of power help to preserve the contract between generations within
T 1 1
family units.
Bates argues that this occurs because:
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• Ethnie groups strengthen the role of the older generation; particularly elders and 
family heads in rural areas, providing them with sanctions over junior kin.
• In many agrarian societies, individuals often cannot freely transfer land. The 
constraints on land use also yield power to elders, and thereby strengthen the 
credibility of intergenerational contracts and the capacity of families to form capital.
• Ethnicity mobilises not only sociological but also cultural forces that safeguard 
contracts between generations. The older generation, based in the rural areas, 
exploits its position as the custodian of the “true” culture of their communities. Its 
members lay claim to this position in order to control the behaviour of their 
offspring.
It has been commented that ‘cooperation and collaboration across ethnic and clan lines 
remains difficult for CBOs and NGOs in some parts of the Pacific. In the view of Jennifer 
Clement, a gender and community development specialist currently based in Papua New 
Guinea, the bonding aspect of civil society is strong; the bridging aspect remains weak. 
This makes collaboration and networking difficult and sustains fragmentation and 
infighting.’ The positive or negative role of traditional association on social capital may 
be relevant for explaining the different performance of provincial governments in PNG.
The main research question to be answered is:
• What has been the importance, if any, of social capital and in particular ethnicity, on the 
performance of provincial governments in PNG?
A number of other research questions follow from this, namely:
• What has been the relative performance of the PNG provincial governments and can 
this be explained by their level of development?
• What measures are available for the stock of social capital in the provinces?
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How might the major ethnic groups in the provinces be measured?
• Which of these various measures of social capital seem to be most strongly associated 
with government performance?
In the selected provinces the additional research questions are:
• What has been the role of collective political engagement or alienation of different 
ethnic solidarity groups for determining the development of government institutions?
• What are the role of community organisations along ethnic group lines and the role that 
group ties played in shaping the political organisation of the selected provinces?
As explained above the underlying philosophy of this study is based in applied social 
science, and therefore seeks to use a broad range of disciplines to test an explanatory theory 
(i.e. social capital) about society. The other important influence on the research 
methodologies chosen was my aim to replicate the Putnam methodology. Again, as 
explained earlier, in his study of Italian regions Putnam used a variety of techniques, both 
qualitative (e.g. field observation and case study) and quantitative (e.g. multiple regression 
and factor analysis). Putnam also took into account the history of the various regions and 
how this may have influenced the present situation. I therefore decided to use at least one 
quantitative research method which was regression analysis because of the importance 
given to this analytical method in the Putnam study. I have also chosen to use one 
qualitative method in this study and decided that in the PNG context to collect information 
on the nature of civil society in the three provinces the most feasible methodology was field 
observation. I also decided to interview the leaders of the most significant civil society 
organisations in the respective provinces. In addition it was only feasible to undertake 
qualitative fieldwork in three provinces so it was important to have a contrast between 
those provinces chosen in terms of their culture, history and resource endowments. I 
decided to choose one province each from the Papua (Southern), Highlands, and New 
Guinea Islands Region.
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CHAPTER 6
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE PROVINCES
‘the bonding aspect o f civil society is strong, the bridging aspect remains weak. This makes collaboration and 
networking difficult and sustains fragmentation and infighting. ” 1 ’
6.1. Introduction
The focus of this chapter is primarily on civil society organisations in PNG. Firstly, at the 
national level and secondly, in the three selected provinces for this study. As explained in 
Chapter 5 for the analysis East New Britain, Eastern Highlands and Gulf provinces have 
been chosen for this research because of the contrast they provide in terms of historical 
experience, culture and resource endowments.
In this research the term ‘civil society’ is used to describe the area between the state, the 
individual and the market where individuals can form autonomous and group activities of 
various kinds. This chapter therefore looks at the nature of these group activities in the 
three provinces to see if the social capital theory discussed earlier has any validity in the 
PNG context. The purpose is therefore to look for ways in which social capital and civil 
society in these provinces may have impacted on development and also the performance of 
the provincial governments.
Civil society organisations in PNG can actually be traced back to the 1870s when the first 
missionary activities began. In 1875 Methodist missionaries began the first Christian work 
in PNG, arriving in New Britain, and the New Guinea Islands region. In 1881 Roman 
Catholic missionaries settled in New Ireland, and were followed a few years latter by the 
Lutherans, Seventh-day Adventist (SDA), and the Anglicans. In the pre-independence 
period, churches were extremely important in the education and health sectors. They still 
remain so today, operating about half the country’s primary schools, about one third of 
lower secondary schools, and several teacher-training colleges. A very large proportion of 
functioning health sub-centres are run by churches, as well as hospitals and other health 
programs.
After independence a distinct growth in civil society organisations occurred. In 1991 the 
World Bank estimated that there were around 100,000 community-based organisations
(CBOs) working throughout PNG. The term CBO is generally used to refer to 
organisations that are located in, and providing, services to its own community. Sometimes 
these organisations may be established to deal with a specific local concern but may also 
develop into a broader NGO that provides services to other communities. The World Bank 
estimate includes landowner groups or community groups focusing on church, youth or 
women’s issues. Independence also saw an influx of international agencies or international 
linkages within the NGO community. A survey in 1995 revealed that out of the NGOs 
surveyed almost half had some sort of international connection.314
However, as the indigenous NGO community grows stronger, overseas organisations are 
stepping back and letting the local NGOs and CBOs take the lead. Most significantly, the 
recent growth in the sector has arisen, as a result of growing political awareness and a 
general recognition of the government’s inability to provide the services required by the 
people. As a consequence, many NGOs have committed themselves to either provide 
services to communities where the government is unable to help, or to assist communities 
to organise themselves in order to demand improved services from the government. Some 
of the more recent NGOs are also having a major impact on empowering disadvantaged 
groups.
6.2. Significant National Civil Society Organisations
As stated above there is now a multitude of civil society organisations in PNG. The focus 
in this section is on the organisations that have an impact on governance in general, and 
which have had a role in strengthening other civil society organisations. Currently there is 
no effective umbrella organisation representing civil society organisations in PNG, and this 
is recognised by some participants as being a major barrier to the sector’s effectiveness.
Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC)
Recently the National Executive Council (NEC) gave approval for the establishment of the
Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC). The NEC also approved the
establishment of a CIMC Secretariat administered by the Institute of National Affairs (INA)
which is a long established private institution. The NEC also directed that all relevant
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Government Agencies participate in the C1MC. The CIMC was established to follow up on 
the recommendations put forward at the National Economic Summit in February 1998 and 
guarantee support to the on-going consultation process between Government, private sector 
and the community at large to advise Government on development policy matters. The 
CIMC is tasked to:
• provide avenues for discussion on development policy matters through regional and 
national Development Forums held every year, sectoral committees and working 
groups.
• oversee and co-ordinate implementation of the recommendations endorsed by the 
forums.
• promote constructive, collaborative and practical policy approaches to tackle some of 
the country’s persistent development problems.
• provide alternative advice to Government on development policy, and
• promote applied research on economic, social and development policy issues.
The CIMC Council was formed following the NEC's endorsement of its composition in 
1998, and comprises the Chief Executives of the Departments of Finance & Treasury, 
Planning & Monitoring, Prime Minister and NEC, Trade and Industry, Bank of Papua New 
Guinea, Agriculture and Livestock, Investment Promotion Authority, as well as 
representatives from the main chambers representing the private sector, churches, non­
government organizations and unions.
The CIMC Council is chaired by the Minister for Planning & Monitoring. Since its 
establishment the CIMC Council has been chaired by Sir Mekere Morauta (Apr 1998 - June 
1999), Sir Rabbie Namaliu (on an interim basis in Aug - Dec 1998), Sir Moi Avei (July 
1999 - June 2001), Bart Philemon (on an interim basis in April - May 2000) and Andrew 
Kumbakor (June 2001 to April 2002). Other members of Parliament who have participated
in the CIMC process include Lady Carol Kidu, as Chair of the Informal Sector Committee 
(2000 - 2002), and Governors and open Members who participated In Regional and 
National Development Forums.
The CIMC Secretariat, which comprises Five permanent staff, services the Council, and is 
under the overall supervision of the Director of the Institute of National Affairs. The 
Council established twelve Sectoral Committees and nominated their Chairpersons to work 
on reviewing specific recommendations, their implementation arrangements and report to 
the Council on proposals to be drawn to the attention of the Government. Sectoral 
Committees cover the following areas: health, education, transport and infrastructure, law 
and order, informal sector, agriculture, family and sexual violence, commerce and services, 
manufacturing and industry, mining and petroleum, fisheries and forestry. Sectoral 
Committees focus on preparing specific and practical proposals for the Annual National 
Budget. Th^se are presented at the National Development Forum, which is organized as 
part of the preparations for the National Budget towards July or August each year. The 
committees also monitor implementation of the recommendations and further discuss 
particular issues of concern that are brought to their attention by committee members of the 
wider community.
In 2002, a total of seven Sectoral Committees are fully operating with assistance of the 
Secretariat (Health, Law and Order, Transport and Infrastructure, Agriculture, Commerce 
and Services, Informal Sector, Family and Sexual Violence). Other Committees (Education, 
Mining and Petroleum, Forestry, Fisheries, Manufacturing and. Industry) are operating on 
an ad-hoc basis through established industry and Government Departments bi-lateral 
arrangements. The Secretariat liaises with these as part of the preparations for the National 
Development Forum.
Churches
While the contribution of the churches to nation building in PNG is open to debate there is 
little doubt that the Christian religion has come to play a prominent part in national politics. 
Many politicians received mission-school education and frequently resort to religious 
rhetoric in their public addresses.’15 The influence of the church in politics is part of a
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broader trend discernible in Melanesia from the earliest missionary efforts of people’s 
creating the version of Christianity that best meets their needs in a rapidly changing modern 
world. An identifiable mainstream Melanesian theology began to flower when some 
missions became less repressive of local beliefs and rituals originally seen as ‘false’ pagan 
religions keeping people in lives of sin.316 For example, ‘until the mid-twentieth century, 
education throughout Melanesia was almost exclusively the province of missions; in the 
1920s an overwhelming 99.85 per cent of schools in New Guinea were mission-run. The 
contribution of missions to the education of new generations probably more than anything 
else promoted them as agents of social change.’317
The other field in which missions have long been prominent is health. Again, until the 
mid-twentieth century they dominated provision of health services, supplying 85 per cent of 
Papua New Guinea’s medical facilities and training the majority of health personnel. The 
clinics and hospitals they established had undisputed impacts on the health of people 
suffering from indigenous diseases such as malaria and introduced ones such as 
tuberculosis, and also significantly buttressed their influence and evangelical success.318
Particularly in the areas of health and education, churches are still involved in providing a 
significant share of essential services in PNG. The Churches provide a majority of health 
services to the rural areas of PNG. In total the Church Health Services (CHS) have 15 rural 
hospitals, 332 health centres and 271 aid posts. During 2002 it received government 
funding of K12 million. The five mainline religious denominations in PNG are the 
Catholic, United, Anglican, Lutheran and the Seventh-day Adventist.
However the wider role of the churches in community development has not been fully 
recognised. A recent AusAID study found that ‘as highly indigenised groups in PNG, 
churches play a key role in many areas of development. Christian denominations have 
been appropriated into many aspects of local cultures and are highly influential in political 
decision-making’.319 Most importantly there is evidence that churches are able to build 
trust amongst local communities, which is a critical component of bridging social capital. 
It is recognised that an important reason for the relative success of the churches was that the 
various denominations became readily indigenised within Melanesian culture. However 
there is not agreement as to why this took place.
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The Catholic Church is one of the largest, and probably the most influential church, in PNG 
with about 29 per cent of the population consider themselves to be Catholic. The main 
Catholic organisation in PNG is the Catholic Bishops Conference, which is made up of a 
number of agencies dealing with education, health and community development. Caritas 
PNG is the Justice, Peace and Development Agency of the Catholic Bishops Conference of 
PNG. As the official Catholic Church agency its role is to respond to poverty throughout 
the country regardless of religious or political beliefs. The agency aims to promote a just 
and compassionate society in PNG by speaking out on issues that are affecting society. It 
carries out its mission by:
• Providing a forum for dialogue and exchange among member organisations to share 
ideas, learn from each other and support each others efforts;
• Helping member organisations to build there own capacity in order to serve the poor 
and marginalised more effectively;
• Acting as a voice or advocate for the cause of the poor and enabling the poor to be their 
own advocates; and
• Facilitating cooperation within and beyond the Caritas Network.
Caritas PNG has undertaken human development programs (i.e. literacy, HIV/AIDS 
awareness, and drug rehabilitation) and small income generating projects. The 
organisations activities include installation of water tanks, fish farming, agriculture, sewing 
and food preservation.
The Evangelical Lutheran Church of PNG is the second largest denomination with around 
20 percent of the population. It has been very active in terms of community development 
and most significantly in Morobe and Madang Provinces. The United Church in PNG has 
around 650,000 members or about 12 percent of the population. It undertakes work 
throughout PNG, and its work is highly localised. It also has probably the largest and most 
successful women’s organisation in PNG, the United Church Women’s Fellowship
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(UCWF). The UCWF has played a major role for encouraging women’s rights, and to 
focus on social and development issues of particular concern to women. About 3 percent of 
the population consider themselves Anglicans. However the Anglican Church of PNG 
mainly focuses on remote rural areas, with a particular focus on capacity building and the 
development of culturally appropriate processes of community awareness. The Seventh- 
day Adventist Church in PNG has a membership comprising almost 10 percent of the 
population. It has been politically influential because often a large proportion of the 
members of parliament in PNG are SDA’s. The Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
of PNG is active in the areas of HIV/AIDS education, adult literacy, small enterprise 
development, health education, disaster response and water and sanitation.
Community Development Scheme (CDS)
The Community Development Scheme (CDS) started in PNG in 1999, and is an important 
mechanism for building the capacity of civil society. The funds to support the scheme 
currently come from the Australian Government through AusAID. CDS’s main Bureau 
office in Port Moresby is supported by four regional offices being; Southern, the Highlands, 
the Islands and Mamose regions. Within each region there are Core Groups and Field 
Workers. The long-term plan is for the CDS to evolve and be sustained by the Core 
Groups and Field Workers independent of AusAID funding.
CDS supports community development and capacity building efforts of NGOs and CBOs. 
The Core Groups and through them, the NGOs and CBOs that receive support from the 
CDS, are supposed to develop the capacity to support themselves, and to source additional 
funds and support from other donors to continue to service the community development 
needs of people across the country. CDS’s target groups are PNG based NGOs and CBOs, 
including church groups. These are groups who are community based, non-profit making 
and who rely on some voluntary effort to deliver economic and social development work. 
Projects supported include primary health care, clean water supplies, small community 
income generating activities, integrated human development and raising community 
awareness (eg STD and HIV/AIDs). However the scheme’s role in civil society capacity 
building has been fairly limited.
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Other National NGOs
Probably the other most active organisation for civil society capacity building is the 
German Development Service. The German Development Service (DED) is providing 
organisation development services to NGO and other organisations, which want to allocate 
time to organisational improvements. The aim of this process is to equip organisations with 
ways to reflect on why they are doing what, and how they can perform better in order to 
achieve their objectives. DED also has a Community Development and NGO Support 
Program. This program contributes to strengthening civil society by supporting community 
self-help action and institutional development of NGOs for community driven 
development. The program started in PNG in 1997 and provides funding and advisory 
assistance for community self-help action and institutional strengthening of NGOs. It 
combines efforts in capacity building with support for practical activities and programs.
6.3. Gulf Province
General Characteristics
Gulf Province includes the estuaries of four large rivers (the Bamu, Turama, Kikori and 
Purari) in the Gulf of Papua. From the coast the province runs inland for about 120 km. 
The Province is 13,500 square km in area of which about 40 per cent is occupied. The 
estimated population in 2000 was about 105,050, or about 2 per cent of the total PNG 
population.320 Gulf Province is generally regarded to be highly underdeveloped, and has a 
population growth rate of 2.5 per cent per annum since 1980. It ranks ninth among the 
nineteen provinces of PNG, according to the measures used in de Albuquerque and D’Sa’s 
study of inequalities in the country. There are about 16 language groups in the province. 
Since the provincial government reforms in 1995 the Province is politically divided into 
two districts. The Kerema District has an estimated population of 65,176, and the Kikori 
District an estimated 39,874. “ The Kerema District has a population density of seven 
persons per square kilometer compared to a population density of only one person per 
square kilometer in Kikori District. Kerema, the Provincial headquarters is about 100 
kilometres west from Port Moresby. Western, Southern, Chimbu, Eastern Highlands, 
Morobe and Central Provinces bound the Province.
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Culturally and politically, the people of the Province can be divided into three: western 
coastal, eastern coastal and the mountain Kamea. The Kamea are part of a language and 
cultural group that extends into the Southern Highlands, Morobe, Chimbu and the Eastern 
Highlands. However, two-thirds of the people in the province speak languages of the 
Eleman family i.e. Toaripi, Orokolo, and Purari. These people live along the eastern coast 
and inland Malalaua district. Hamtai, the other widely spoken language, has its roots in the 
Highlands.324
The general characteristics of Gulf Province are large river systems and extensive swampy 
country both in the West and, Eastern parts. The eastern part has low rainfall and short dry 
season from June to October, but the West is wet all year. The river systems and extensive 
saline tidal swamps form natural navigable water channels to travel from village to village 
and from one administrative centre to another. A great deal of the coastal area is swampy 
or subject to inundation while a lot of the inland area consists of broken rugged mountain 
terrain. About ten percent of the total area is being used for subsistence agriculture, cash 
crops agriculture, industry and services. The Province is made up of four land systems:
• the hinterland consisting of hills and broken rugged mountains of the Owen Stanley 
Range;
• the low alluvial land systems;
• the tidal flat littoral land systems mostly made up of large river systems and saline 
swampy deltas of fresh water river and mangroves. Which form navigable waterways 
for people to travel from delta to delta and to inland alluvial lands for gardening; and
• the coastal beach ridge land systems are mostly for settlement, fishing and coconut 
growing.
The coastal beach ridge land system is restricted to the Elma people from Oiapu to Vailaha. 
Sago is the chief source of food, and is supplemented by fish, coconut and subsistence food
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gardening of crops; sweet potato, yam, taro, bananas, sugar cane, green vegetables, cassava, 
paw paw and mangoes. The use of the tidal flat land is restricted to the people in Kekori, 
Baimuru in the Purari deltas, and Moveave in the East. The people in Kikori and Purari 
deltas are known to be hunters, fishers and collectors. Sago forms an even greater part of 
the diet as elsewhere in the Gulf Province. The people of the delta land build their houses 
on piles high above the riverbanks. As the rivers change their courses, the people 
frequently have to move their villages. Traditionally, each village was centred on the dobu, 
or ‘ravi’ in which weapons, important artifacts, ceremonial objects and the skulls of 
enemies was stored. While men slept in the long house, women slept in smaller, individual 
huts outside. Today the long houses are no longer so culturally important. The Gulf people 
have been strongly influenced by Christianity for nearly a century, and many traditions 
have been lost.
The use of the foothills is restricted to the people of Kerema, Kaipi, Kovio, Popo and 
Moripi areas. In the hills behind the coastal swampland live the Anga people, whose 
territory stretches right across to the southeastern highlands in Morobe Province. The use 
of the hills and mountains is restricted to the Kukukukus in the Kamea area. Both groups 
derive their subsistence by means of shifting cultivation of less intensive crops than the 
people in the Highlands. Sweet potatoes are the main source of food for the Kameas; 
banana, yam, breadfruit and pigs supplement them.
The coastal people of the province have had a long history of contact with outside 
influences. Fairly easy travel along the coast of the Gulf made trade significant, and by 
independence in 1975, the coastal people of the Gulf thought of themselves as advanced 
and knowledgeable. The Gulf people traded their plentiful sago with the Motuan people’s 
pottery. The annual Motuan trading voyages along the south coast, known, as the ‘hiri’ 
were regular even after Europeans established Port Moresby. There were also trade links to 
the Highlands. Because of their easy access from the sea, the coastal villages were also the 
‘hunting grounds’ for representatives of the London Missionary Society, who first arrived 
in the area in the early 1880s. However although the Gulf coast was well charted and the 
main rivers were soon comprehensively surveyed it was not until the late 1920s that the 
mountains north of the coast were explored. Unfortunately when the missionaries first
arrived in the Gulf area their attitude towards local culture was considerably less
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enlightened than it later became. The people were forced to give up their spiritual beliefs, 
and especially headhunting.
Gulf Province has provided its fair share of human resources in senior management in the 
private sector, the PNG diplomatic service, and has the distinction of having produced two 
govemors-general. The province produced out-standing leaders such as Sir Albert Maori 
Kiki and Sir Tore Lokoloko who played countrywide roles and enjoyed national 
reputations/25 However even today education facilities are not evenly spread throughout 
the Province. In Kerema District there are four high schools with a total enrolment of 1,122 
students and 39 teachers while Kikori District has only one high school which enrols 307 
students and has 13 teachers. The Catholic Education Service administers two of the high 
schools with a total of 337 students, nine primary schools, eight community schools, and 
thirty-three elementary schools. In Kerema the Baptist Church has established a school 
providing elementary to Grade 12. The school has been expanding quite rapidly since it 
was established 13 years ago, and is almost entirely locally staffed. There is no evidence of 
SDA run schools in Gulf. Along the coast around half of the schools are government run 
but in the mountain areas are entirely church run. In the Kikori District there are three 
United Church primary schools with elementary to Grade 8. National statistics show that 
45 percent of the Gulf population between the ages of five to nineteen have no formal 
education.
There are profound discrepancies between the districts and in particular the tension is 
greatest in the area covered by Kerema Open electorate i.e. Kerema, Malalaua and 
Kaintiba. Around half of the population of Gulf live in Malalaua and Kaintiba, and the 
coastal people, especially in and around Kerema, have had access to schools for several 
generations and in the post- World War Two period, leading up to self-government, 
independence and beyond, they have provided more than their proportionate share of Papua 
New Guinea’s leadership in politics and the public service.326 The Kamea people, 
concentrated in Kaintiba, are fully aware of their disadvantaged position in comparison 
with the adjacent coastal peoples of Malalaua and Kerema. The province therefore has 
very significant social and political divisions, and which reflect the ‘basic artificiality of the 
boundaries of the province.’327 For elections to the National Parliament there are three 
electorates, two open electorates, Kerema and Kikori and a Provincial electorate. While the
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capital of the province is Kerema, the Kikori and Baimuru areas are actually where most of 
the economic activity of the province takes place.
Economic Activity
The range of economic activities in Gulf Province has been, and remains, quite limited. 
There is oil, gas, forestry and oil palm. There is also an abundance of marine resources. 
The main agricultural products have been copra, rubber, coffee, timber and crocodile skins. 
Copra has been by far the most important product. For the most part the Province is 
dependent upon air and sea transport to isolated locations along the coast. Road 
communication is largely confined to small stretches of intermittent access in the vicinity of 
Ihu, Kerema and Malalaua. A road connection from Malalaua to Kerema has been planned 
but as yet no funds have been budgeted. This section of road would also be a major stretch 
of the projected Trans-Island highway, which would link Port Moresby with the Highlands. 
Therefore a major problem facing the development of the Gulf Province is the absence of 
adequate market outlets resulting from:
• a lack of an adequate road network;
• a lack of river transport services; and
• an unreliable coastal shipping service and expensive air transport.
Transport infrastructure is more developed in Kerema District which has 505 kilometres of 
roads compared with only 163 kilometres of roads in Kikori District.328 The shipping 
companies mainly operate to service their own coconut and rubber plantations; occasionally 
they collect copra from villages depending on the availability of space on the ships after 
picking up items and produce from their holdings. There is a major airstrip at Kerema, but 
the rest of the province is serviced by clay and grass covered airstrips (14 in Kerema 
District and 11 in Kikori District). The province is therefore characterised by its poor 
transport facilities.
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Service centres are small, and often have few services to offer, and many areas get virtually 
no government services, especially in the mountains. The main hospital is in Kerema but 
currently there is no medical officer. The Catholic Church, which has one rural hospital, 
five health centres, and eighteen rural aid posts, provides the majority of functioning rural 
health services. The Baptist Church proposes to provide health services to the mountainous 
areas by introducing an aircraft for medical evacuations and visits by health workers. The 
United Church runs a health sub-centre in the Kikori District however apparently three aid 
posts in the same area have closed due to a lack of staff. Most of the government run health 
centres and sub-health centres have deteriorated to virtual aid post status. Overall health 
standards in the province are below the national average.
The most densely populated district, Kaintiba, appears to have serious problems with poor 
agricultural yields, and malnutrition among children. The road connection to Port Moresby 
from Malaiaua enables betei nut, the provinces highest value export, fish and sago to be 
carried to the city markets. Although a minor road network has been developed inland 
around Kaintiba, but it does not connect with the rest of the province nor with any other 
parts of the country.
The possibility of very rapid development through the exploitation of newly discovered 
resources (i.e. oil and gas) may have opened up for Gulf during the 1990s. However few 
benefits are apparent from this development. A road was built from Lake Kutubu in the 
Southern Highlands to Kikori to service a buried pipeline that carries gas and oil to the 
coast for export. However apparently this road is no longer open.
The overall population density in Gulf is lower than the average for PNG. The population 
is well spread throughout the Province, although there are some pockets of concentrated 
population such as the coastal strip from Ihu to the Central Province border and around 
Kaintiba. There is sufficient land of agricultural quality to provide for the people’s 
subsistence needs. The main agricultural potential of the Gulf Province is restricted to the 
alluvial plains of the Vailala, Tauri and Lakeekamu rivers, the narrow coastal fringe and 
pockets of more gentle topography. Cash cropping is confined to coastal and navigable 
river areas due partly to their accessibility of transport. Cash cropping by the village people
are generally carried out within the area used for subsistence gardening, the cash crop for
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example, coconut is grown with food crops at the same time. Coconuts are used both for 
copra and for domestic consumption. There has been a substantial decline in the role of the 
private sector in the province with a number of plantations closing down in recent years. 
However, timber exploitation and fisheries have still been a source of significant wealth in 
the province/30
Gulf Province has been the main centre of petroleum exploration activities in PNG since oil 
seepages were first reported near the Vailala River in 1911. The Province falls within the 
geological area known as the Papuan Basin and also has known reserves of natural gas. 
InterOil is currently undertaking exploration work at Subu in the province. Apparently the 
exploration is creating some concerns amongst local landowner groups in the Baimuru area, 
and a meeting of landowners is being organised for September at Baimuru.
Political Activity
Since independence the manoeuvring’s for provincial and national political power, and 
especially representation in both the National Executive Council (NEC), and the Provincial 
Executive Council (PEC), has been a constant preoccupation of the Kamea political leaders 
who are from the most underdeveloped area of Gulf. Oliver found that for the 1987 
national elections ‘every candidate counted on village, and sometimes clan, affiliations for
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a core vote which could give him victory.’ Therefore political activity in Gulf province 
is very localised. In a similar way to national politics, the dynamics of provincial politics is 
affected by the power relations between the three main groups in the province, and ‘most 
informants from Gulf agree that provincial candidates have been supported on the basis of 
local affiliations of language, village or clan (rarely clan among the Toaripi), perceived 
ability to bring “development”, and personal leadership qualities. But the ability to wield 
influence in politics and to be respected in one’s community sometimes has other roots, and 
the belief that there are short cuts to “development”, in the sense of access to material 
wealth, has a long history among the coastal people of Gulf Province.’332 Therefore the 
pursuit for political power has undermined any sense of cooperation between the ethnic 
groups.
In his study of electoral politics in the province Oliver ‘became convinced that local factors
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overwhelmed national or even provincial concerns in people’s minds.’3”  In his study of 
the 1982 National Elections Mai lau found that candidates needed to make contact through 
formal organisations such as youth groups, women’s fellowship groups, village sports 
clubs, church members’ groups, clan groups, and groups of village elders. A candidate’s 
membership in social or other village groups reinforced the tendency to vote for him, 
especially if he (normally candidates are male) is supported by the leaders of these
334groups.
One factor that must have militated against any effective performance by the Gulf 
Provincial Assembly was the plethora of motions of lack of confidence with which the 
governments of the province were plagued prior to the 1995 reforms. Gulf Provincial 
Government also has a very poor reputation for financial accountability. For example the 
Auditor General found in his 1990 report that ‘some of the Warrant Authorities and Cash 
Fund Certificates issued during the year were not signed by the Provincial Finance Minister 
and Chief Accountable Officer, respectively and contained numerous errors. Also certain 
adjustments effected through the revised Budget were not recorded through Warrant 
Authorities. In some instances Cash Fund Certificates were issued in excess of the 
appropriations authorised by the warrant authorities.335 The Auditor General therefore 
considered that the Provincial Government had not exercised effective budgetary controls 
during that year.336 Recently a deliberate fire destroyed the Province’s head office and 
which was probably related to investigations into fraud by provincial officials.
2002 National Elections
For the elections the choices were made out of a field of 106 candidates representing 31 for 
the provincial seat, 52 for Kerema Open and 20 for Kikori Open electorates. A full list of 
the candidates is provided in Appendix F. In Gulf Province the independent candidates 
dominated the election with 24 in the Kerema Open, 10 out of 31 for the provincial seat and 
8 out of 23 for the Kikori Open Seat. Most importantly more than 80% of the candidates 
were ‘absentee’ Gulf people who only returned on this occasion to contest the elections.
Mr Kimave, defended his Kikori Seat as a PANGU MP, faced a very strong field of
candidates who included former MPs Roy Evara (PSP), and Allan Ebu Maria (PLP). In
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1997 he held the seat with about 15% of the votes. Allan Marai was Kikori MP up until 
1992 when he lost to Roy Evara. Mark Ivi Maipakai, a People’s Progress Party candidate, 
with 16% of the votes, won the seat.
For the Kerema Open seat Avosa Saea was one of the frontrunners to challenge the 
incumbent Sir Tom Koraea. Koraea held the seat in 1997 with less than 10% of the votes 
among 44 candidates. Other candidates in 2002 were prominent lawyer Sarea Soi (PDM), 
engineer Sari Maso (NA), former deputy managing director of the Investment Corporation 
of PNG, Meakoro Opa (Independent), and Peter Eka (PPP), the former National Executive 
Council secretary. Ekis Ropenu, a People’s Labour Party candidate, with 9.6% of the 
votes, won the seat. The sitting member, Chris Haiveta, retained the Provincial Seat with 
15.2% of the votes. The 2002 elections demonstrate the highly fragmented nature of 
politics in the Province.
Civil Society Organisations
The role of civil society organisations in the province has been generally very limited. 
Overall the years of colonial administration brought very little development of any kind and 
especially that in which local people could participate. Possibly the lack of development is 
the result of the goals, policies, and methods of the colonial governments and the social, 
economic, and demographic continuities between the colonial period and the period since 
independence that have not furthered the overall participation of local people in
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development. As Oliver observed ‘Gulf was ill prepared for provincial government. Its 
peoples had little sense of unity. Almost half the population identify with the United 
Church while about one fifth of the population are Catholic. Even the Eastern Elema 
identity that the United Church was in part responsible for creating never gave much of a 
sense of solidarity to the eastern coastal peoples, who usually thought in terms of much 
smaller groupings (Toaripi, Kaipi, Moripi, Sepoe)... Gulf had never had a fully-fledged 
administrative presence, which might evoke a common attempt to mobilise for access to the 
services it could provide.’
Today in Gulf province significant population areas receive little or no government
services. Largely as a result, churches of various denominations have provided beyond
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their pastoral responsibilities such as essential services as infrastructure development and 
maintenance, social services such as health, education and information programs in areas 
not serviced by the government. Government educational institutions, especially high 
schools, are so rundown that a whole generation of young Gulf Province children find it 
difficult to qualify with a graded certificate at Grade 10 level.
The only significant NGO in Gulf Province is the Community Development Initiatives 
Foundation Trust Fund (CDI). The CD1 is a non-profit organisation supported by 
corporations in the petroleum industry aimed at addressing the social needs of rural 
communities in the provinces within which these companies have invested i.e. Gulf and 
Southern Highlands.33'* The CDI Foundation builds upon community development 
initiatives originally carried out by Chevron Niugini Ltd in the Southern Highlands and 
Gulf Provinces since construction of the oilfield and pipeline facilities commenced there in 
1990. CDI assumed direct responsibility for these initiatives in 2001 as an NGO that can 
hopefully facilitate long term social development well past the life of oil and gas production 
in the area.
The primary CDI training facilities have been established at the Kikori District Centre. The 
training centre has been established on land provided under agreement with the Gulf 
Provincial Government and the National Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL). 
The training centre includes offices, classrooms, a library, a radio studio, and a training 
workshop. CDI is assisting the government agricultural officers in Kikori, whose office is 
next to CDTs Training Centre. As part of its agreement with the government, CDI has also 
renovated an old unused agricultural shed belonging to DAL at the same location. This 
shed has been converted into office facilities for Kikori District DAL staffs who are being 
assisted to expand their agricultural demonstration plots and carry out training for local 
farmers.
The linguo-cultural groups assisted in the Kikori area include the Kairi (Dumu), Ikobi 
(Kasere, Ikobi Kairi), Porome (Kibiri), and Kerewa (Goaibari) speaking communities. 
These communities comprise about 21 villages along the Kikori River and have a 
population of around 4,000 people. A significant part of the facilities CDI has established
for supporting its programs and objectives is its community radio station -  CDI FM. which
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broadcasts throughout the targeted communities. CDI has established six programs, being:
• to support and assist primary healthcare providers and members of the community to 
improve curative and preventative health conditions;
• to improve the competency of education service providers and the quality of education 
services for human resource development;
• to foster balanced agricultural development in the community to improve food security 
and generate income;
• to empower and build the capacity of local leaders and institutions for planning and 
implementing sustainable rural development;
• to promote the sustainable use of natural resources amongst rural communities; and
• to improve the capacity of government agencies to plan and implement sustainable 
development.
CDI anticipates that government and aid donor interest in the CDI will grow over time as it 
develops its capacity. If this interest generates additional funding support, the target area 
for CDI’s programs may expand to other underdeveloped communities within Gulf 
Province.
In addition CDI is working to more effectively integrate its social development activities 
with the community outreach efforts of the Kikori Integrated Conservation and 
Development Project (KICDP) managed by the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). 
Established ten years ago, this project has two main components that comprise scientific 
research and community outreach. Scientific research is mainly to collect baseline data on 
the wildlife in the area to be used for conservation management in cooperation with the 
Department of Conservation and Environment. The community outreach component 
includes community capacity building (i.e. to identify suitable income generating
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opportunities besides logging), and distributing educational materials based on the 
scientific findings. WWF’s stated objectives are:
• To build community capacity to make sound natural resource management decisions;
• To assist groups to benefit from community generated sustainable eco-enterprises; and
• To assist community groups to implement resource management.
CD1 has also entered into an agreement with the University of Papua New Guinea’s School 
of Medicine to extend its rural health program to Kikori. Under this agreement the School 
of Medicine will provide final year medical, nursing and public health medicine students, 
resident medical officers and supervising lecturers to assist the Kikori rural hospital, and to 
deliver health services in the area. The cost will be met by CD1.
The Community Development Scheme (CDS) has supported around twenty-nine projects in 
the province. A core committee is functioning in Kerema, although its resources to reach 
out into the more remote areas are very limited. The majority of these projects were with 
women’s and church groups. Three projects were undertaken in cooperation with local 
NGOs. A significant number of projects were for health and clean water, followed by 
community capacity building and skills development. Sewing, and bakery skills training 
has been popular amongst the women’s groups. Other projects include agricultural income 
generating such as vanilla, poultry, spices, rice and fishing. However most of these projects 
have been confined to areas close to Kerema, with no projects in Kikori District and only 
one project close to Baimuru. There has been one project supported near Ihu and eight in 
the Kaintiba Local Level Government area.
Caritas PNG through the Diocese Development Secretary is active with church based 
women’s, youth, and fathers groups. Programs focus on issues related to human rights and 
conflict resolution including drug and alcohol abuse. Caritas also provides some assistance 
to small income generating projects such as poultry. Another NGO in the province is the 
Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) which assists with a small village project for primary
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health and education, which targets children. The New Zealand ODA has also provided 
seed funding for a women’s microfinance project through the Gulf Provincial Council of 
Women. The Council however is not active at this time until an annual meeting is held to 
elect the office bearers.
Mobilisation of civil society in Gulf is especially difficult due to the absence of a provincial 
radio station. Radio Gulf has been off the air for several months and while this is blamed 
on the need for a replacement transmitter the condition of the broadcasting facilities 
indicates that much more substantial work is required to get the station back on air. While 
CD1 FM provides news and a very broad range of development programming (mostly 
produced by CD1 staff) and awareness messages this is only for the communities living 
adjacent to the oil pipeline. The Baptist Church has obtained a license to establish a radio 
station in Kerema to relay programs from an established station in Mt Hagen. Clearly Gulf 
people need improved facilities for heaith-care and education, housing for public servants, 
business development for villagers, better roads and other transport infrastructure, 
improved communication facilities, good drinking water supplies, agricultural development 
and gainful participation in resource development. However effective leadership at the 
village and provincial levels has been a rare commodity for the people of Gulf at least since 
independence. Overall the situation is that Gulf Province has been characterised by 
significant political, social and ethnic divisions and poor capacity all of which have 
weakened social capital and made any broad mobilisation for development extremely 
problematic.
6.4. Eastern Highlands Province
General Characteristics
The Highlands is the most densely populated and agriculturally productive region of PNG. 
The Highlands are made up of a series of fertile valleys and rugged intervening mountains. 
Eastern Highland Province was one of the first areas of the Highlands to be opened up 
during the colonial period, but not substantially until after the Second World War. As with 
the rest of PNG, the Highlands region has tremendous cultural and linguistic diversity. The 
largest social units are tribes numbering in the thousands. The area controlled by a single
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group has usually been small. Despite the political fragmentation, there were extensive 
trade links with the coast. The first direct European contact with the Highlands came as a 
result of the gold rush near Wau and Bulolo, which created speculation there would be 
more gold, further afield, and missionaries soon followed. Until then, Europeans had 
thought that the centre of PNG was a rugged tangle of virtually unpopulated mountains. 
Kainantu was the main administrative centre in the Highlands during the 1930s, and from 
there patrols set out to establish control. The early patrols used the highly prized kina 
shells, salt and steel tools in exchange for labour and food provided by the Highlanders. 
This was the method of payment used until the late 1940s when money was introduced. 
However little development occurred before the Second World War and it was not until the 
1950s and 1960s that the Highlands were really opened up. During this period trade stores 
were established and then coffee was first planted commercially. The Eastern Highlands 
has had longer and more extensive contact with the outside world than other parts of the 
Highlands.
Goroka is the provincial capital and has grown rapidly since it became the centre of the 
coffee industry. Its estimated provincial population in 2000 was 429,480, and with an 
annual growth rate since 1980 of 2.2 per cent.340 Eastern Highlands Province is estimated 
to have 8.4 per cent of the total PNG population. The 1986 study by de Albuquerque and 
D’Sa found that Eastern Highlands ranked sixteenth in level of development. In terms of 
absolute amounts of revenue available to provincial governments, Eastern Highlands ranks 
fourth out of the nineteen provinces, however on a per capita basis it receives the second- 
lowest level of funding from the National Government.
There are eight administrative districts in the province being Daulo (population 30,446), 
Goroka (population 70,408), Henganofi (population 55,193), Kainantu (population 91,511), 
Lufa (population 45,505), Obura/Wonenara (population 29,394), Okapa (population 
62,257) and Unggai/Benna (population 44,766). Obura/Wonenara District has the highest 
population density in the Province where there are 88 people for every square kilometre 
compared with the lowest population density of 12 people per square kilometre in Lufa 
District. The de Albuquerque and D’Sa study found that only Goroka and Kainantu ranked 
among the upper half of the districts of PNG. These districts have population densities of
68 and 63 persons per square kilometre respectively. In general, the province divides into
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two on the basis of the physical environment and level of development. The northern 
valleys are economically vibrant with intensive smallholder coffee production and 
relatively good road access to markets in Goroka and Lae. The south of the province is 
mountainous, remote and poor.341
Eastern Highlands has a patrilineal society with 20 local languages, most of which are 
loosely related. As elsewhere in the Highlands clan and tribal loyalties are still very strong. 
The largest social units are tribes that may number in the thousands. Although the province 
is heavily populated, the people are a less cohesive group than the people in other parts of 
the Highlands region are most likely because language divisions and geographical terrain 
separating language groups seem to determine cultural behaviour. In the Goroka Valley, 
the largest two language groups are the Gahuku, with an estimated population of 80,000, 
and the Benabena, with an estimated population of 60,000. On the eastern side are the 
Kamano/Kafe speaking people, with an estimated population of 80,000, living between 
Kainantu and Henganofi districts. The Fore speaking people, with an estimated population 
of 60,000, live near the Okapa district. The province has the fourth highest population 
density in PNG. The population is heaviest in the northern valleys, where people live in 
large villages. The people are more spread out in the south.342
Economic Activity
The Province has large areas of land, especially in the Wonenara, which are sparsely 
populated but which have little development potential. Other areas, especially the Asaro 
Valley north of Goroka and Kainantu areas have considerable development potential, but at 
the same time have high population densities. There is, however, sufficient land of 
agricultural quality to provide for the people’s subsistence needs with a reasonable margin 
for commercial agriculture. At the same time pressures on land do exist in some parts of 
the Province. The greater part of agricultural development in the Eastern Highlands is 
concentrated on the valley and basin floors of the Asaro, Bena Bena, Ramu and Lamari 
river systems. The steep and rugged mountains of the province form the headwaters for 
two of PNG’s most important river systems: the Ramu River which runs parallel to the 
coast to the north-west, and the Wahgi and Aure rivers which run south and enter the Gulf
of Papua as the Purari River. Most of the population lives at altitudes between 1500 and
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2300 metres. However steepness of the topography is a major limiting factor for most of 
the Province.
Coffee is the largest cash crop and the development of the Province is closely linked to the 
prosperity of the coffee industry. Coffee provides an income for 80 percent of smallholders 
in the Province. It is also impossible to over emphasise the importance of the coffee crop to 
the people of the Eastern Highlands with respect to the establishment of commerce. After 
the early settlers proved coffee to be a viable and profitable crop, the early 1950s saw many 
expatriates starting plantations in the Highlands. However by the early 1960s several 
Highlanders were establishing their own plantations and this was the starting point for a 
new generation of indigenous businessmen.
There is only one hospital in the Province in Goroka. The Evangelical Brotherhood Church 
provides the most active church health services. The Province has 13 secondary schools, 
228 community schools and 5 vocational schools but has a low adult literacy rate of only 
25%. Education facilities are not well spread throughout the Province. For example, 
Goroka District has enrolments of 1,606 for elementary, 7,778 for primary schools and 
1,567 for secondary schools compared with Lufa District that has a total secondary 
enrolment of 537 students. Besides government run schools the Catholic and Lutheran 
churches are the main providers. The Catholic Church runs 10 elementary schools, 5 
primary schools, and a girl’s vocational school. These schools are fairly well spread around 
the province. The Catholic Church also has a school for the blind in Goroka.
Political Activity
The draft constitution of the Eastern Highlands Province was presented in August 1976 and 
the interim provincial government was established three months later. Provincial elections 
were held every four years with the first held in 1978.
In his study of the province Stewart found that the provincial government had been
remarkably stable from its establishment until 1986 due mainly to the Premiership of James
Yanepa. He concluded that Yanepa was able to adapt the exercise of power to communally
based decision-making and this was probably the source of his success.34' In Eastern
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Highlands, until 1985, the constitution provided for members of the PEC to be elected by 
the assembly and to at least some extent this provided for wider representation. Ethnic 
divisions within the political system were a major concern as Goode observed during the 
1977 National Elections that ‘many people in Ko-ae butuka expressed a preference for a 
Tairora-speaking candidate, believing that a politician from one’s own language group 
would provide greater assistance than one from another language group.’344 In general 
‘most sitting members seemed certain of support from their village. This accord with the 
idea of communal solidarity, where the principal cleavage is along clan lines. Clan loyalty, 
however, seems not to be an inexhaustible resource. In constituencies close to towns, 
where clans are more fragmented and where members have held their seats for longer than 
four years, there is less certainty of village and clan support.’j45
From 1985 the amended constitution gave the Premier a clear power to appoint the 
membcis of the PEC. Stewart explains that ‘i will refer to these relations of trust as 
“communal solidarity”, by which I mean a decision-making order where the principal 
actors are clans, or lineages, where esteem is the principal medium of exchange, where the 
predominant resources are trust and inherited status, where the principal motive is 
belonging to a group, and where relations are ruled by common consent and unanimous 
agreement. The principal lines of cleavage in such a system are clan rivalries and personal 
disputes.’346 Westermark also observed that during the 1982 National Elections ‘voters 
continued to align themselves by ethnic areas and political alliances.’347 Traditionally 
Kainantu and Goroka have been rivals and this has included strong personality conflicts. 
However Stewart found that by 1990 this stability had begun to break down, and that this 
‘was principally because of the collapse of relations of trust which had existed in the early 
years and upon which the early coordinating devices had been based.’348
2002 National Elections
Prior to the 2002 elections the Eastern Highlands Governor, Peti Lafanama, was also the
Chairman of the Highlands Governors’ Council, and prided himself in being a political
power broker. He claimed responsibility for ensuring the appointment of another Eastern
Highlander as the Governor-General and assisting the formation of the previous
government led by Bill Skate. His basic appeal to the Eastern Highlands people was that if
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he were re-elected he would aim for the prime ministership. In the 1997 elections he won 
the seat in a field of 36 candidates with just over 15% of the votes. For the 2002 elections 
the Provincial Seat attracted a total of 26 candidates. This included Pacific Helicopters 
owner Mai Smith Kela and the only female candidate Julie Soso Akeke. A full list of the 
candidates is provided in Appendix F.
Mai Smith campaigned on the policy to make the Eastern Highlands Province attractive for 
investors. Mai Smith was not aligned to any political party but placed advertisements in 
the media calling for other independent candidates to join him. He stated that this was 
because he wanted independent members of parliament with similar interests for the 
country to get together to push for major constitutional changes. One policy proposal is to 
abolishment of the Electoral Development Fund. He also campaigned for greater emphasis 
in infrastructure maintenance. He argued that important economic activities such as 
tourism and agriculture would have to be injected with necessary support, both financially 
and structurally, so that exports in this sector picked up once again. He campaigned to be 
Governor and in particular to develop the province and to reconstruct Goroka. The results 
showed strong support for Smith-Kela across the province and he almost doubled the vote 
obtained by Lafanama in the 1997 poll. Smith Kela won with 132,137 votes ahead of 
Lafanama with 54,390 votes. Lafanama’s support even in his stronghold of Lufa District 
showed a marked decline. Since taking office as Governor he has concentrated on 
reforming the Provincial public service and trying to improve its capacity.
In the 2002 elections more than 300 candidates nominated to contest the nine seats. 
Seventeen of PDM’s seats were in the Highlands and seven of them were in Eastern 
Highlands. Four of the seats were held by cabinet ministers, Ron Ganarafo (Fisheries); 
Henry Smith (Correctional Services); Mathias Karani (Provincial Affairs); and Muki 
Taranupi (Education). However non-of the six PDM members of parliament won their 
seats as PDM candidates in the 1997 elections except Henganofi MP Viviso Seravo. All 
six MPs nominated to defend their seats under PDM tickets together with a new candidate 
in Korak Korae Yasona challenging Castan Maibawa for the Okapa Open seat. However 
PDM’s own coalition partner, Advance PNG Party, endorsed seven candidates, for the 
regional seat Stanley Harry Totaha, Captain Danny Fezamo for the Henganofi; Benny 
Asamole for Lufa; Lawrence O’entuma for Okapa; Councillor Dio Kano for Obura-
Wonenara: Kepsy Holu Miller for Unggai-Bena Open; and Robyn Belari Nenda for Daulo 
Open. The leader of the Advance PNG Party, Charlie Benjamin, was the Minister for 
Lands and Physical Planning in the former government. This Seventh Day Adventist based 
political party hoped to make in-roads via the strong SDA following in Eastern Highlands.
The Goroka Open seat was defended by the Corrective Services Minister, Henry Smith, and 
attracted 41 candidates. He had traditionally polled well in Gorohanota, Kafuku, Kabiufa 
and Okiufa. He still had the overall support of his voters that elected him in 1997 with just 
fewer than 10% of the votes. However Mathias Ijape was revisiting his old support base, 
and he was expected to do well there. His base at Ufeto, Bihute and Okiufa appeared to be 
still behind him, and he hoped to use his own Lapeigu base to give him sufficient numbers. 
Businessman Michael Gotaha was also a strong candidate because of his many 
contributions to Goroka Town as Town Major. He also obtained support from his own 
Asaroyufa, Komiufa and iviasilakaiyufa villages. He was aiso expected to poll well in the 
settlements in the peripheries of Goroka Town. He also claimed the support of the working 
class in Goroka. However in Goroka Open the settlements hold the ‘balance of power’. 
The declaration of a winner was postponed due to a petition by Mathias Ijape.
Mathias Mero Karani won the Lufa Open seat in 1997 with about 15% of the votes. For the 
Lufa Open Seat former public servant Eddie Mike, despite his long absence from home, 
had support coming from Kauro-Kevi, Pometo and Hagareda areas. Also Kanera Sokere 
came third in the 1997 general elections. His strongholds were Kotomi, Silupa and Fima 
areas. Lufa Council President, Jeremiah Pakuta had probably the biggest advantage. His 
ward councillors could play a major role where he was able to use their network to mobilise 
his supporters. His support was from Lagiyu-Nupuru, Lagareda and Gitomu. Incumbent 
and Defence Minister Mathias Karani had not lost his support in Losowe and Kora. His 
mushroom, water supply, and the new road upgrade project had a big impact. He also had 
made inroads into strongholds of other candidates. Yawa Silupa, a National Alliance Party 
candidate with 14.9% of the votes, won the seat.
Ben Merere Kiagi, United Party, with 7.4% of the votes, won Daulo Open. Tota Bahanare
Bun, Christian Democratic Party, with 17.1% of the votes, won Henganofi Open. Yuntuvi
Bao, People’s Labour Party, with 9.9% of the votes, won Kainantu Open. John Koigiri,
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People’s Solidarity Party, with 13% of the votes, won Obura-Wonenara Open. Okapa 
Open was won by Tom Amukele a Pipol First Party candidate. Unggai-Bena Open was 
won by Benny Tipot Allan an independent with 10.8% of the votes. The results show that 
party affiliation played no apparent role in the outcomes, and the low percentage of votes 
won by the winning candidates.
Civil Society Organisations
According to the 1990 census, by far the largest church in terms of membership was the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church. However based on interviews with provincial officials and 
the private sector the Seventh Day Adventist Church is now considered to have the largest 
membership.349
The Eastern Highlands Provincial Advisory Committee (EHPAC) began as a result of the 
Goroka Chamber of Commerce conducting a Goroka Seminar in August 2002. The 
Governor of Eastern Highlands in consultation with the Consultative Implementation & 
Monitoring Council (CIMC) proposed the set up of a Committee system in the Eastern 
Highlands that replicates the work of CIMC at a provincial level. A proposal was put 
forward to as a result of consultation with CIMC to set up the EHPAC, formed by a limited 
number of members from all sectors of society, and chaired by the Governor of Eastern 
Highlands. The task of the EHPAC is to promote, oversee and coordinate implementation 
of recommendations put forward through various sectoral working committees, and to 
promote innovative, collaborative policy approaches to tackle the province’s problems. The 
EHPAC reports to the Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities Committee, which 
then takes its policy recommendations to the Provincial Executive Council. The results of 
the EHPAC’s work will then be presented at a Provincial Development Forum once a year. 
It is Government’s intention to foster closer dialogue with the business sector and the non­
governmental sector, and to base policy formulation and implementation on broad-based 
consultation with all the relevant stakeholders. Therefore the EHPAC has to have strong 
and continuous political support to make it more effective, and to ensure that the 
Government departments involved do not disregard its important function.
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The EHPAC provides opportunities and forums for organisations from all sectors at the 
district level to contribute on issues of provincial interest. The results of the EHPAC’s 
work will make a positive contribution to the planning process. Input from other sectors 
will provide Government with new insights and tools to enhance proper planning. Ten 
advisory committees or sectoral groups have been established:
• Finance and Revenue
• Research, Planning and Monitoring
• Lands and Physical Planning
• Works and Transport
• Law and Order
• Health
• Education
• Social Services and Welfare
• Agriculture and Natural Resources
• Commerce and Tourism
The terms of reference of EHPAC require the committees-.
• To oversee and coordinate the implementation of the recommendations of the residents 
of Eastern Highlands for a better quality of life.
• To establish ad-hoc working groups and consultative sectoral working groups to advise 
on the best way to carry out the implementation of these recommendations and to 
provide solutions to any technical problems.
• To act as an advisory body to the Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities 
Committee on economic and other matters affecting the economy, growth and 
development.
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• Report on a monthly basis to the Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities 
Committee on the progress of implementation of recommendations and any other 
matters related to the same.
• Report to the Provincial Development Forum on the progress of recommendations and 
problems being encountered in the implementation.
• Promote joint applied research on the relevant economic policy and social policy issues.
There are a number of fairly large NGOs operating within and from the Eastern Highlands 
Province; however the Community Development Scheme is not currently very effective in 
the province. The Research and Conservation Foundation (RCF) facilitates research and an 
Integrated Conservation and Development (ICAD) Project in the Crater Mountain Wildlife 
Management Area (CMWMA). The CMWMA covers an area of almost 3,000 square 
kilometres, and is one of the largest expanses of pristine tropical forest in the world. It 
ranges from lowland tropical rainforest on the Purari River to sub-alpine scrub on the 
summit areas of Crater Mountain. This project is seeking to encourage businesses such as 
research, eco-tourism and artifact sales as an alternative to the use of resources for large- 
scale timber and mineral extraction.
TABLE 3
List of NGOs in Eastern Highlands Province
Organisation Main Activity
ATprojects Business Development & Vocational Training 
Environment & conservation 
Health & women.
Women’s & children’s rights 
Capacity building
Agriculture, health & Vovational Training 
Teaching & Women’s Programs 
Health & Youth Programs 
Agriculture, Health, &, Vocational Training 
Agriculture, Health, Vocational & Women 
Housing, Women’s & Youth Programs 
Teaching, Women & Youth Programs 
Women & Youth Programs 
Capacity building
RCF
Save the Children 
Family Voice 
Inter-team 
Salvation Army
YWCA
Baptist Church
Catholic Church
Evangelic Brotherhood Church
Lutheran Church
SDA Church
United Church
Goroka Chamber of Commerce
Source: Compiled by the author
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ATprojects was established in 1998 to enable rural people to use appropriate technologies 
that contribute to the sustainable development of their communities. The organisation is 
developing a close working relationship with both the provincial government and the eight 
district administrations in the Eastern Highlands as well as the churches and other NGOs. 
In the context of the Eastern Highlands, A1 projects sees “appropriate technology” as:
• Projects that require only small amounts of capital;
• Emphasising the use of local materials;
• Relatively labour intensive, but more productive than traditional technologies;
• Small enough in scale to be affordable to individual families or small groups;
• Can be understood, controlled and maintained by villagers, without a high level of 
special training;
• Produced in villages or small workshops;
• Promoting people working together to bring improvements to communities;
• Offering opportunities for people to become involved in the development process; and
• Useful in productive ways without doing harm to the environment.
A recently established organisation in the province is Family Voice. The focus for Family 
Voice is on the family and particularly the rights of children. The organisation is currently 
receiving funding from Save the Children, and undertakes family counselling on domestic 
violence, and family disputes. Save the Children PNG have their national head office in 
Goroka. Similarly with Family Voice their focus is on family violence, children’s rights, 
children’s health and education, and HIV/AIDS. Save the Children do not generally 
support income-generating projects. Inter Team (Swiss Development Service) also have 
there national head office in Goroka, and primarily provide volunteer development workers 
for community groups. The focus is on technical and agricultural assistance. At this time 
the Eastern Highlands Provincial Aids Council is not effective.
Another initiative in the Province is the Smallholders Support Services Pilot Project which
is primarily funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This project commenced in
2000 and is envisaged to continue as a pilot project for five years covering all 8 districts.
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The task of providing governmental support services to smallholders has traditionally been 
mainly the responsibility of DAL however for many reasons DAL has not been able to do 
the job effectively.
In this project the approach being tried is contracting out. Service providers are contracted 
to undertake specific extension tasks. The expectation is that this will create a delivery 
system that is cost effective, more flexible and accessible. There is also a particular 
emphasis on women’s income-generating options to raise women’s status. The focus is on 
coffee with food crop production and other income generating on-farm and off-farm 
activities taking second place.
The project’s main aim is to improve support services through awarding contracts to 
service providers. It does not fund farmer’s projects. Instead the emphasis is on funding 
extension projects that support the training and institutional strengthening of producer 
groups. Over the five-year period the project aims to assist 7,600 households in the 
province. By mid-2000 twelve groups, comprising 370 smallholders has received or is still 
receiving support.
Radio Eastern Highlands (Karai Bilong Kumul) currently transmits on two frequencies, 
MW and the Stereo FM band. The station provides news and information, educational and 
entertainment services to the Eastern Highlands population in English and Pidgin. The 
station broadcasts five hours a day, from 1700 to 2200 hours. It has only recently 
recommenced transmission that had been suspended due to a shortage of funds. A number 
of civil society organisations use the radio for providing information including RCF, 
Family Voice, the YWCA and the various churches. Provincial Government departments 
also use the station for providing the community with information on health, education and 
agriculture.
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6.5. East New Britain Province
General Characteristics
East New Britain Province occupies the eastern half of the island of New Britain, and small 
island groups off Rabaul. The Province covers an area of 15,100 square km, which is about 
3 percent of the total area of PNG. The estimated 2000 population is 220,035 people, and 
with an average annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent since 1980.350 However the population 
growth rate in some areas may be as high as 7 per cent. The province is divided into four 
districts, Gazelle, Kokopo, Rabaul and Pomio. Rabaul District has the highest population 
density of 255 persons per square kilometre compared to only 4 persons per every square 
kilometre in Pomio District. Eighty percent of the population live in either Rabaul or 
Kokopo District, most of the lowlands of the Gazelle Peninsula, with a limited number in 
the rugged Baining Mountains. The socioeconomic ranking of provinces shows that while 
East New Britain is amongst the four best-developed provinces; two of its four districts, 
namely Kokopo (estimated population 58,650) and Rabaul, (estimated population 27,023) 
ranked second and third out of eighty-seven districts, while Pomio (estimated population 
44,698) ranked forty-seventh.331 Further evidence of the unevenness of development is that 
there are hospitals in Kokopo and Rabaul Districts but there is no hospital or medical 
officers in Pomio District. Also in terms of infrastructure Pomio has only 216 kilometres 
of road in a very spread out district while the Gazelle has a well-developed road network 
totalling 304 kilometres. Pomio district is characterised by mountains, heavy rainfall and 
poor soil. The Gazelle District has an estimated population of 89,664.
East New Britain has around 11 language groups but the Kuauna speaking Tolai is by far 
the largest single group and is the language of almost two thirds of the people. People who 
live in ENB are of Melanesian descent, speaking Austronesian languages. Kuanua is the 
main language of the Gazelle Peninsula. There are five main ethnic groups consisting of 
Tolais who dominate the Gazelle Peninsula followed by the Bainings, Sulkas, Taulils and 
Pomios. The estimated population of the province is 210,000 of whom the majority are 
Tolais.
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In the matrilineal society of the Gazelle Peninsula Tolais inherit land and other properties 
from their oldest maternal uncles. They are known as lualua or headman. It is the eldest 
maternal uncle who looks after land, shell money and other communally owned property on 
behalf of the sub-lineage relatives. Pomio people also inherit land and other property from 
their closest eldest maternal uncles. Unlike the Tolais and Pomio people the Baining 
people are patrilineal. Traditional inheritance patterns, therefore, differ from those 
practised in the Gazelle Peninsula and Pomio with Baining children, particularly sons, 
inheriting land and other properties from their father.
The people of the Province have had long contact with the outside world and the Province 
has a well-educated population due to the fact that the missions and the government have 
established some of the first schools in the Province. The English navigator William 
Dampier was the first European to visit the island of New Britain, arriving early in 1700. 
Althougn he proved New Britain was an island, separated from the New Guinea mainland 
by Dampier Strait, it was not until 1767 that fellow Englishman Phillip Carteret discovered 
that Dampier’s St Georges Bay was actually a channel and that New Ireland and New 
Britain were separate islands. St Georges Bay became St Georges Channel. A hundred 
years passed with only occasional contact, although whalers and sailors passed through the 
channel, sometimes pausing for water and provisions.
In 1874 German traders established settlements at Mioko Island, in the Duke of York 
islands, and in 1876 at Matupit Island in Blanche Bay. In 1875 the Reverend George 
Brown started a Methodist mission at Port Hunter in the Duke of York islands with a group 
of six Fijians. Sacred Heart Catholics began a mission on the peninsula’s north coast in 
1882, and the following year saw the region’s first coconut plantation near Kokopo and the 
founding of the Vunapope Catholic Mission. On 3 November 1884 a German protectorate 
was declared.
From the earliest period following independence ‘factionalism among the Tolai leadership, 
deep social inequality among the Tolai, and major spatial inequality between the north-east 
Gazelle and the rest of the province put obstacles in the way of establishing and operating a 
provincial government.’ ~ There is a marked contrast between the developed part of the 
Gazelle Peninsula and the undeveloped rest of the province, because ‘the former is
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characterized by very high population densities, good infrastructure, good access to 
services, significant economic development and very high resource potential.’353 
Development in the province is very uneven and ‘from the German period onwards, 
“modem” economic activity has been concentrated in the northeast Gazelle, the Bainings 
and Pomio areas lagging far behind. While rugged terrain and scattered population may 
have made this inevitable, very little development effort was made either by the Australian 
administration or in the first few years following independence.’354 The provincial capital 
is Kokopo.
The province has a relatively high adult literacy rate of more than 70%. The Catholic 
Education Agency administers a very significant proportion of the education system. The 
Agency administers two high schools, thirty-two primary schools, twenty-eight community 
schools and sixty-three elementary schools.
East New Britain has a relatively good health system. The Catholic Health Service 
administers ten health facilities which includes a large hospital and nine health centres. 
ENB is taking a multi-sectoral approach in its effort to deal with HIV/AIDS. The 
Provincial Aids Council (PAC) is now active and has agreed on a six-month strategic plan.
Economic Activity
The economy of ENB has been predominantly based on the agricultural sector. Cocoa and 
copra have been the main products of the Province. The Province is now the leading cocoa 
producer in the country. The total cocoa production of the province consists of large 
plantations owned by foreign companies, individuals and a few local business groups and 
smallholder blocks owned by local people. ENB is also the leading copra producer for 
exports in the whole country.
There has been a history of intensive plantation development in the Gazelle Peninsula. 
Also there has been scattered and comparatively minor plantation development in coastal 
areas together with small-scale logging and milling activities. There has been a gradual 
extension of road communications from the Rabaul and Kokopo areas to its immediate 
hinterland. However there is continued dependence on water and air access to isolated
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areas in the Province. In particular apart from the Gazelle Peninsula there has been very 
little development, even for subsistence purposes, inland from the coast.
The economy is fairly highly monetised by PNG standards, stemming from the relatively 
large urban centres and the high level of cash cropping in the Province. The education 
levels are also comparatively high by PNG standards. Each of the districts has a high 
school and Kokopo, the most densely populated district, has three high schools with an 
intake of 1,986 students and 85 teachers. The greater part of agriculture development in the 
Province occurs in the more gentle topography of the Gazelle Peninsula and the adjacent 
islands. Limited development occurs along the coastal fringe of the east and south coast, 
but elsewhere steepness of topography is the major limiting factor. Paimalmal in the Pomio 
District may expand as the main town and growth centre in the area, particularly for 
agricultural development. The forests of the Pomio District are rated critical for 
conservation in PNG and classified as ‘very important’ biological areas.
Social inequality in the northeast Gazelle has its roots in the long-established patterns of 
economic activity in the area, and the closely related patterns of land distribution there.355 
The provincial economy is dependent on agriculture. The total cocoa production of the 
province consists of large plantations owned by foreign companies, individuals and a few 
local business groups, and small holder blocks owned by local people. A majority of 
people in the northeast Gazelle depend on subsistence agriculture supplemented by cash 
crops, mostly smallholder cocoa and copra. Sales of cocoa, copra, fresh food and betel nut 
in this area provide relatively high incomes to most villages. In addition, there is oil palm 
and some tourism. In the Pomio and Bainings areas, subsistence gardening is far more 
important, with much smaller proportion of people involved in cash cropping and on an 
even much smaller scale than the Tolai areas.356 ‘The south coast and interior of Pomio 
District face a number of limitations particularly excessively high rainfall and poor soils, 
and steep topography in places.’357 There is an excellent network of roads, many sealed, in 
the northeast lowlands of the Gazelle Peninsula, but in the rest of the province road 
development is very limited. Pomio District and the mountainous parts of Rabaul and 
Kokopo Districts, is characterised by relatively low population density, poor infrastructure, 
poor access to services, limited economic development and limited resource potential.358
There are few roads in the south of the province. Outboard motor boat and canoe travel 
is common in coastal areas. People in the northeast of the Gazelle Peninsula require less 
than one hour’s travel to reach Kokopo, while those in the west Baining Mountains, in 
the Duke of York Islands and on Watom Island require less than four hour’s travel. 
People on the south and northeast coasts require 4-8 hour’s travel to reach the nearest 
service centre, while those in the inland mountains of Pomio District are very remote 
and require more than one day’s travel.339
Recently the Province has been preparing a development plan. The last attempt at 
preparing a plan was in 1986 when a draft “ENB Integrated Development Plan” was 
prepared. This plan set out six strategic objectives and a series of recommendations from 
each Provincial Division for policy measures and operational measures.
In recent years the ENB economy has performed reasonably because it has benefited from 
good cocoa prices, and large inflows of capital for infrastructure rebuilding. However 
quantities of cocoa produced have not significantly increased. Also industry has not fully 
recovered from the major losses caused be the volcanic eruptions. The latest development 
plan therefore proposes to develop the regional centre role of the Gazelle for the New 
Guinea Islands region. This concept of a regional centre applies to government, 
institutions, NGOs, churches, companies and commerce. It is proposed to move more into 
manufacturing and services whilst at least maintaining or moderately increasing agricultural 
production -  the same or more and different types of cash crops whilst at the same time 
producing more food crops. However it is envisaged that agriculture will decline relatively 
as a proportion of the total economy.
Political Activity
Since 1981 the provincial Government has been relatively stable with only one attempted 
vote of no confidence. There is also some evidence that the provincial government is 
moving beyond mere service provision towards developing a capacity to develop policies, 
which tend to reshape economic and social relations by dealing with the major problems of 
the province.360 This has been attributed partly to cultural characteristics supportive of 
economic activity, and ‘the factionalism of the Tolai in the period since World War II 
should not hide the fact that they share a high degree of social cohesion. The relationship 
between traditional society and what might be called the parallel introduced government
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system involves complex interchanges. Adaptable traditional culture recognises and gives 
credit to achievement in the parallel system, and in the modern economy. At the same time 
it would not be easy for a Tolai to advance far in the parallel governmental system without 
a strong basis of support in traditional society.’361
However like most provinces in PNG administrative and financial management have not 
been without problems. In 1991 the Auditor-General reported that ‘internal controls in 
regard to payments need improvement as instances were noted where payments were 
processed without adequate supporting documentation and in certain instances without 
being authorised by a financial delegate, correction fluid was used in alteration of amounts 
on purchase orders, alteration to amounts were not authenticated by the respective financial 
delegate, in four instances purchase orders were raised after goods and services had been 
obtained and some claims were not certified prior to payment.’362
Another recent development has been a report on greater autonomy commissioned by the 
Provincial Government and approved by the Provincial Executive Council in April 2003. 
The report was presented in three main parts comprising an executive summary, a report on 
the administration of the consultation process, and the third part contains the proposed 
constitution. The report highlights the shortfall in grants owed to the Province, including 
total gross exports by the Province since 1995 calculated on a five percent basis and how 
much the Province should be receiving in derivation grants due to the gross export of its 
commodities.
East New Britain Province comprises a Provincial Seat and four Open Seats. Lion Dion, 
who won the seat in a by-election about 18 months before the 2002 elections, occupied the 
Provincial Seat. This followed the decision of Francis Koimanrea to resign and contest the 
Pomio Open Seat that was left vacant following the death of his brother Alois Koki 
Koimanrea. Dion was a controversial Governor who approved the establishment of a 
community consultative committee to consult the community on greater administrative and 
financial autonomy for the province, as a way to try and address the lack of funds flowing 
down to the provinces and the rural people for services. He had been particularly active in 
trying to shift the emphasis on traditional cash crops and to encourage alternative cash
crops. The development of oil palm, also an initiative of his government, and the
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expansion of alternative cash crops such as vanilla, cardamon and other spice products, was 
a means of diversifying the economic base of the province. Leon Dion held the seat in 
2002 with 33.9% of the vote.
Why then has provincial government been relatively successful in ENB in terms of 
performance? This has been in spite of ‘factionalism among the Tolai leadership, deep 
social inequality between the north-east Gazelle and the rest of the province put obstacles in 
the way of establishing and operating a provincial government.’j6 ’ It has been argued that 
‘the degree of mobilised popular support for the provincial government is a key to 
understanding its success. Unlike perhaps any province other than Bougainville, there has 
been continuity in the support of a proportion of the population (the Tolai) for both the 
principles of local autonomy and its manifestation in their provincial government... The 
popular support has a range of consequences. It makes service in the provincial 
government an attractive option for aspiring Tolai politicians and bureaucrats. There are 
rewards other than personal enrichment, which may flow from a political career in the 
provincial government, more so than may be the case in many other provincial 
governments.’364 Also the Tolai leader ‘has always appealed to established norms and 
idioms as well as insisting on the need for forms of economic innovation.’303 One of 
Salisbury’s main points is that Tolai entrepreneurship was never divorced from political 
leadership. The entrepreneur was also always a local political leader. What is more he was 
a leader who appealed to supporters in ‘traditional’ (that is, indigenous rather than foreign) 
political idioms. Hence Tolai society in the period since European contact has been 
characterised both by economic dynamism, and by a proud adherence to aspects of Tolai 
tradition and culture.366 Regan argues that the ‘relationship between traditional society and 
what might be called the parallel introduced government system involves complex 
interchanges. Adaptable traditional culture recognises and gives credit to achievement in 
the parallel system, and in the modem economy. At the same time it would not be easy for 
a Tolai to advance far in the parallel government system without a strong basis of support 
in traditional society.’367 Most importantly Regan finds that the relative provincial 
government stability was largely the result of an ‘alliance’ between the well-educated Tolai 
politicians and moderate Pomio and Bainings members.368
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2002 National Elections
East New Britain Province comprises a Provincial Seat and four Open Seats. A full list of 
the candidates for each seat is provided in Appendix F. Lion Dion, who won the seat in a 
by-election about 18 months before the 2002 elections, occupied the Provincial Seat. This 
followed the decision of Francis Koimanrea to resign and contest the Pomio Open Seat, 
which was left vacant following the death of his brother Alois Koki Koimanrea. Dion was 
a controversial Governor who approved the establishment of a community consultative 
committee to consult the community on greater administrative and financial autonomy for 
the province, as a way to try and address the lack of funds flowing down to the provinces 
and the rural people for services. He had been particularly active in trying to shift the 
emphasis on traditional cash crops and to encourage alternative cash crops. The 
development of oil palm, also an initiative of his government, and the expansion of 
alternative cash crops such as vanilla, cardamon and other spice products, was a means of 
diversifying the economic base of the province. Leon Dion held the seat in 2002 with 
33.9% of the vote.
Tiensten Paul, a People’s Progress Party candidate, with 28.1% of the votes, and defeating 
Koimanrea, won the Pomio Open seat. The Rabaul Open Seat was held by Sir John 
Kaputin who retained the seat with just over 20% of the vote against eight candidates in the 
1997 election. However leading up to the 2002 elections he was accused of neglecting the 
volcano devastated Rabaul town. However Sir John may not have done anything visible in 
Rabaul town, but he had assisted in securing aid funding for the Gazelle Restoration 
Program, which has been used to relocate and build infrastructure for displaced Rabaul 
people. His funding was all over the Gazelle, Sikut, Vunakabi, Gelagela, where the 
majority of his voters are, but the town’s people did not appreciate this. Dr Allan Marat 
with 59.4% of the vote won this seat, and who has now become Deputy PM. Sir Rabbie 
Namaliu who retained the seat in 1997 against 4 candidates and obtaining about 53% of the 
votes has held the Kokopo Open Seat. For the 2002 election he held the seat with 32.8% of 
the vote. The incumbent, Sinai Brown, of the National Alliance Party with 37.6% of the 
vote also held the Gazelle Open seat. The characteristics of the political contest in the 
Province are in stark contrast with both Gulf and Eastern Highlands Provinces.
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Civil Society Organisations
Within the NGO sector in East New Britain networking and the formation of strategic 
alliances has become important. This includes most importantly government agencies with 
which the various CBOs and NGOs seem to have a constructive relationship. The 
Community Development scheme appears to have been very active in strengthening civil 
society organisations. The CDS has funded a project to improve management capacity with 
the PHF, an organisational and management review of the ENBCW, and community health 
training with ENBSEK. It has also funded 18 projects with CBOs that include youth, 
women’s and church groups. The Alliance of Community Development Agencies (East 
New Britain) Inc or the ACDA is an organisation that was very recently established to 
bring together NGOs, CBOs, church groups, government agencies and other development 
organisations to work together towards sustaining community development in the province, 
iio primary function is to review, and to screen, expressions of interest received from 
NGOs, CBOs, and church based organisations in the Province using the CDS guidelines or 
guidelines from other donor organisations.
Civil society organisations in the province are dominated by church related organisations 
such as men and women’s fellowship groups, community groups and a few NGOs which 
are predominantly local. About half the population are Catholic with the United Church 
accounting for about one third of the population. Civil society seems to have deepened in 
recent times with villages joining environmental groups, forming social action groups, and 
village groups to speak on national and international issues. Examples include the Viviran 
and Vunamami social action groups. In Pomio, the Kivung Association is both a religious 
as well as a political organisation/69 Tolai women’s groups are among the most active in 
PNG.
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TABLE 4
List of NGOs in East New Britain Province
Organisation Main Activity
ENB Social Eksen Committee
Pacific Heritage Foundation
ENB Council of Women
ENB Youth Development Foundation
ENB Red Cross
ENB Scouts Movement
ENB Small Farmers Association
Catholic Church
United Church
ENB Aids Council
Environment, conservation and health 
Community capacity building 
Rehabilitation of displaced families 
Youth activities and HIV/AIDS 
First Aid and H1V/A1DS awareness 
Community service programs 
Environment and urban growth 
Health and education 
Health and education 
H1V/A1DS awareness
Source: Compiled by the author
A fairly large and active NGO in the province is the East New Britain Social Eksen 
Committee (ENBSEK), or SEK, which undertakes work to raise people’s confidence and 
capacities. The rapid escalation of logging in ENB, the pollution and erosion caused by 
illegal logging practices and increasing abuse of landowners’ rights prompted the formation 
of SEK about 12 years ago. Interestingly it was established by a government agency -  the 
Division of Community Development -  of the Provincial Government. During the early 
1980s the Community Development Division became concerned about the increased levels 
of social problems in the province, and realised that Government resources were inadequate 
for any serious impact on the problems. It was recognised that the approach needed to 
mobilise the people as partners in solving the problems, and that past government programs 
had not been successful. Currently its methodology includes community awareness and 
training, advocacy, and support to local communities to design and implement community 
development activities. SEK has a large volunteer network living in the villages, and who 
are vital to the SEK network which responds to villagers’ needs for information around a 
range of themes such as environmental issues and landowner rights, domestic violence, 
women’s rights, AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases and drug and alcohol dependency.
SEK’s Environment and Awareness Program informs communities of their legal rights as 
landowners, and of the environmental and social implications of uncontrolled and illegal 
logging operations. SEK also investigates and documents the logging companies’ abuses 
and illegal practices and, in some cases, takes the companies to court. SEK also works
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closely with other organisations, which can provide more specialised information, and to 
provide alternatives to large scale logging, such as eco-tourism, food production, and 
butterfly farming. For example, the Duke of York Social Concern Committee was started 
in 1994, after the volcanic eruption, with help from SEK in response to the increase in 
social and environmental problems. Their current aim is to carry out education and 
awareness raising on issues like drug and alcohol abuse, HIV/AIDS, domestic violence, 
child abuse, climate change and conserving marine life around the islands. SEK’s approach 
is to educate people on the true value of their natural resources, to teach them how to better 
look after their environment, and to highlight the dangers of uncontrolled resource 
exploitation in the province. The group promotes the involvement of women in decisions 
about resource development. SEK works with the Pacific Heritage Foundation, which is 
helping landowners, earn income by milling their own timber rather than selling their logs 
to foreign timber companies.
The Pacific Heritage Foundation (PHF) was started in 1993. Its key objectives are to 
promote practices that sustain the cultural and environmental heritage of PNG. It pursues a 
community development strategy that works with all sections of the community. Its 
activities include projects to aid mothers and their families to address the problems living in 
care centres. It supports small-scale forestry and community development projects, and 
tries to help groups from allowing outside loggers into their areas.
The ENB Council of Women (ENBCW) is a semi-non-govemment organisation 
established in 1973 to voice women’s concerns on social, political, economic, cultural and 
religious activities. More recently it has concentrated on the rehabilitation of displaced 
women, children and families from villages that were affected by the volcanic eruptions. 
Currently there is a review of the Council’s vision, mission statements, and objectives, 
guiding principles, services and organisational structure. The ENBCW has adopted the 
provincial government reform structure and established District Councils, Local Level 
Councils and Ward Councils.
The ENB Small Farmers Association was formed in 1994 as a Smallholder Cocoa Farmers
Committee. It was originally set up during the implementation of the ENB Smallholder
Development Project. However after this project was wound up in 1996 the services to
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small farmers began to deteriorate. The community decided to incorporate the group to 
become an association.
Another NGO active in the rural sector is the Organisation for Industrial, Spiritual and 
Cultural Advancement (OISCA) whose training programs are largely funded by the 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), but designed by the Department of 
Agriculture and Livestock. OISCA provides training courses consisting of the latest 
integrated farming methods and appropriate technology. Its main clients are youth from all 
over PNG. The organisation mainly focuses on sustainable farming, with rice production 
as the main component. A former ENB Member of Parliament established OISCA in 
1987.
Another successful organisation in the province has been the ENB Savings and Loan 
Society. The society is one of oniy a very few that has managed to operate in the rural 
areas of PNG. It has its head office in Kokopo with branch offices in Kerevat and Rabaul. 
The Society currently has a membership of around 25,000. It provides loans for individuals 
as well as various businesses e.g. bakeries, cocoa fermentries, and assistance to cocoa and 
coconut farmers.
Since Rabaul was devastated by the volcanic eruption in October 1994, work has been in 
progress on the restoration of the Gazelle Peninsula, much of it financed by aid. As one of 
the restoration projects the Japanese Government funded a complete rebuilding and re­
equipping of the NBC’s provincial Radio East New Britain facility.
As a result, Radio East New Britain or “Maus blong Tavurvur” (the mouth of the volcano) 
now has the most modern, reliable and powerful systems in the NBC and transmits on three 
frequencies, MW, SW and the most popular Stereo FM band. The station provides news 
and information, educational and entertainment services to the East New Britain population 
in Kuanua, as well as English and Pidgin.
The station broadcasts 18 hours a day, from 0500 to 2300 hours. The music is a mix of 
PNG (Current Hits, String Bands, Traditional Songs, Gospel, Choirs) and International
(from Gold 60s up to the 90s and some current hits). The station mainly aims at an adult
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audience, but also aims some daytime programming at younger age groups. Radio ENB 
has wide appeal across the demographics and an estimated audience of over 175,000 people 
in ENB Province and nearby parts of the New Guinea Islands region. The station is 
allowed to accept advertising to help meet operational costs.
The University of Vudal and the Provincial Administration have recently agreed to 
establish a project for integrated agricultural training for rural farmers in ENB. The project 
will be funded through the AusAlD PNG Incentive Fund. The project involves access to 
training, credit and market information. A community resource centre will be built at the 
University to provide training and information in all areas of rural development, enterprise 
development and natural resource management.
6.6. Conclusions
At the time of independence it was argued by PNG policy-makers that decentralisation 
would lead to democratic participation in decision-making by devolving power down to the 
provinces. To some extent this has happened in ENB, to a lesser extent in EHP, and to a 
very limited extent in Gulf. Clearly the failure of the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial and 
Local-level Governments, originally seen as the most far reaching reform since 1975, is a 
good indication that isolated legislation to change the structure of institutions does not 
guarantee that there will be changes in the values and attitudes of politicians or the general 
community.370 In addition provincial and especially local level governments currently lack 
the technical and project management skills required to implement the aims of the 1995 
reforms.
In ENB Regan found that the ‘degree of support for provincial government also means that 
it is very much open to public scrutiny, something which acts as an important check not 
evident in most other provinces.’ Also in ENB civil society organisations are largely 
locally based and have a generally cooperative relationship with the Provincial 
Administration. In the case of Eastern Highlands Stewart found that during the early 1980s 
relations of trust were not inviolable but where they existed they overlapped with ethnic 
and cultural ties to create a sort of “spontaneous solidarity” in the government of the 
province. However the broad consensus which characterised this period could not
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survive the pressures imposed by so many ethnic groups. As the economic fortunes of the 
province declined with the coffee price these divisions were further exacerbated.
In PNG the multiplicity of ethnic groups frustrates attempts to form long-run multi-ethnic 
coalitions even at the provincial level. Brown and Ashman have shown in their case studies 
how ‘social capital is also indicated by the existence o f individuals or organizations with 
the intersectoral relationships that enabled contact among parties with different interests 
and backgrounds. Such “bridges” between sectors facilitated the recognition of common 
problems and shared interests in problem solving.373 In Gulf, and to a lesser extent in 
Eastern Highlands, organisations which bring diverse groups together to solve common 
problems are lacking. In this context the establishment o f the EHPAC is a very positive 
step for rebuilding social capital in that province.
The overall evidence from the qualitative research is that an explanation for the failure of 
effective government in Gulf and Eastern Highlands may be found in social capital theory. 
Clearly the nature o f social capital in PNG, probably the most ethnically fragmented 
country in the world, poses some unique problems for effective government if social capital 
theory is valid. It seems true from this research that ethnic group’s can both generate 
benefits and inflict costs on societies, and it appears from the field investigation that ethnic 
fragmentation does affect the performance of government institutions. In communities with 
effective government and high levels of ‘bridging’ social capital, development seems to 
have been more likely. Alternatively when a society’s social capital is in primarily social 
groups disconnected from one another (i.e. ethnic groups), it is more likely that powerful 
groups will dominate government, to the exclusion of other groups, and development will 
be slower. In ENB a broad consensus across ethnic groups and cooperation between 
government and civil society favours effective government whereas in Gulf and Eastern 
Highlands the multiplicity of ethnic groups and a lack of cooperation between government 
and civil society frustrate any attempts to maintain a consensus necessary for effective 
government. Gulf faces some very formidable obstacles but the establishment of a body 
along the lines o f the EHPAC might be a good first step for building social capital in that 
province.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPLAINING PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE IN PNG
‘Institutions that were established as these countries attained independence have come under pressure as the 
aspirations o f power players have grown, and as unresolved tensions -  pushed underground by colonial
muscle -  have re-emerged. ’ 474
7.1. Introduction
This chapter replicates Putnam’s methodology in the context of provincial government in 
PNG. The available data for measuring provincial performance and the stock of social 
capital at the provincial level are discussed, and some preliminary analysis of the 
relationship between social capital and provincial development and performance is given. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to analyse the feasibility and the validity of both 
measuring social capital and identifying its role in explaining the differential performance 
of provincial governments across PNG. The focus of my research is on provincial 
government in PNG, because the apparent failure of provincial government in PNG is 
increasingly given as a reason for the lack of broad-based development. An analysis of 
provincial government provides an opportunity for comparison. Case studies of East New 
Britain, Gulf and Eastern Highlands Province were undertaken because of the difficulties of 
generalising about the relationship between sociopolitical factors and government 
performance. In The Logic o f Comparative Social Inquiry Przworski and Teune argue that, 
although achieving a high level of generality should be a basic goal of social science 
significant difficulties can arise in generalising beyond an initial set of cases.375 These 
three provinces have been chosen because of the availability of relevant data, and to 
provide a contrast in terms of their socioeconomic and cultural characteristics.
Various reasons are given for the poor performance of provincial government in PNG, 
including inappropriate design (i.e. the revised Organic Law), a lack of economic and 
financial resources, low level of skills and cultural impediments. John Burton also argues 
that ‘many of the problems of provincial development... are traceable to cultural attitudes, 
not to absolute shortage of money, nor to intrinsically badly educated officials and 
politicians. Culture is praiseworthy - in village affairs. When it invades government, it 
leads wittingly to cronyism and nepotism, and unwittingly, to structural imbalances that
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may take years to correct.’376 However the precise nature of political culture is uncertain 
and ‘it is undoubtedly necessary to renounce making “political culture” a reservoir of easy 
explanations, which would make up for any lack of understanding and even discourage 
further efforts to discover other possible causes. In too many models, culture remains an 
independent variable that unilaterally influences political phenomena. That is why we must 
applaud when research is done in order to understand what political culture itself depends 
on -  how it is fashioned, along what processes, under the pressure of what conflicts, events, 
conscious policies.’377 1 have chosen to use a combined quantitative and qualitative 
research design because my case study analysis is focusing on real-life situations, and 
embedded in a particular social and political context.
7.2. Measuring Government Performance in PNG
i'he aim of this section is to identify the available quantitative measures of institutional 
performance applicable to provincial government in PNG. Wilson published the first 
comprehensive study of disadvantaged districts in PNG in 1974. Wilson used six 
indicators to identify the level of socio-economic development for each sub-district (pre­
independence the districts were known as sub-districts). The indicators used were:
• smallholder cash crop production;
• hospital beds per 1,000 people;
• administration staff per 1,000 people;
• enrolments at primary and secondary schools per 1,000 people
• accessibility to the sub-district headquarters; and
• the level of local government services.
In 1984 the PNG National Planning Office requested the PNG Institute of Applied Social 
and Economic Research (IASER) to conduct a study on spatial inequalities at the district 
level. This study attempted to delineate differences in socio-economic development at the 
district level based on an initial list of 32 indicators. The social indicators used for the 
study were derived primarily from the Provincial Data System and the 1980 National 
Population Census.
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TABLE 5
Provincial Development Rankings
Province Dev Ranking 1986 Dev Ranking 1984 Dev Ranking
Western 10 11 18
Gulf 9 9 13
Central 6 7 16
Milne Bay 8 8 15
Oro 7 6 6
Southern Highlands 18 18 14
Enga 19 19 12
Western Highlands 13 16 2
Simbu 12 12 9
Eastern Highlands 16 17 7
Morobe 17 14 11
Madang 15 11 17
East Sepik 11 10 10
Sandaun 14 15 19
Manus 3 2 3
New Ireland 4 5 4
East New Britain 1 4 1
West New Britain 5 3 8
Bougainville 2 1 5
Sources: de Albuquerque, K and D’Sa, E. 1984, Spatial inequalities in Papua New Guinea: A Provincial 
Level Analysis, 1ASER, Mimeograph, Port Moresby; de Albuquerque, K and D’Sa, E. 1986, Spatial 
Inequalities in Papua New Guinea: A District Level Analysis, IASER, Discussion Paper No 49, Port 
Moresby. Hanson, L.W., Allen, B.J., Bourke, R.M., and McCarthy, T.J. 2001, Papua New Guinea Rural 
Development Handbook, The Australian National University, Canberra.
The indicators were categorised under six main categories: demographic, migration, 
economic, education, access; and health. A summary of the social indicators used is 
provided in Appendix C. A development ranking for the provinces had previously been 
estimated by the same authors in an earlier analysis of spatial inequalities in PNG.
In their study of provincial inequalities the researchers used 41 indicators, among them, per 
capita value of cash crops produced, per capita domestic factor income, per capita 
expenditure for salaries of teachers and public servants, per capita value of all buildings 
completed during 1980, registered motor vehicles per 10,000 population, and road length
i o n  #
per 1,000 population. In their 1986 study the researchers aggregated the district scores to 
the provincial level revealing a favourable comparison with the earlier preliminary study.
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The development ranking for the provinces is given in Table 5 above where the left column 
is the result from their 1986 study and the right column is their 1984 result. Both of these 
rankings have been tested in the following analysis, and they provide very similar results.
The third column in the table is a ranking of the provinces using the results of the analysis 
by the Land Management Group (LMG) at the Australian National University. The 
LMG combined data from two spatial databases: the PNG Resource Information System 
(PNGR1S), and the Mapping Agricultural Systems of PNG Project (MASP) database. The 
PNGRIS was completed in 1986 and provides data on environmental attributes such as 
altitude, landforms, geology, slope gradient, rainfall, vegetation and soils. MASP was 
completed in 1998 and provides data on village agriculture such as the crops grown, fallow 
length, cropping period, agricultural intensity, land management practices, cash earning 
activities and rural population.
The parameters used in their analysis of the PNG districts include population, access to 
services, income from agriculture, agricultural pressure and potential and disadvantaged 
people. Adding together a score on land potential, agricultural pressure derives a 
disadvantage index, access to services, income from agriculture and child malnutrition.
• Land potential was defined by classifying updated PNGRIS environmental data based 
on the growth requirements for sweet potato, which is the dominant staple crop in most 
of PNG.
• The agricultural pressure and potential classes identifying land that is under-utilised and 
over-utilised. This is defined by mismatches between land potential and agricultural 
intensity.
• Access to services was defined as the time taken to travel by foot, vehicle or boat from 
each MASP ‘agsystem’ to the nearest service centre. The access classification is 
qualitative and based on field experience.
• Income from agriculture was estimated for each MASP ‘agsystem’ based on the 
observed presence and significance of 21 agricultural cash earning activities. Both 
export and non-export commodities were considered and include animal products, betel 
nut, cardamon, cattle, chillies, cocoa, copra, coffee, crocodile products, firewood, fish,
fresh food, oil palm, potato, pyrethrum, rice, rubber, sheep, tea and tobacco.
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• Information on child malnutrition is drawn from the 1982-83 PNG National Nutrition 
Survey. In the analysis data on weight-for-height (wasting) and height-for-age 
(stunting) are used.
Therefore the LMG’s classification of disadvantaged districts incorporates a balance of 
environmental, social and economic data to reflect the factors that create disparities 
between rural people. For details of the rankings see Appendix D.
An approach adopted by Axline in his study of provincial government in PNG may be 
applied to measure provincial performance. He examined the performance of provincial 
governments with regard to legislative activity, the capacity to extract and allocate 
resources, and the setting of provincial priorities. This is similar to Putnam’s approach in 
his Italian study, where he examined all regional legislation from 1970 to 1984, with 
special emphasis on his six selected regions, seeking to evaluate the regional legislative 
performance. In Axline’s study, administrative capacity encompasses the broader policy­
making process, from formulation to implementation, including the elaboration of long 
term goals and the day-to-day operation of the department of the province. This is also 
similar to Putnam’s approach, where he initiated comprehensive case studies in six selected 
regions of social and economic planning to ‘recreate the policy process from the demand 
side, follow it through the “black box” of government, and trace its progress into the stage 
of administrative implementation and its final impact.’383 Axline adopts five categories 
under which provincial government administrative performance can be evaluated; namely:
• general planning, programming and policymaking;
• coordination, cooperation and communication;
• political cooperation and support;
• administration and management; and
• local and district affairs.
Axline was able to draw up a profile of provincial performance from which a general idea 
of the relative levels of provincial administrative capacity could be obtained across the five 
categories. It also enabled him to analyse the range of difference between the best and the
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worst performing provincial governments, and the kinds of problems posing the greatest 
obstacles to more effective provincial policy making. He concluded that it ‘confirms the 
widely held perception that administrative capacity at the provincial level is very limited
384while at the same time there are marked differences among provincial governments.’
TABLE 6
Axline’s Measures of PNG Provincial Performance
Province Acts Adopted Prov Rev Capital Works
Western 33 0.17 57.33
Gulf 40 0.11 36.99
Central 44 0.24 9.91
Milne Bay 37 0.72 23.13
Oro 29 1.18 62.00
Southern Highlands 31 0.12 23.43
Enga 31 0.12 29.03
Western Highlands 40 0.00 N/A
Simbu 39 0.20 63.49
Eastern Highlands 49 1.10 27.70
Morobe 54 1.37 22.55
Madang 34 0.25 5.96
East Sepik 31 1.14 4.53
Sandaun 32 N/A -6.63
Manus 38 0.44 29.22
New Ireland 36 0.36 -0.39
East New Britain 29 0.94 -2.52
West New Britain 35 0.38 -16.34
Bougainville 67 0.64 -13.82
Source: Axline, W.A. 1986, Decentralisation and Development Policy: Provincial Government and the 
Planning Process in Papua New Guinea, Monograph No 26, IASER, Boroko.
The PNG Department of Decentralisation developed the data on which Axline’s analysis 
was based in co-ordination with provincial governments from 1980 to 1983. A set of 
criteria embracing eight areas of activity, for which data were collected on a quarterly basis, 
were:
• provincial level planning, decision making, implementation and reporting;
• financial management;
• Provincial Assembly/PEC, Secretariat and ministerial support staff;
• local level government and district administration;
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• personnel management;
• management of physical resources and equipment;
• political relationships and relationships of support with national departments and 
agencies; and
• divisional progress.
Axline’s assessments provide a basis for drawing up a profile of provincial performance 
from which a general idea can be obtained of the relative levels of provincial administrative 
capacity across the categories, the range of difference between the best and the worst 
performing provincial governments, and the kinds of problems which pose the greatest 
obstacles to more effective provincial policy making.383
Widely held perceptions of regional differences in PNG were supported by his analysis. 
The two best performing provincial governments were in the New Guinea Islands region 
and the two worst were in the Southern (Papuan) region. Differences do not clearly follow 
regional lines, however. Even though no provincial government in the Southern region was 
among the better performers, one Islands region provincial government was among the 
worst third of all provincial governments. Performance of provincial governments in the 
Highlands and Mamose region was also mixed, with some better and some poorer examples 
in each.386 Key data for provincial government performance from Axline’s study is 
provided in Table 6.
The making of laws is the most fundamental way of making political decisions in a 
parliamentary democracy, and it is on the basis of these laws that governments have the 
authority to act. Under the Organic Law, provincial legislation is the source of provincial 
executive power, and it is in the making of provincial laws that one can look for the first 
indication of the exercise of policy-making power. The first column in Table 6 shows the 
laws that have been adopted by provincial legislative assemblies’ form 1977 to 1982 by 
province. The pattern of provincial legislative activity varies greatly across provinces, with 
Bougainville with 67 acts, Morobe with 54 acts, and Eastern Highlands with 49 acts 
standing out from the other provincial governments which range from 29 acts for Oro and 
East New Britain to 44 for Central Provincial Government.
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One of the basic functions of any government is the raising of revenue to provide resources 
for its own operation and the allocation of those resources as part of policy implementation. 
The policy-making performance of a government depends in part on its ability to extract 
resources from society as a means of raising revenue and its ability to allocate those 
resources in such a way as to further its policy aims.
There are a number of indicators of the ability of provincial governments to extract and 
allocate resources, including raising revenue from taxation, allocating expenditure in 
pursuit of policy objectives, discharging the responsibility to maintain provincial assets, 
and maintaining overhead costs of running government at a reasonable level. Provincial 
governments can be judged by examining their records on each of these indicators through 
analysis of provincial budgets. This gives an indication of policy-making performance 
related to resource extraction and allocation. Column two in Table 6 provides provincially 
raised revenues in 1982 as a proportion of total Provincial Factor income. One indicator of 
the effectiveness of allocation of development resources by provincial governments is their 
ability to spend the funds, which they have allocated. The proportion of capital works 
provides such an indicator funds that have been budgeted but have not been spent. Column 
three in Table 6 gives the provincial expenditure on New Capital Works in 1982 under­
spending percentage of the estimate. Again, it should be kept in mind that this indicator 
does not take into account whether particular projects respond to the most pressing needs, 
nor whether the funds are being used effectively.
Axline’s results are interesting when they are compared with the development rankings 
produced by de Albuquerque and D’Sa, who found the most developed provinces were the 
outer island regions of New Ireland, New Britain, Bougainville and Manus, while the least 
developed regions were the Highlands provinces of Enga and the Southern and Eastern 
Highlands. Axline’s aggregate ranking of provincial performance is shown in Figure 6, 
with the provincial development indicators. The provincial abbreviations used in the 
scattergrams are explained in Appendix B. Overall while there is some commonality 
between the two indicators (the Islands Region score high and some parts of the 
Highlands score low on both measures, for example), the similarities are outweighed 
by the differences -  suggesting that government effectiveness alone does not account 
for differences in provincial development. This suggests that some other factor
account for provincial development.
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Another measure that may be used to compare provinces is the Human Development Index 
(HDI). The HDI is based on three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at 
birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy and combined 
elementary, primary, and secondary education; and level of living, as measured by the 
Domestic Factor Income per capita. The measure used for PNG is therefore slightly 
different to that which is normally used for the global report. Domestic Factor Income 
includes formal, non-formal, and subsistence components. However the HDI is not only a 
measure of comparative income levels but also measures the level of educational attainment 
and longevity of life. These two measures are important for the quality of life, and provide 
an indication of people’s ability to participate in development.387
The HDI has a maximum value of l .00, which represents a near optimal situation, and 0.00,
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which represents a minimum value. These measures would also be expected to reflect, to 
some extent, the relative performances of the provinces. As can be seen the provincial 
ranking indicates enormous disparities between provinces. Five of the six Southern region 
provinces and all the Islands region provinces are among the top ten provinces. Only one 
province from the Momase region (Morobe) is ranked among the top ten provinces. The 
remaining three provinces from Momase and all the Highlands region provinces lie below 
the national average.388 Table 7 shows the HD1 value for 1996 according to provinces, as 
well as, Real Domestic Factor Income (DFI) per capita, the Life Expectancy Index (LEI), 
and the Education Index (El) for 1996.
In summary the three available measures seem to confirm that the better performing 
provinces are in the Islands Region while the poorer performing provinces are in the 
Highlands Region. Some commentators attribute this to historical and population factors; 
however it seems from this analysis that the level of development has been also influenced 
by some other important factors. All of these measures were tested in the following 
analysis, however the rankings provided by de Albuquerque and D’Sa are shown.
TABLE 7
PNG Human Development Index
Province HDI DFI LEI El
Western 0.472 1,829 0.501 0.631
Gulf 0.331 381 0.351 0.594
Central 0.408 481 0.526 0.636
Milne Bay 0.420 758 0.468 0.684
Oro 0.386 532 0.518 0.569
Southern Highlands 0.274 625 0.460 0.276
Enga 0.283 737 0.434 0.309
Western Highlands 0.282 490 0.501 0.280
Simbu 0.320 417 0.519 0.387
Eastern Highlands 0.325 709 0.519 0.355
Morobe 0.389 1,240 0.470 0.510
Madang 0.336 505 0.479 0.463
East Sepik 0.304 449 0.461 0.394
Sandaun 0.262 607 0.345 0.359
Manus 0.421 634 0.537 0.638
New Ireland 0.396 493 0.529 0.593
East New Britain 0.431 833 0.508 0.664
West New Britain 0.394 595 0.511 0.589
Source: Government of PNG. 1999, Papua New Guinea: Human Development Report 1998, Office of
National Planning, Port Moresby.
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7.3. Measuring Social Capital in PNG
The aim of this section is to identify the available quantitative measures o f social capital 
applicable to PNG provinces. Empirical studies differ among themselves in the way they 
attempt to measure social capital. Some have measured social capital by the density of 
networks while other studies have used measures of trust. Other studies have combined a 
measure of network density with some proxies for assessing the strength of relevant norms. 
Krishna and Shrader in the Social Capital Assessment Tool argue that ‘neither an 
exclusively networks-based nor an entirely norms-dependent measure suffices for scaling 
social capital.’389 Putnam used in his Italian analysis horizontally organised networks to 
measure social capital, and he argues those vertical networks, no matter how dense and no 
matter how important to its participants, could not sustain social trust and cooperation. 
More recent studies carried out in other countries indicate that ‘horizontally shaped 
networks do not necessarily reveal the presence of higher social capital.’ Because of the 
enormous uncertainties surrounding this issue, Krishna and Shrader have expressed the 
view that ‘what sorts of norms are associated with which types of networks cannot be 
assumed in advance but it must be verified independently for each social context’.390 Four 
measures o f social capital are tested in this study, namely, the quality of education; the 
level o f community knowledge about current events; the number of women’s community 
based organisations operating in six provinces, the number of rugby league football clubs, 
and the number of women in local politics. The reasons for selecting these measures are 
explained in each case below. Tables 8 and 9 below show the correlation coefficients 
between each of these variables.
Social Capital and Education
Recent research shows an important relationship between social capital and education. In 
particular it indicates that social capital is not only a critical input for education, but also a 
by-product. In addition to strengthening the human capital needed for economic 
development, social development and state accountability, education seems to foster social 
capital networks. It seems that social capital is produced through education in three ways: 
students practice social capital skills, such as participation and reciprocity; schools provide
forums for community activity; and through public education students learn how to 
participate responsibly in their society.
TABLE 8
Correlations for Provincial Development
Educ
Qual
Sports
Groups
Womens
Groups
Youth
Groups
News
Readers
Radio
Listener
Women
Politics
Dev
Rank
.735 .574 .705 .548 .520 .751 .481
Educ
Qual
1.0 .831 .801 .802 .543 .847 .082
Sports
Groups
.831 1.0 .938 .865 .164 .887 .238
Womens
Groups
.801 .938 1.0 .894 .229 .899 .466
Youth
Groups
.802 .865 .894 1.0 -.114 .673 .186
News
Readers
.543 .164 .229 -.114 1.0 .565 .142
Radio
Listener
.751 .847 .887 .899 .673 1.0 .305
Women
Politics
.082 .238 .466 .186 .142 .305 1.0
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TABLE 9
Correlations for Provincial Performance
Educ
Qual
Sports
Groups
Womens
Groups
Youth
Groups
News
Readers
Radio
Listener
Women
Politics
Axline .391 -.203 .180 .223 .176 .333 .101
Educ
Qual
LO .831 .801 .802 .543 .847 .082
Sports
Groups
.831 1.00 .938 .865 .164 .887 .238
Womens
Groups
.801 .938 1.0 .894 .229 .899 .466
Youth
Groups
.802 .865 .894 1.0 -.114 .673 .186
News
Readers
.543 .164 .229 -.114 1.0 .565 .142
Radio
Listener
.847 .887 .899 .673 .565 1.0 .305
Women
Politics
.082 .238 .466 .186 .142 .305 1.0
It is true that levels of educational attainment are linked to levels of economic development. 
However, financial resources alone do not guarantee positive educational outcomes for 
students. Considerable evidence shows that family, community and state involvement in 
education improves outcomes. Primary schools constitute a centre for social capital in rural 
areas of PNG. While they are considered to be government institutions they are also 
funded in a large part by the community. School based research in both developed and 
developing countries indicates that social capital plays an important role in creating 
effective schools. Francis et al in Hard Lessons: Primary School, Community and Social 
Capital in Nigeria undertook in 1997 a survey of 54 schools and communities across six
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zones in Nigeria concerning primary school quality and found that school environments 
were not conducive to learning.341 The research in Nigeria indicates that trust between 
parents and teachers, the effectiveness and involvement of the local PTA, and the support 
and effectiveness of the governmental administration are key components in producing 
effective schools. In Nigeria it was concluded that the changing relationship between 
school and community are reflected in the decline of involvement in building educational 
capacity. The study found that an effective school could be identified as when:
• parent support for the school is high, they attend meetings, give feedback, make 
contributions and help with projects;
• teacher cooperation and motivation is high, absenteeism and misbehaviour low;
• school functions effectively and smoothly; and
392• administration and education officials view the school favourably.
TABLE 10 
Education Quality
Province Education quality Total Popn
Western 7.2 153,304
Gulf 5.2 106,898
Central 8.0 183,983
Milne Bay 5.6 210,412
Oro 3.8 133,065
Southern Highlands 2.8 546,265
Enga 3.6 295,031
Western Highlands 4.2 440,025
Simbu 3.8 259,703
Eastern Highlands 4.4 432,972
Morobe 7.5 539,404
Madang 5.9 365,106
East Sepik 4.1 343,181
Sandaun 3.8 185,741
Manus 11.4 43,387
New Ireland 10.7 118,350
East New Britain 12.2 220,133
West New Britain 6.7 184,508
Source: Rannells, J. 1995, PNG: A fact book on modern Papua New Guinea, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne; Government o f PNG. 1999, Papua New Guinea: Human Development Report 1998, Office 
o f National Planning, Port Moresby. PNG National Statistical Office. 2001,2000 National Census of 
Population and Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port Moresby.
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It has therefore been found that family, community and state involvement helps to increase 
the relevance and quality of education by improving ownership, building consensus, 
reaching remote and disadvantaged groups, mobilising additional resources, and 
strengthening institutional capacity. The percentage of the population that has completed 
year 10 at school is provided in the table 10 above to provide an indication of the relative 
levels of ‘educational quality’ achieved in each province. The statistical relationship 
between provincial development (the dependent variable) and the quality of education 
(independent variable) are shown in Figure 7 below. The Pearson Correlation is r = .735, 
which indicates an association between the two variables, and it, appears that a higher 
quality of education is associated with a higher level of development and is statistically 
significant. It should be noted that an education indicator is incorporated into the 
development measure. R squared is also shown because when two variables are related, 
positively or negatively, they vary together. This means they share common variance, and 
therefore if we square it we get a numerical estimate of the proportion of the variance in 
one variable that is held in common with, or accounted for by the other.
FIGURE 7
Provincial Development and the Quality of Education
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In comparison Figure 8 below shows a similar correlation but this time between the quality 
of education in the provinces with provincial government performance. The statistical 
relationship between provincial government performance (the dependent variable) and the 
quality of education (independent variable) are shown. The Pearson Correlation is r = .391, 
which indicates a weaker association between the two variables, and is not statistically 
significant.
FIGURE 8
Provincial Performance and the Quality of Education
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Social Capital and Community Awareness
Another indicator of social capital is the community’s awareness about current events. The 
Papua New Guinea Human Development Report 1998 provides data on communications in 
PNG because it is argued that it
plays an essential role in facilitating the process of economic and social 
development and promoting human development. Modes of communication such 
as print media; broadcast radio, television, video, postal services and 
telecommunication services are crucial in the dissemination of information and in 
linking remote locations to services.393
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TABLE 11
Community Awareness
Province Daily Newspapers Radios Total Popn
Western 1.1 41.7 153,304
Gulf 0.7 25.1 106,898
Central 0.7 34.8 183,983
Milne Bay 0.6 32.0 210,412
Oro 0.7 33.3 133,065
Southern Highlands 0.4 20.4 546,265
Enga 0.2 25.9 295,031
Western Highlands 1.8 22.5 440,025
Simbu 0.4 24.0 259,703
Eastern Highlands 1.5 30.2 432,972
Morobe 0.3 29.4 539,404
Madang 1.3 34.0 365,106
East Sepik 1.0 28.5 343,181
Sandaun 0.0 21.0 185,741
Manus 1.3 56.6 43,387
New Ireland 0.9 38.9 118,350
East New Britain 3.1 47.1 220,133
West New Britain 1.6 43.2 184,508
Source: Government of PNG. 1999, Papua New Guinea: Human Development Report 1998, Office of 
National Planning, Port Moresby. PNG National Statistical Office. 2001,2000 National Census of 
Population and Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port Moresby.
The most common form of modem communication in PNG is the transistor radio. 
However, newspaper readership is probably the most important mode of communication 
because of the role it plays in providing wide information and views on issues of 
community concern. Table 11 shows the number of newspapers read, and the number of 
radios for each province. Figure 9, below, shows the relationship between provincial 
development and newspaper readership where r = .520 and which is statistically significant. 
Figure 11, also below, shows the similar relationship but with radios where r = .751 and 
which also is statistically significant. For Provincial Performance and newspapers r = .176, 
and for radios r = .333, shown in Figures 10 and 12 respectively.
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FIGURE 9
Provincial Development and Newspaper Readership
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FIGURE 10
Provincial Performance and Newspaper Readership
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FIGURE 11
Provincial Development and Radios
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FIGURE 12
Provincial Performance and Radios
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Social Capital and Community Based Organisations
The Papua New Guinea Human Development Report 1998 highlights the role ot village 
organisations for contributing to a positive social environment, because
churches and local government councils provide structures for mediating disputes 
between individuals, clans and tribes to maintain peace and stability within 
communities. The service agencies, such as health care centres, schools and 
churches, are instrumental in organising villages to plan and coordinate activities/94
In particular there is an important role played by community based groups for women. 
These groups engage in a range of activities that provide income earning opportunities, 
non-formal skills training, and literacy and awareness training.
Table 12 provides an estimate of the numbers of these groups in the provinces. The 
number of women’s groups is estimated using the number of census units that have 
women’s groups as reported in the Village Services database. The report also found that 
there was a strong community desire for sports fields because ‘sporting networks also 
engender personal and communal pride and build communication links and support across 
communities.’395 Table 13 also provides data on the density of sports groups in six 
provinces. Unfortunately data for more provinces is not available.
TABLE 12
Density of Women’s and Youth Groups
Province Womens Gps
Western 50.0
Central 31.0
Eastern Highlands 37.0
Morobe 34.0
Madang 13.0
Manus 99.0
Youth Gps Total Popn
44.0 153,304
48.0 183,983
48.0 432,972
65.0 539,404
21.0 365,106
98.0 43,387
Source: Government of PNG. 1999, Papua New Guinea: Human Development Report 1998, Office of 
National Planning, Port Moresby. PNG National Statistical Office. 2001,2000 National Census of 
Population and Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port Moresby.
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FIGURE 13
Provincial Development and Women’s Groups
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FIGURE 14
Provincial Performance and Women’s Groups
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The figure above shows statistically the relationship between provincial development and 
the density of women’s groups for the selected provinces. The Pearson Correlation in this 
case is r = .705 and which indicates a fairly strong association, however due to the small 
sample it is difficult to draw any conclusions. For provincial performance r = . 180.
Province
Western
Central
Eastern Highlands 
Morobe 
Madang 
Manus
TABLE 13
Density of Sports Groups 
Sports Gps
40.0
15.0
22.0
39.0
22.0 
97.0
Total Popn
153,304
183,983
432,972
539,404
365,106
43,387
Source: Government of PNG. 1999, Papua New Guinea: Human Development Report 1998, Office of 
National Planning, Port Moresby. PNG National Statistical Office. 2001, 2000 National Census o f 
Population and Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port Moresby.
FIGURE 15
Provincial Development and Sports Groups 
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FIGURE 16
Provincial Performance and Sports Groups 
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Table 14 below present’ s data on the number o f rugby league football clubs and the 
numbers o f participating players in each o f the provinces for the period 1998 to 2001. In 
PNG rugby league football is probably the country’ s most popular sport. Putnam found 
that ‘ leaving aside labour unions for the moment, sports clubs are by far the most common 
sort o f secondary association among Italians,’396 and he found a strong correlation between 
sports membership, and regional performance in Italy. Partial correlation may be used to 
investigate the relationship between the number o f clubs and players with the level o f 
provincial development while controlling for population. The results o f this analysis are 
given in Figure 17 below. There is a medium negative partial correlation between the level 
o f provincial development and the number o f players r = .309, n = 15, p<.01.
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TABLE 14
PNG Rugby League Football Statistics
Province Number of Clubs Number of Players Total Popn
W estern 26 750 153,304
G u lf 15 345 106,898
C entral 7 186 183,983
N C D 14 1,127 252 ,469
M ilne  Bay 4 159 210 ,412
O ro 6 227 133,065
S ou thern  H ig h lan d s 40 1,189 546,265
E nga 7 231 295,031
W estern  H ig h lan d s 35 1,404 440 ,025
S im bu 18 373 259,703
E astern  H ig h lan d s 28 873 432 ,972
M orobe 20 820 539 ,404
M ad an g 7 205 365 ,106
E ast Sepik 6 220 343,181
S andaun 4 158 185,741
M anus - - 43 ,387
N e w  Ireland 6 325 118,350
E ast N ew  B rita in 8 450 220,133
W est N ew  B rita in 18 664 184,508
B o u g ain v ille 8 397 175,160
Sources: PNG Rugby Football League Inc. PNG National Statistical Office. 2001, 2000 National Census 
of Population and Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port Moresby.
FIGURE 17
Provincial Development and Rugby League Football 
Partial Correlation Coefficients: Zero Order Partials
Dev Rank RL Player Population
Dev rank 1 .0 0 0 0 .3246 -.7 5 1 3
( 0 ) (16) (17)
p = . P= .189 P= .0 0 0
RL Player .3 2 4 6 1.0000 .6 4 0 9
(16) (0) (16)
P= .192 P= . P= .0 0 4
Popn .7 5 1 3 .6409 1 .0 0 0 0
(17) (16) (0)
P= .000 P= .004 p = .
Controlling for population
187
D e v  R a n k R L P la y e r
D e v  R an k 1.0000 -.3098
(0) (15)
p = . P= .213
R L  P la y e r -.3098 1.0000
(15) (0)
P= .226 P= .
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)
Social Capital and Women in Politics
The role of women in local level politics may also provide an indication of the stock of 
social capital in a community. At the national level participation is very low with currently 
only two women members of the national parliament. However at the local level women’s 
participation is higher and this can be partly attributed to a requirement in the new Organic 
Law that requires some women representation.
TABLE 15 
Women in Politics
Province No of Women Total Popn
Western 5.6 153,304
Gulf 7.1 106,898
Central 5.9 183,983
Milne Bay 5.0 210,412
Oro 9.1 133,065
Southern Highlands 2.9 546,265
Enga 5.6 295,031
Western Highlands 5.9 440,025
Simbu 4.3 259,703
Eastern Highlands 6.7 432,972
Morobe 3.1 539,404
Madang 5.0 365,106
East Sepik 6.7 343,181
Sandaun 5.0 185,741
Manus 6.7 43,387
New Ireland 7.7 118,350
East New Britain 4.5 220,133
West New Britain 7.1 184,508
Source: Government of PNG. 1999, Papua New Guinea: Human Development Report 1998, Office of 
National Planning, Port Moresby. PNG National Statistical Office. 2001,2000 National Census o f 
Population and Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port Moresby.
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FIGURE 18
Provincial Development and Women in Politics
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FIGURE 19
Provincial Performance and Women in Politics
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Figure 18 above shows the relationship between provincial development and the number of 
women in local politics where r = .481 and which is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. In comparison for provincial performance r = .101, and which is shown in Figure 19.
7.4. Conclusions
It has been explained that the specific aim of this study is to analyse the feasibility, and the 
validity, of both measuring social capital and identifying its role in explaining the 
differential performance between provincial governments and provincial development in 
PNG. The purpose of this chapter was to replicate Putnam’s methodology in the PNG 
context. It was found that relevant data to measure provincial development, provincial 
government performance and social capital in the provinces is very limited. Empirical 
studies of social capital sometimes try to measure social capital by the density of networks, 
or by measures of trust. The measures of social capital in this study have been 
predominantly concerned with the density of social networks. A major weakness of the 
statistical methodology applied in this study is the uncertainty about the direction of 
causation. For example, does performance determine education quality or vice versa? The 
analysis of the available data shows that there is a correlation between provincial 
development and the available indicators for social capital across the nineteen provinces. 
However the analysis also shows that there is no clear correlation between the performance 
of the provincial governments, and the indicators of social capital across provinces which 
you would expect from the qualitative research.
Most attempts to reform provincial governments have focused on the institutional 
structure, and on the provision of financial resources, and which are the primary 
focus of Axline’s research. However the analysis shows that the much stronger 
relationship is between the “development” measures and the social capital indicators. 
This suggests that there are other factors in the PNG context, which is impacting on 
development and that the performance of the provincial governments has not been in 
itself significant.
The literature suggests that possibly the nature of social capital in PNG, probably the most 
ethnically fragmented country in the world, poses some unique problems in terms of
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government performance. A number of studies have shown how ethnic groups can both 
generate benefits and inflict costs on societies, and how ethnic fragmentation affects the 
performance of political institutions. Overall the Western notion of civil society finds it 
difficult to accommodate the importance of ethnicity. We have seen that Woolcock and 
Narayan have argued that in communities with good governance and high levels of 
bridging social capital, there is complementarity between state and society, and economic 
prosperity and social order are likely.397 Alternatively when a society’s social capital 
inheres mainly in primary social groups disconnected from one another, possibly the more 
powerful groups dominate the state, to the exclusion of other groups. These complex issues 
are explored in the next chapter, where the factors of ethnicity and the political process in 
PNG are explored.
Notes
374 Callick, R., 2000, “A nation searches for a way between two worlds”, Australian Financial Review, 25 
May.
73 Przworski, A., and Teune, H., 1970, The Logic of Comparative Inquiry, Wiley, New York, p.124.
76 Burton, J., 1998, “Mining and Maladministration in Papua New Guinea”, in Larmour, P.r (ed), Governance 
and reform in the South Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, p. 175.
377 Dogan, M and Pelassy, D. op cit„ p.73.
,78 Wilson, R.K., 1974, Socio-economic indicators applied to sub-districts o f Papua New Guinea, Economic 
Geography Department Discussion Paper No 1, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.
379 de Albuquerque, K., and D’Sa, E., 1986, op cit.
380 de Albuquerque, K., and D’Sa, E., 1984, Spatial Inequalities in Papua New Guinea: A Provincial Level 
Analysis, Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, Mimeographed, Port Moresby.
381 Hanson, L.W., Allen, B.J., Bourke, R.M., and McCarthy, T.J., 2001, op cit.
382 Axline, W.A., 1986, op cit.
383 Putnam, R.D., 1993, op cit.. p. 191.
384 Axline, W.A., 1986, op cit.. p. 171.
385 ibid., p.198.
386 Ibid., p.171.
387 Government of PNG, 1999, op cit.
388 Ibid., p.78.
389 Krishna, A., and Shrader, E., 1999, Social Capital Assessment Tool, Prepared for the Conference on Social 
Capital and Poverty Reduction, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
390 Ibid.
391 Francis, P., Adelabu, S.P.I., Agi, S., Ogoh Alubo and Owoicho Akbo, 1998, Hard Lessons: Primary 
School, Community and Social Capital in Nigeria, 1-64 World Bank Technical Paper, Washington D.C.
392 Md.
t o t
Government of PNG, 1999, op cit.
394 ibid.
395 Ibid.
'96 Putnam, R.D., 1993, op cit., p.91.
97 Woolcock, M., and Narayan, D., op cit.
191
CHAPTER 8
ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN PNG
'In recent years, economists have increasingly turned to ethnic heterogeneity as an explanatory variable to 
account for cross-country variation in economic growth rates. A number of researchers have found 
statistically and economically important effects of ethnic heterogeneity on growth. ’ 398
8.1. Introduction
In Chapter 2 the importance of ethnic identities in PNG was discussed and then in 
Chapter 4 some of the studies on the importance of ethnic identities for social capital 
were explained. In this chapter the possible importance of ethnicity for social capital in 
PNG is addressed. It was explained earlier that Anthony Smith defines ethnic 
communities as ‘named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and 
cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.’399 It is 
generally recognised that ethnic groups and ethnic minorities exist by virtue of long 
standing association across generations, complex relations of kinship, common culture 
and usually religious uniformity and common territorial attachments. In this study 
ethnicity is used as a broad concept ‘covering a variety of factors which distinguish one 
group of people from others. Important contemporary distinctions are language, race, 
religion and colour. When these markers cease to be mere means of social distinctions, 
and become the basis of political identity and claims to a specific role in the political 
process or power, ethnic distinctions are transformed into ethnicity.’400
There is a wide range of views as to how important ethnicity is in terms of government 
performance and development. Easterly and Levine argue that the ethnic diversity of 
African countries undermines their rates of economic growth through two principal 
mechanisms. Firstly ethnic diversity makes it difficult for agreements to be reached on 
growth promoting goods like infrastructure and education, and which leads these goods 
to be under-provided. Secondly, ethnic diversity is likely to transform macroeconomic 
policymaking into an instrument of “rent-seeking”. In their model, the more ethnic 
groups there are in a country, the less agreement there will be on public goods, the more 
‘rent-seeking’ will take place and as a result the poorer policy choices will be.401 Along 
similar lines La Porta et al also argue that ethnic diversity leads to more corrupt and less 
efficient government. This is because of the tendency of the groups that come to power
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to ‘fashion government policies that expropriate (or kill) the ethnic losers... and limit 
the production of public goods to prevent those outside the ruling group from also 
benefiting and getting stronger.’402
As discussed earlier, while opinion is divided on the significance of ethnic diversity on 
government performance it is recognised that the importance of ethnicity may vary over 
time as a result of a number of political, social and economic factors. A particularly 
important factor is the nature of the government institutions. For PNG the transition 
from a traditional society to a nation-state was far from culturally neutral. The concept 
of the ‘nation state’ is fundamentally founded on Western notions of the relationships 
among the individual, state, and civil society that are not necessarily relevant to PNG. 
Also in PNG the colonial experience provided for the formation of ethnic identities as a 
result of the way in which administrative boundaries were established by the colonial 
government. For the most part provincial boundaries were not determined by ethnic 
considerations. However ‘twenty-seven years after independence, the primary 
allegiances and identities of most Papua New Guineans remain firmly implanted in local 
kin-based associations.’403 Economic, political and social change has disrupted the 
traditional patterns of power relations in PNG society and these changes have often 
caused conflict.
8.2. Ethnic Diversity and Language Groups
Like social capital, measuring the degree of ethnic diversity in PNG is no simple task. 
One possible means to approximate the number of ethnic groups is to use as an estimate 
of the number of language groups. Data for the number of language groups in each 
province is provided in Table 16. Data for the number of language groups is 
approximate because it is difficult to decide if some of the languages spoken by small 
groups have become extinct. However the number of language groups per province has 
been compiled using data from Otto Nekitel, and Barbara Grimes.404 The detailed data 
may be found in Appendix A. Figure 20 below shows the statistical relationship 
between provincial development and number of language groups. Figure 21 shows the 
statistical relationship between provincial performance and language groups. The 
Pearson Correlation for development and language groups is r = -.315 which
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indicates a medium association, and for performance r = .204. These results, on the face 
of it, reveal that there is no significant direct relationship between either provincial 
development or provincial performance with ethnicity as measured by language groups.
TABLE 16
Number of Language Groups in Provinces
Province No of Language Gps Total Popn
Western 39 153,304
Gulf 16 106,898
Central 25 183,983
Milne Bay 50 210,412
Oro 23 133,065
Southern Highlands 15 546,265
Enga 08 295,031
Western Highlands 12 440,025
Simbu 13 259,703
Eastern Highlands 24 432,927
Morobe 94 539,404
Madang 151 365,106
East Sepik 86 343,181
Sandaun 89 185,741
Manus 29 43,387
New Ireland 18 118,350
East New Britain 11 220,133
West New Britain 28 184,508
Bougainville 25 175,160
Sources: Nekitel, O. 1998, Voices of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Language, Culture and Identity, 
UBS Publishers, New Delhi; Grimes, B.F. (ed), 2001, Ethnologue: languages o f the world, 14th edition,
Summer Institute of Linguistics, Dallas.
Probably the main reason for this result is the dominance of large language groups in 
the Highlands Provinces, and where in this region the primary identity is usually the 
clan. In the lowland areas of PNG language groups’ number between a few hundred, 
and up to perhaps fifteen thousand, hence they probably provide a reasonable 
approximation of ‘ethnic’ groups. However language groups in the Highlands can 
include more than 100,000 members, and therefore do not provide a very accurate 
indicator of fragmentation. For example the largest language group is Enga which is 
spoken in the highlands and probably has more than a quarter of a million speakers. 
The next largest language groups, the Melpa, with about 150,000 speakers, and Kuman,
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with about 75,000 speakers are also highland languages. Outside of the highlands the 
only other province where there is predominant use of the local language is in East New 
Britain with the predominance of the Kuana-speaking Tolai. It is generally recognised 
that extreme clan-based tribalism afflicts some of the largest language groups in the 
Highlands more than in almost any other part of PNG but:
language was not always the marker which distinguished friend from foe. 
Frequently, fighting took place (as it still does) amongst clans or lineages of the 
same language group, and sometimes alliances were formed across language 
divides. Language groups, in other words, were not necessarily political 
units.405
It is therefore not my argument here that necessarily provinces with lots of language 
groups do worse than provinces with few language groups but rather it is the nature of 
ethnic divisions, which is important for provincial development.
FIGURE 20
Provincial Development and Number of Language Groups
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FIGURE 21
Provincial Performance and Number of Language Groups
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FIGURE 22
Provincial Development and Number of Language Groups 
(Excluding the Highlands provinces)
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FIGURE 23
Perf
Provincial Performance and Number of Language Groups 
(Excluding the Highlands provinces)
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In the Highlands province of Enga, for example, one of the most fractious provinces of 
the entire country, there is one main language but about 162 ‘major clans’ in the 
province, according to the electoral register. Because of this it is fair to say that the 
number of language groups is not an accurate measure of ethnic fragmentation in the 
Highlands. However, in other non-highlands provinces, the number of languages 
constitutes a more meaningful aggregate measure of ethnic fragmentation. Figure 22 
above shows the relationship between provincial development and the number of 
language groups per province but excludes the Highlands Provinces. This shows that r 
= -.831 which is a very significant relationship which is significant to the 0.01 level, and 
R squared is 69 percent. In other words, the more languages per province, the lower the 
level of provincial development. This suggests that there may be a link between ethno- 
linguistic fragmentation and provincial development. However, the model is limited to 
non-highlands areas, rendering its explanatory value for the whole country extremely 
limited. Figure 23 shows the similar relationship for the number of language groups in
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non-Highlands provinces, but with provincial performance. Here the relationship is 
very weak, r = .037 and which indicates that ethnic fragmentation, per se, has not been a 
significant determinant of performance.
8.3. Index of Ethnic Fragmentation
It is probably fair to say that nowadays there is a broad consensus among scholars on 
how to measure ethnic fragmentation as great many authors have opted for the index of 
ethnic fractionalization proposed by Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor. However the 
problem with Rae’s and Taylor’s formula is that it copes poorly with incomplete data. 
Simply disregarding the percentage of people for which we lack data is out of the 
question. The usage of the formula presupposes that we have an estimate for the size of 
each ethnic group. There are a number of issues concerning the application of the 
index, and in particular the
problem with using an index of fractionalization to summarize the effects of a 
country’s ethnic landscape stems from the fact that such indices convey no 
information about the depth of the divisions that separate members of one group 
from another. Yet this factor certainly matters. In practice, what shapes the 
public policies selected by governments is often not so much the number or 
comparative sizes of the ethnic groups in the political system as the depth of the 
divisions between them.40b
The following is a formula Rae has created for measuring the degree of ethnic 
fragmentation of the party system. The percentages o f each ethnic group are squared, 
and then added. The sum is thereafter subtracted from 1, giving us an index ranging 
from 0 to 1. Values close to 0 indicate that the level o f ethnic fragmentation is low, 
whereas values close to 1 indicate that the country in question is ethnically fragmented. 
The resulting index is shown in Table 17 below.
Figure 24 below shows the statistical relationship between provincial development and 
the ethnic fragmentation index. Figure 25 shows the statistical relationship between 
provincial performance and the ethnic fragmentation index. The Pearson Correlation 
for development and the index is r = -.064 which indicates a medium association, and 
for performance r = .347 which is stronger. This is an interesting result because it is the 
only relationship measured where it is reasonably strong with performance.
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TABLE 17
Ethnic Fragmentation Index
Province No of Languages Popn Index
W estern 39 153,304 0.865
G ulf 17 106,898 0.468
Central 25 183,983 0.876
M ilne Bay 50 210,412 0.545
Oro 23 133,065 0.785
Southern H ighlands 15 546,265 0.682
Enga 8 295,031 0.463
W estern H ighlands 12 440,025 0.844
Sim bu 13 259,703 0.598
Eastern H ighlands 24 432,972 0.901
M orobe 95 539,404 0.844
M adang 151 365,106 0.891
East Sepik 86 343,181 0.897
Sandaun 89 185,741 0.941
M anus 29 43,387 0.814
N ew  Ireland 18 118,350 0.767
East N ew  Britain 12 220,133 0.621
W est New  Britain 28 184,508 0.630
Bougainville 25 175,160 0.792
Sources: Nekitel, O. 1998, Voices of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Language, Culture and 
Identity, UBS Publishers, New Delhi; Grimes, B.F. (ed), 2001, Ethnologue: languages o f the world, 
14th edition, Summer Institute of Linguistics, Dallas. PNG National Statistical Office. 2001, 2000 
National Census o f Population and Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port
Moresby.
FIGURE 24
Provincial Development and Fragmentation Index
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FIGURE 25
Provincial Performance and Fragmentation Index
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FIGURE 26
Provincial Development and Fragmentation Index 
(Excluding the Highlands provinces)
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FIGURE 27
Provincial Performance and Fragmentation Index 
(Excluding the Highlands provinces)
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Figure 26 above shows the statistical relationship between provincial development and 
the ethnic fragmentation index, but excludes the Highlands provinces. Figure 27 shows 
the statistical relationship between provincial performance and the ethnic fragmentation 
index, but similarly excludes the Highlands provinces. The Pearson Correlation for 
development and the index is strongly negative and for performance which is only 
slightly positive. Both relationships are very weak.
8.4. Ethnicity and the political process.
As was explained earlier, in PNG the national parliament is elected on a first-past-the- 
post voting system, where the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected and 
there is no limit to the number of candidates. A number of studies of elections in PNG 
have shown how it is possible for a candidate to divide the electorate’s vote along tribe 
or clan lines by encouraging representatives of each group to stand. Candidates 
therefore concentrate on mobilising the vote of their own clan group. Many analysis of 
elections in PNG emphasise the link between ethnicity and election candidature. 
According to Saffu, for example, ‘the most widely observed feature of PNG elections is
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the phenomenon of localized support for candidates. Localized support is demonstrated 
by the ability of a candidate to attract virtually 100 per cent of the votes of a locality 
within the wider constituency, thereby denying his numerous competitors and electoral 
support within that particular locality.’ The PNG Electoral Commissioner has noted 
that
while the element of popular participation is usually not in doubt in Papua New 
Guinea’s national elections, the concept of effective representation via elections 
appears to be diminishing progressively with every election. There are essentially 
two inter-related reasons for this. Firstly, the ever increasing large numbers of 
candidates who stand means that it becomes easier and easier to win with fewer and 
fewer percentages of voter support and endorsement. Secondly, the ever increasing 
large numbers of candidates who stand as Independents and win means that it 
becomes more and more difficult to know what representatives stand for and how 
they expect to make the parliamentary system work well for the people they
. 407represent.
Standish found that in Simbu society the clans of around a thousand people and tribes of 
up to five thousand are large enough in themselves to influence the outcome of 
elections. These groups have been competitive rivals and enemies for centuries. 
Although elections are contests between individuals in wide new arenas set up by the 
state, all Simbu candidates are members o f clans and tribes which as corporate groups 
themselves bring their existing identities and oppositions into the new electoral arenas
set up by the state. May has observed that
with 28 candidates (i.e. the mean number per seat in 2002) competing for around 
30,000 votes in an open seat, it is statistically possible for a candidate to win 
with a little over 1,000 votes. Since this figure roughly approximates the 
number of eligible voters a serious candidate might expect to receive from his 
local support base, the increasing number o f candidates has produced a situation 
in which, in many parts of the country, candidates in national elections seek to 
safeguard their support base (generally a village or clan line), by preventing rival 
candidates from entering their territory, and attempting to enforce block voting 
along clan or village lines by coercion or bribery.
For the 1987 elections Yaw Saffu surveyed people’s attitudes to voting. He obtained 
interviews from 1127 electors in seventeen provinces and the National Capital District. 
One of the crucial questions he asked was: What is it that you will look for in the 
candidate you will be voting for in 1987? He found that ‘personal attributes of 
candidates, their perceived leadership qualities and ability to bring development to the
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area, both assessed personally at close quarters by electors, are the most significant 
explanatory variables/ To try to identify what factors determine voting choice Saffu 
asked two identical questions, one referring retrospectively to the 1982 election, the 
other prospectively to the forthcoming 1987 election. The retrospective question, asked 
of those who said they had voted in 1982, was: ‘What was it that you liked about the 
candidate you voted for in 1982?’ The forward-looking question about voting 
intentions was: ‘What is it that you will look for in the candidate you will be voting for 
in 1987?’ Saffu provided a list of nine alternative responses, and a tenth omnibus, 
‘other’ category was offered. The categories went from primordial, kinship and 
linguistic considerations, through traditional socio-political factors, to aspects of 
secondary association solidarity, and to more personal attributes of the candidate. These 
observations seem consistent with the traditional view of leadership in Melanesia where
a leader had power only insofar as people were economically and socially 
obligated to him personally. He had influence only as far as his voice was heard 
and his advice taken. A leader maintained his position only as long as 
competing leaders did not defeat him in large scale exchanges of valuables or 
through warfare or sorcery.409
Rabushka and Shepsle also find that ‘the proliferation of ethnic groups, which defines 
the fragmented society, encourages a commensurate proliferation of political parties; the 
plethora of parties, in turn, inhibits cooperative ethnic behaviour. The resulting product 
is instability, or at best a most tenuous stability.’410 Further as many people have 
become disillusioned with the politics of the past, they are now prepared to ‘market 
their votes’. Especially since members of parliament only show up in the electorate 
once every five years, voters feel they should get what they can, while they can, from 
them.
Accordingly as shown by Rabushka and Sheple ‘effective party politics, therefore, does 
not usually emerge in the fragmented setting; no party is large enough to rule and the 
multiplicity of culture groups frustrates any attempts to form long-run multiethnic 
coalitions. In settings such as these, democracy frequently gives way to forms of 
authoritarian rule.411 Overall there is substantial reason to believe that ethnic 
fragmentation is likely to impact on the political process in PNG, because of the way in
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which the electoral system has encouraged the establishment of political interest groups 
along ethnic lines.
8.5. Politics and Government Performance
Table 18 below shows the numbers of candidates standing in the open electorates for the 
past three general elections. The three figures also below compare provincial 
development with the number of candidates. The figures below show a very strong 
relationship, for the 1992, 1997, and 2002 national elections between provincial 
development and the number of candidates standing for election.
TABLE 18
Number of Election Candidates (Open Electorates) in Provinces
Province 1992 1997 2002 Total Popn
Western 32 71 94 153,304
Gulf 36 67 75 106,898
Central 63 91 125 183,983
Milne Bay 52 78 91 210,412
Oro 35 71 81 133,065
Southern Highlands 86 117 157 546,265
Enga 94 128 137 295,031
Western Highlands 83 124 145 440,025
Simbu 202 211 247 259,703
Eastern Highlands 193 234 252 432,972
Morobe 155 235 288 539,404
Madang 93 137 195 365,106
East Sepik 68 109 156 343,181
Sandaun 68 79 118 185,741
Manus 6 15 12 43,387
New Ireland 8 14 34 118,350
East New Britain 18 27 34 220,133
West New Britain 22 37 40 184,508
Bougainville 14 36 33 175,160
Source: Saffu, Y. (ed). 1998, The 1992 Papua New Guinea Election: Change and Continuity in 
Electoral Politics, Political and Social Change Monograph 23, The Australian National University, 
Canberra; PNG Electoral Commission. 1997, Report to the Sixth Parliament on the 1997 Elections, 
July 1997, Port Moresby. PNG National Statistical Office. 2001, 2000 National Census o f Population 
and Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port Moresby.
Interestingly there is only a very weak relationship with provincial performance. The 
analysis suggests that a higher level of provincial development is associated with fewer 
candidates standing, but that this has no apparent impact on the performance of the 
respective provincial governments. However the analysis of the three most recent
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national election results was strikingly similar, suggesting that a higher level of 
provincial development is associated with fewer candidates standing. This is also 
consistent with the correlation between development and social capital.
A possible explanation is that a large number of candidates indicate a high level of 
political fragmentation that has a negative effect on social capital and which, in turn, 
negatively impacts on provincial development. The overall number of candidates in 
each province is thus strongly (and negatively) related to provincial development. The 
data from the National Capital District is not included in the analysis because of the 
multi-ethnic nature of the district reflecting the fact that many of the residents have 
migrated from other provinces. However, while the aggregated data provides some 
indication of the relationship between election candidacy and the level of development 
it is necessary to undertake more intensive investigations of a small sample of 
provinces. However it is plausible that the political system particularly in PNG creates 
or reduces social capital and the flow of causation is from government to civil society.
FIGURE 28
Provincial Development and Number of 
Election candidates (Open Electorates) 1992.
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FIGURE 29
Provincial Performance and Number of 
Election candidates (Open Electorates) 1992.
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The 2002 General Elections
For the 2002 elections a total of 2,875 candidates contested the 109 seats in Parliament 
of which 1,247 candidates were independents, while 43 political parties officially 
endorsed 1,628 candidates. A list of parties may be found in Appendix E. Of the 109 
seats, 89 are open seats created inside provincial boundaries of the 19 provinces and the 
National Capital District (NCD). The Provincial Seats in Parliament represent the 
provinces. Under the Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local Level 
Government (OLPGLLG) the provincial members of parliament have the automatic 
right to become Governor of their respective provinces. Also in the elections the 
electors also voted for their Ward Councillor of which there are 284 local level 
governments.
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FIGURE 32
Provincial Development and Number of 
Election candidates (Open Electorates) 2002.
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FIGURE 33
Provincial Performance and Number of 
Election candidates (Open Electorates) 2002.
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Table 19 below gives an Election Vulnerability Index using data from the 1997 
elections, and which appeared in the election study for that year. For purposes of 
consistency with the earlier ethnic fragmentation analysis the National Capital District 
is not included. One popular theory to account for poor development outcomes and 
poor institutional performance is the high turnover rate of Members of Parliament at 
each election. It is frequently argued that this phenomena leads to a lack of experience 
among members and also to a lack of consistency on policy making. Figures 34 and 35 
below show the relationship between election vulnerability and provincial development 
and performance. The analysis shows that there is a relationship also between the 
turnover of candidates and development and performance, and where it is strongest with 
development rather than performance. However this also lends some support to the 
argument that development and performance is not necessarily determined by 
knowledge and experience alone, and that the most significant aspect of the political 
process is its impact on social capital.
TABLE 19
Election Vulnerability Index
Province Old Members New Members Ratio Percentage
Western 0 4 0:4 100
Gulf 1 2 1:2 67
Central 2 3 1:1.5 60
Milne Bay 3 2 1:0.7 40
Oro 3 0 1:0 0
Southern Highlands 4 5 1:1.3 56
Western Highlands 3 5 1:1.7 63
Simbu 3 4 1:1.33 57
Eastern Highlands 2 7 1:3.5 78
Morobe 7 3 1:0.4 30
Madang 1 6 1:6 86
East Sepik 3 4 1:1.33 57
Sandaun 2 3 1:1.5 57
New Ireland 1 2 1:2 67
East New Britain 5 0 1:0 0
West New Britain 2 1 1:1.5 33
Bougainville 3 1 1:0.33 25
Source: Anere, R. “Political Parties and Elections in Papua New Guinea”, in Rynkiewich, M. op cit„
p. 125.
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FIGURE 34
Provincial Development and Election Vulnerability Index
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8.6. Multiple Regression Analysis
Multiple regression results are often interpreted as telling us how much of the variance 
in the dependent variable (i.e. provincial development) that can be explained by the 
independent variables. This is referred to as the squared multiple correlation coefficient 
and the closer it is to 1.00 (or 100%), the more of the variance in the dependent variable 
can be accounted for. Therefore the more variance we can account for, the more 
accurate the prediction we can make. It also provides us with an indication of the 
relative contribution of each independent variable, because the regression weights (beta) 
are estimated. The regression weights tell us how important each independent variable 
is in predicting the dependent variable. The tests also allow us to determine the 
statistical significance of the results, both in terms of the model, and the individual 
independent variables. In the standard multiple regression which is used here all o f the 
independent variables are entered into the model simultaneously. Each independent 
variable is evaluated in terms of its ‘predictive power’, over and above that offered by 
the other independent variables.
An issue raised by this analysis is the relative importance of social capital as opposed to 
the other independent variables tested in this study. There are numerous other factors 
that may be affecting the relationships that are the focus of this research. Some of these 
other possible influences are almost impossible to quantify, for example the effects on 
development of a long period o f missionary contact. However it may be possible to at 
least partially capture some of these influences by choosing to use some more easily 
identified factors.
A model which incorporates some of the most likely other factors was tested to evaluate 
the extent to which, total social capital, land area, ethnic fragmentation, and domestic 
factor income (DFI) influence provincial development. The measure for “total social 
capital” combines the various indicators outlined above. Land area is the total land area 
for each of the provinces, and ethnic fragmentation is an estimate of ethnic diversity for 
each province. DFI is the real domestic factor income per capita in 1996 for each 
province, and includes formal, non-formal, and subsistence components. DFI is not 
included in the provincial development indicator. These factors were chosen because it
may be argued that the overall physical size of a province may affect development. 
Similarly income levels for the population would be likely to affect development, and 
ethnic diversity has also been identified as a possible important influence on 
development.
TABLE 20
Multiple Regression Model Coefficients
Beta Sig
Land Area -.275 .510
Total Social 
Capital
-.350 257
Ethnic
Fragmentation
.040 .892
Domestic Factor 
Income
.169 .685
Table 20 above provides the analysis of this relationship. The column labeled ‘Beta’ 
shows the contribution of each independent variable for explaining the dependent 
variable, and any negative signs should be ignored. O f these independent variables 
tested, social capital makes the largest unique contribution (beta = -.350). Land area 
makes the largest contribution of the other variables tested where beta = -.275. The next 
is DFI, followed by ethnic fragmentation. Statistically the beta weight for social capital 
tells us how much of a change we would make in the level of provincial development by 
making a one-unit change in social capital, while keeping all other variables constant. 
The column marked ‘Sig’ indicates if this particular variable is making a statistically 
significant unique contribution to the model. The significance is very dependent on 
which variables are included in the model, and how much overlap there is among the 
independent variables. In this model no variable is making a significant unique 
contribution to the prediction. Although the available data are not comprehensive, and
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therefore the statistical significance is not strong, these results suggest that social 
capital is a better predictor of the level of provincial development than any of the 
other variables tested, and is what you would expect from the previous discussion.
TABLE 21
Multiple Regression Model Coefficients with Axline
Beta Sig
Land Area -.038 .933
Total Social 
Capital
-.233 .458
Ethnic
Fragmentation
-.158 .635
Domestic Factor 
Income
.029 .946
Axline .394 .246
Table 21 above provides a similar analysis but includes Axline. Of these independent 
variables, provincial performance makes the largest unique contribution (beta = .394). 
Social capital makes the largest contribution of the other variables tested where beta = - 
.233. The next is ethnic fragmentation, followed by land area, and with DFI making the 
least contribution. The beta weight for provincial performance tells us how much of a 
change we would make in the level of provincial development by making a one-unit 
change in performance, while keeping all other variables constant. Similar to Table 20 
the ‘Sig’ column shows that none of the variables tested make a significant unique 
contribution. A further major problem with this model is that it tests two separate time 
periods. The Axline data is from the period prior to the mid-1980s while the income 
data comes from the late 1990s which makes comparison problematic. As was 
previously discussed the literature on social capital theory would suggest that the poorly 
developed provinces would be characterised by strong engagement by ethnically based
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groups (which would result in low levels of trust in government), and be characterised 
by strong ‘intra-ethnic’ association, and weak ‘inter-ethnic’ association. In the first part 
of this research case studies were undertaken of Gulf, Eastern Highlands and East New 
Britain Provinces to investigate the nature of social capital in these provinces. These 
provinces were selected for this investigation because they represent different examples 
of ethnic diversity and government effectiveness (as measured by traditional 
development indicators). This study then considered the evidence across all nineteen 
provinces for a relationship between effective government, and ethnic fragmentation.
8.7. Conclusions
In this chapter I have considered the importance of ethnic diversity as a possible 
explanation for the differences in the level of social capital. Like social capital, 
measuring the degree of ethnic diversity in PNG is no simple task. One possible means 
to approximate the number of ethnic groups is to use as an estimate of the number of 
language groups. A formula can also be used which Rae has created for measuring the 
degree of ethnic fragmentation of the party system. Although there is a reasonably 
strong correlation between the number of language groups in the non-highlands 
provinces and provincial development the analysis shows that there is no significant 
direct relationship between ethnicity and provincial development or performance.
As discussed above a number of studies of elections in PNG have shown how it is 
possible for a candidate to divide the electorate’s vote along tribe or clan lines by 
encouraging representatives of each group to stand. Candidates therefore concentrate 
on mobilising the vote of their own clan group. Many analysis of elections in PNG 
emphasise the link between ethnicity and election candidature. A possible explanation 
is that a large number of candidates indicate a high level o f political fragmentation that 
has a negative effect on social capital and which, in turn, negatively impacts on 
provincial development. The overall number of candidates in each province is thus 
strongly (and negatively) related to provincial development. However, while the 
aggregated data provides some indication of the relationship between election candidacy 
and the level of development it is necessary to undertake more intensive investigations 
of a small sample of provinces. The election data suggests a link between ethnicity and
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social capital, and supports the qualitative research. However it is plausible that the 
political system particularly in PNG creates or reduces social capital and the flow of 
causation is from government to civil society.
An issue raised by this analysis is the relative importance of social capital as opposed to 
other independent variables or possible influences. A model was tested to evaluate the 
extent to which, total social capital, land area, ethnic fragmentation, and domestic factor 
income (DFI) influence provincial development. The measure for total social capital 
combines the various indicators outlined above. Land area is the total land area for each 
o f the provinces, and ethnic fragmentation is an estimate of ethnic diversity for each 
province. DFI is the real domestic factor income per capita in 1996 for each province, 
and includes formal, non-formal, and subsistence components. Furthermore DFI are not 
included in the provincial development indicator. Although the available data are not 
comprehensive, and therefore the statistical significance is not strong, these results show 
that social capital is a better predictor of the level of provincial development than any of 
the other variables tested, while improving provincial performance would have a 
positive impact on the development indicators.
Notes
398 Posner, D.N., 2000, “Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa: How should it be measured? What Does it 
Explain about Economic Growth?” Paper presented to the World Bank Development Research Group 
Seminar, 29 March.
399 Ibid., p.32.
400 Ghai, Yash, op cit., p.4.
401 Easterly, W., and Levine, R., op cit, p.1250.
402 La Porta, R., Florencio, L., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1999, “The Quality of Government,” Journal 
o f Law, Economics and Organisation, 15(1): 222-279.
403 Dinnen, S., 2003, “Building Bridges -  Law and Justice Reform in Papua New Guinea”, in Jowitt, A., 
and Newton Cain, T., (eds), op cit.. p.279.
404 Grimes, B.F., (ed), 2001, Ethnologue: languages o f the world, 14th edition, Summer Institute of 
Linguistics, Dallas.
405 May, R.J., 2003, “Harmonising Linguistic Diversity in Papua New Guinea”, in Brown, M.E., and 
Ganguly, S., (eds), Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia, MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA.
406 Posner, D.N., op cit.
407 PNG Electoral Commission, 1997, Report to the Sixth Parliament on the 1997 National Election, Port 
Moresby, p. 11.
408 May, R.J., 2003, op cit.. p.7.
409 Rynkiewich, M., and Serb, R., (eds), 2000, Politics in Papua New Guinea: Continuities, Changes and 
Challenges, Melanesian Institute, Goroka, p.5.
410 Rabushka, A., and Shepsle, K., 1972, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory o f Democratic Instability, 
Merrill, Columbus, p. 187.
411 Ibid., p.178.
215
CHAPTER 9
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
‘To many observers, the crisis in political participation at the local level could be resolved by establishing 
community governments smaller in scale and closer to the people. ’412
9.1. Introduction
This research focused on the performance of provinces in PNG to investigate the 
importance, if any, of civil society and social capital. There is now significant qualitative 
evidence, from a number of studies, to indicate that features, such as the level of trust and 
norms of co-operation, crucially impinge on social well being and on the effectiveness of 
government institutions. As discussed in Chapter 4, Robert Putnam in Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy stresses the importance of civil society and social 
capital in developing effective government institutions.413 Putnam’s study was the first of 
its kind to analyse government performance and the role of social capital. Putnam 
concludes that the regions in Italy enjoying effective government in the 1990s have 
inherited a legacy o f ‘civic engagement’ that can be traced back to the early Middle Ages. 
Putnam views social capital as a set o f ’horizontal associations’ among people who have an 
effect on the productivity of the community. These associations include ‘networks of civic 
engagement’ and social norms. Two assumptions underlie this concept. The first is that 
networks and norms are empirically associated; and second, that they have important 
economic consequences. In his definition, the key feature of social capital is that it 
facilitates coordination and cooperation for the mutual benefit of the members of the
• . •  414association.
According to Putnam an effective government-citizen relationship is the outcome of 
successful solutions to dilemmas of collective action. Norms of reciprocity and networks 
of civic engagement favour this outcome, because they raise the costs of defection, 
facilitate information among people, reduce uncertainty and provide models for future 
cooperation. As civil society increasingly received attention for its governance role there 
was more recognition of the role of social capital in facilitating and enhancing civil society. 
Particularly Putnam’s work linked the concepts of civil society and social capital.
It was earlier explained how applying the concept of social capital to the regional and
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national level raises new issues. In particular it raises the question of whether social capital 
necessarily has to result in outcomes that are mutually beneficial to all in the region or the 
nation -  that is; must social capital result in common-good outcomes? A broader 
understanding of social capital accounts for both the positive and negative aspects by 
including vertical as well as horizontal associations between people, and includes behaviour 
within and among organisations, such as firms. This view recognizes that horizontal ties 
are needed to give communities a sense of identity and common purpose, but also stresses 
that without ‘bridging’ ties that transcend various social divides (e.g. religion, ethnicity, and 
socio-economic status); horizontal ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow 
interests. Bonding social capital can actively preclude access to information and material 
resources that would otherwise be of great assistance to the community.
Recent literature distinguishes between bonding, and bridging.415 Bonding social capital 
refers to relations among relatively homogenous groups (such as an ethnic, religious or 
socioeconomic group), and it strengthens the social ties within the particular group. 
Bridging social capital refers to relations between heterogenous groups, and it strengthens 
ties across such groups. Examples of bridging social capital include the civil rights 
movement and ecumenical religious organisations. Studies highlight the importance of 
bridging social capital in societies characterised by considerable ethnic diversity. Trust 
limited within an ethnic group may promote norms of social interaction that are inward 
looking and less oriented to trust and co-operation at a broader community level.416 A 
particularly strong focus on group interests can encourage ‘rent seeking’ behaviour by the 
group to the disadvantage of the wider community.
In this study of PNG social capital has been defined in terms of relationships that are based 
in structures of voluntary association, norms of reciprocity and co-operation, and attitudes 
of social trust and respect. The critical question is the degree to which the concept and 
theory of social capital is relevant, and if so, can be made operational for the purposes of 
analysis and policy in PNG. As shown earlier, institutional strengthening has traditionally 
focused on internal aspects of organisations. These activities are especially concerned with 
efficiency and effectiveness, but the idea of governance is a broad concept that 
encompasses more than the formal legal aspects of a political system.
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In particular it was also discussed how it is often assumed that less developed societies are 
much less likely to be characterised by a strong civil society given the importance of 
‘personalistic patronage style relationships’.417 PNG has both inherited and adopted 
modern western government institutions to fit what is essentially, a communal social and 
economic structure characterised by a decentralised political structure. Traditional 
Melanesian society was based on consensus, gift giving, exchange and obligations. The 
notion of ‘reciprocity’ was central, and involves in various forms a complicated, shifting 
network of reciprocal obligations that continues over time. Such a network can operate on 
an intra-village or inter-village basis, and involve reciprocal obligations between
A 1 O
individuals or groups. In general the concept of social capital, and the way it is applied 
by Putnam is strongly associated with the notions of essentially “Western” government 
institutions. However is this really applicable in the PNG context?
9.2. Provincial Development and Social Capital
Chapters 5 and 6 investigated civil society and social capital in PNG from both a qualitative 
and quantitative aspect. Both the qualitative and quantitative research confirms that there is 
a relationship between provincial development and social capital. Furthermore, as 
explained earlier in Chapter 6, the measures used for these two variables are not the same.
This study found that the role of civil society organisations in Gulf Province, and their 
interaction with the administration, has been generally very limited. Significant population 
areas in Gulf receive little or no government services. Largely as a result, churches of 
various denominations have provided beyond their pastoral responsibilities such as 
essential services as infrastructure development and maintenance, social services such as 
health, education and information programs. However beyond the churches there has been 
minimal involvement of civil society organisations in provincial affairs. Gulf Province is 
characterised by weak social capital.
In contrast there are a number of large NGOs operating within and from the Eastern
Highlands Province. Although Eastern Highlands Province is heavily populated the people
are a less cohesive group than the people in most other parts of the Highlands region
because language divisions and the geographical terrain separating language groups appear
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to impact upon social capital. Recently the Eastern Highlands Province Advisory 
Committee (EHPAC) was formed by members from all sectors of society, and is chaired by 
the Governor of Eastern Highlands. The task of the EHPAC is to promote, oversee and 
coordinate implementation of recommendations put forward through various sectoral 
working committees, and to promote innovative, collaborative policy approaches to tackle 
the province’s problems. Social capital in the Eastern Highlands has been in decline for at 
least the past fifteen years, and it will be interesting to see if the EHPAC can reverse this 
trend.
Civil society organisations in East New Britain Province are dominated by church related 
organisations such as men and women’s fellowship groups, community groups and a few 
NGOs which are predominantly local. ENB has in the past characterised by relatively 
strong social capital however this is now coming under significant pressure. In response 
the Alliance c f Community Development Agencies (East New Britain) or the ACDA is an 
organisation that brings together NGOs, CBOs, church groups, government agencies and 
other development organisations to work together towards sustaining community 
development in the Province. There is a need for governments and civil society to develop 
processes and suitable structures (e.g. the EHPAC and ACDA) to better manage their 
relationships. Public policy should focus on strengthening the ‘links’ between government 
institutions and civil society at all levels. Formal development planning, at both the 
National and Provincial level, should incorporate the potential role for the participation of 
civil society organisations in project design and implementation.
The overall evidence from the qualitative research is that an explanation for the 
failure of effective government in Gulf and Eastern Highlands may be found in social 
capital theory. In ENB civil society organisations are largely locally based and have a 
generally cooperative relationship with the Provincial Administration. In the case of 
Eastern Highlands however the broad consensus which characterised the 1980 period could 
not survive the pressures imposed by so many ethnic groups.
The qualitative research shows that in communities with effective government and high 
levels of ‘bridging’ social capital, development seems to have been more likely. 
Alternatively when a society’s social capital is in primarily social groups disconnected from
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one another (i.e. ethnic groups), it is more likely that powerful groups will dominate 
government, to the exclusion of other groups, and development will be slower. In ENB a 
broad consensus across ethnic groups and cooperation between government and civil 
society favours effective government whereas in Gulf and Eastern Highlands the 
multiplicity of ethnic groups and a lack of cooperation between government and civil 
society appear to frustrate attempts to maintain a consensus necessary for effective 
government. In particular in the case of East New Britain many of the reasons given for its 
comparatively good economic and political performance i.e. colonial initiatives in 
promoting plantation and cash crop development, the geographical position of Rabaul, the 
solidarity of the Tolais and the value placed on education over an extended period, have 
contributed to building social capital in that province.
The purpose of Chapter 6 was to replicate Putnam’s methodology in the PNG context, and 
to test its relevance. It was found that relevant data to measure provincial development, 
provincial government performance and social capital in the provinces is very limited. 
Empirical studies of social capital sometimes try to measure social capital by the density of 
networks, or by measures of trust. The measures of social capital in this study have been 
predominantly concerned with the density of social networks. These associations include 
rugby football clubs, and women’s, youth and sports associations. The analysis of the 
available data shows that there is a correlation between provincial development and 
the available indicators for social capital across the nineteen provinces. However the 
analysis also shows that there is no clear correlation between the performance of the 
provincial governments, and the indicators of social capital across provinces which would 
be expected from the qualitative research. This important point is discussed below.
In Chapter 7 I then considered the importance of ethnic diversity as a possible explanation 
for the differences in the level of social capital. Like social capital, measuring the degree of 
ethnic diversity in PNG is no simple task. One possible means to approximate the number 
of ethnic groups is to use as an estimate of the number of language groups. It was also 
shown that a formula can also be used which Rae has created for measuring the degree of 
ethnic fragmentation of the party system. Although there is a reasonably strong correlation 
between the number of language groups in the non-highlands provinces and provincial
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development the analysis shows that there is no significant direct relationship between 
ethnicity and provincial development.
It was further explained that in PNG the national parliament is elected on a first-past-the- 
post voting system, where the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected. There 
is also no limit to the number of candidates. A number of studies of elections in PNG have 
shown how it is possible for a candidate to divide the electorate’s vote along tribe or clan 
lines by encouraging representatives of each group to stand. Candidates therefore 
concentrate on mobilising the vote of their own clan group. Many analysis of elections in 
PNG emphasise the link between ethnicity and election candidature. A possible 
explanation is that a iarge number of candidates indicate a high level of political 
fragmentation that has a negative effect on social capital and which, in turn, negatively 
impacts on provincial development. The data shows that the overall number of 
candidates in each province is strongly (and negatively) related to provincial 
development. Therefore the ethnic diversity of the province is highly likely to have a long 
term impact on development while likely having little direct impact on the performance of 
the provincial government.
Finally the issue raised by the analysis is the relative importance of social capital as 
opposed to other independent variables or possible influences. A model was therefore 
tested to evaluate the extent to which, total social capital, land area, ethnic fragmentation, 
and domestic factor income (DFI) may influence provincial development. These variables 
were chosen because they are independent of each other, and that they also may feasibly 
account for different levels of development between provinces. Although the available data 
are not comprehensive, and therefore the statistical significance is not strong, these results 
show that social capital is a better predictor of the level of provincial development than any 
of the other variables tested.
9.3. Provincial Government Performance and Social Capital
Interestingly the quantitative research found no correlation between provincial 
government performance and social capital whereas the empirical evidence seems to 
indicate otherwise. In PNG a system of provincial governments was established following
independence primarily in order to account for the diversity in the country and to give a 
voice to the ‘grassroots’. By establishing the system of provincial and local government 
the central authorities sought to take into account local and ethnic factors.
However it was explained previously that in reality the introduction of a decentralised 
system of provincial government in the late 1970s led to a gradual decline in the quality and 
coverage of these services, despite the rapid expansion in the size of the state. The 
rationale behind the provincial government system was to improve delivery of services at 
the local level. But, while the number of schools and aid posts increased, there is little 
doubt that the quality of services declined. This was due in part to a shift of resources away 
from local government, and from sub-district mission and state services, to the provincial 
centres, government headquarters and also to the discretionary budgets of politicians. Only 
in provinces where local government was already well developed was there a reasonably 
effective integration of provincial and local government. Apparently the important 
preconditions for effective decentralisation, which were discussed in Chapter 3, were not 
fulfilled. It also supports the argument made by May and Regan that where ‘the sharing of 
political power and resources is resisted by national politicians and officials, 
decentralisation is unlikely to prosper.’419
Provincial government in PNG has been almost continually the subject of major reform. 
As explained earlier very significant changes occurred following the new organic law on 
Provincial Government which was passed by the National Parliament in 1995. The focus 
of the reform has been the organisational design of the governments and their economic and 
financial resources. There has been wide debate about whether administrative incapacity or 
financial incapacity has been the major constraint to their performance. The original 
Axline research only covers the period prior to these reforms and therefore makes analysis 
over the longer period problematic. However, thus far the reforms do not appear to have 
improved provincial government performance. A likely reason is that provincial
government was only established at independence and has generally not taken root in much 
of the country. Put even more simply people generally do not trust provincial governments.
9.4. Ethnicity and Social Capital
It was shown in Chapter 2 that the idea of the nation state is an introduced concept in 
Melanesian societies. It is widely recognised that ethnic groups and ethnic minorities exist 
by virtue of long standing association across generations, complex relations of kinship, 
common culture and usually religious uniformity and common territorial attachments. For 
the most part Papua New Guineans define their ethnicity in terms of kinship, language and 
sometimes their region. The population of PNG speaks more than eight hundred languages 
and live in small-scale, decentralised communities. Members of PNG society were bound 
for the most part by kinship connections, a common language and communal landholdings.
It can be seen that the importance of ethnicity may vary over time as a result of a number of 
political, social and economic factors, but a particularly important factor is the nature of the 
government institutions, in particular many studies show that ‘identities may also be 
forced upon the people by the state. The colonial experience provides many examples of 
administrative boundaries or categorised people.’420 Chapter 4 explained that a number of 
recent studies have addressed the issue of ethnic diversity, and social capital. They show 
that the distinction between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital is important. If bonding 
social capital is predominant then it makes it much more difficult for society to solve 
common problems in mutually beneficial ways. However it was also shown that there are a 
wide range of views as to how important ethnicity is in terms of government performance 
and development.
The quantitative analysis in Chapter 7 found that there is no significant direct 
relationship between ethnicity and provincial development or performance. Ethnic 
fragmentation does not directly account for development or provincial performance. 
However the qualitative research shows that ethnic and clan identities do impact on the type 
of social capital (i.e. bonding or bridging), and has a strong impact on the political process. 
The political process is also largely divorced from the lives of the vast majority of the rural 
population. Similarly with provincial government the vast majority have no trust in these 
institutions. However the qualitative research and the electoral data do suggest that 
ethnic divisions impact on social capital in PNG.
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9.5. Implications for the theory
This research shows that applying the concepts of civil society and social capital in PNG is 
clearly problematic. In particular this study highlights the view that applying the concept 
of social capital to a regional or national level raises the question of whether social capital 
necessarily has to result in mutually beneficial outcomes.
As discussed earlier, generally speaking the term ‘social capital’ is used to refer to the 
institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s 
social interactions. It was earlier explained that Coleman introduced the concept of social 
capital into his research in order to provide a ‘socialised’ view of human action. In other 
words he seeks to answer the question, how is social order possible if each individual is 
maximising their self-interest? Putnam uses the concept of social capital at a different scale 
to Coleman; however his definition of the concept is drawn directly from Coleman. Like 
Coleman he views social capital as facilitating action within social structures.
Debates have focussed on the degree to which social capital stems from individual and 
institutional behaviour or from the inherent properties of social networks. The broadest and 
most encompassing view of social capital includes the social and political environment that 
shapes social structure and enables norms to develop. This view not only accounts for the 
virtues and vices of social capital, and the importance of forging ties within and across 
communities, but recognizes that the capacity of various social groups to act in their 
interest depends crucially on the support (or lack thereof) that they receive from 
government. Similarly, government institutions depend on social stability and widespread 
popular support, because relationships of trust and networks also involve public 
institutions. In the case of a developing country such as PNG with recently inherited 
government institutions, significant ethnic divisions and a very long history of traditional 
forms of governance, this theory of social capital, as it is strongly related to the essentially 
western notions of government institutions, is not directly applicable. This conclusion is 
supported by the data discussed in Chapter 6 where provincial development and 
performance were compared.
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As discussed in Chapter 6 Axline’s results are interesting when they are compared with the 
development rankings produced by de Albuquerque and D’Sa, who found the most 
developed provinces were the outer island regions of New Ireland, New Britain, 
Bougainville and Manus, while the least developed regions were the Highlands provinces 
of Enga and the Southern and Eastern Highlands. It was shown that overall while there is 
some commonality between the two indicators (the Islands Region score high and some 
parts of the Highlands score low on both measures, for example), the similarities are 
outweighed by the differences -  strongly suggesting that government effectiveness alone 
does not account for differences in provincial development.
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FIGURE 37
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Returning also to my simple model in Chapter 1, Figure 37 above shows the possible 
relationships and causal flows. To summarise, the study supports the hypothesis that there 
is a direct relationship between social capital and provincial development, and that the 
provincial government institutions have not generally been significant. This study also 
supports the contention that ethnic diversity does not directly determine provincial 
development but that it does impact on social capital. Particularly it seems from the 
qualitative research that social capital in PNG is characterised by close social bonding, 
primarily along ethnic lines, but with very weak levels of co-operation and trust across 
these divides. Also traditional leadership seems to be still strong and to often override 
government authority. As a result the role of civil society, in terms of governance, is much 
less effective because of the influence of ethnic associations. The distinction between 
‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital is therefore critical to the analysis. Trust 
limited within an ethnic group may promote inward looking norms of social 
interaction and ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour by ethnic groups. As explained earlier a 
number of studies have argued that in communities with good governance and high levels 
of bridging social capital, there is complementarity between state and society, and 
economic prosperity and social order are likely. Alternatively when a society’s social
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capital inheres mainly in primary social groups disconnected from one another, the more 
powerful groups dominate the state, to the exclusion of other groups. The nature of the 
political system, including the electoral process compounds the influence of ethnic diversity 
on social capital. There are probably also some more indirect impacts on the performance 
of provincial governments because of the important positions (e.g. Governor) held by the 
national Members of Parliament.
However the direction of the causal flows are much more difficult to identify, and the 
statistical methodology used in this study provides few clues. Durlauf and Fafchamps in 
their analysis of the social capital research raise serious questions about the causal 
interpretation of regressions often used in social capital studies and ‘are unaware of any 
social capital study using aggregate data that addresses causality versus correlation for 
social capital and growth in a persuasive way. ’ 421 It would still seem logical that while 
social capital determines development performance, there is likely to ue some relationship 
in reverse e.g. a province with good educational infrastructure is more likely to enhance 
social capital in that province. Similarly the political process not only exacerbates ethnic 
divisions but is in turn a product of those divisions.
Finally it seems clear from the research that the Putnam conclusions are not necessarily 
applicable to a country which is characterised by huge ethnic diversity, still relatively 
strong traditional governing institutions and weak “modern” western government 
institutions.
9.6. Implications for policy and practice
Over the last twenty-five years the primary focus for provincial government reform in PNG 
has been on the structure of the institutions and the improvement in the transfer of 
economic and financial resources. However this focus seems to have generally failed to 
provide any significant improvement in performance.
In PNG it was argued at independence that decentralisation would lead to democratic 
participation in decision making by devolving power down to the provinces. In reality
broad community participation in political institutions has been lacking. But, as any close
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inspection of the literature shows there are in fact, as many plausible reasons for thinking 
that democratic decentralisation will have negative outcomes as there are for accepting that 
it will provide the benefits listed above.422 Gulf Province is characterised by the politics of 
power relations between the main ethnic groups. The practice of provincial politics has 
been about ‘capturing’ the resources to bring about ‘development’. ENB and Eastern 
Highlands provides examples where ethnic diversity has been managed effectively and this 
has undoubtedly contributed to better government performance and development. As 
Putnam also found:
changing formal institutions can change political practice. The reform had 
measurable and mostly beneficial consequences for regional political life. As 
institutionalists would predict, institutional changes were (gradually) reflected in 
changing identities, changing values, changing power, and changing strategies... 
The regional reform allowed social learning, “learning by doing”. Formal change 
induced informal change and became self-sustaining.42
Government authority should be decentralized as far as possible to bring decisions to 
smaller, local jurisdictions, while recognizing and offsetting the potential negative effect of 
that decentralization on equality and redistribution. In all the domains of social-capital 
creation that I have discussed here all too briefly, social capitalists need to avoid false 
debates. One such debate is “top-down versus bottom-up”. The roles of national and local 
institutions in restoring community need to be complementary; neither alone can solve the 
problem.424
The key to a new policy framework is that policy needs to recognise that in Melanesia the 
social, economic, political and cultural contexts in which institutional strengthening has 
been undertaken differ significantly. The concept of governance puts a great deal of 
emphasis on institution capacity building, however institutional reform cannot solve all the 
problems that we have identified with the performance of provincial governments in PNG. 
Particularly important in the PNG context is the role of the churches. Sport is also an 
obsession in PNG and membership of sports team can significantly strengthen social 
capital. By strengthening the role of social capital in these reforms some of the adverse 
features may be dealt with more effectively.
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9.7. Conclusions and Further Research
In the introduction to this study it was explained how it is frequently argued that the 
inappropriate nature of the institutional structures provided to the Melanesian countries at 
independence that have been a major contributor to their poor economic performance. 
Whether there is a relationship between the form of government on the one hand, and 
political and economic performance on the other, is one of the classic questions of 
comparative politics. In these countries the relationships between their economic 
development strategies and institutional processes are particularly poorly understood. What 
is clear from this study is that at least in PNG institutions need to be reformed in ways that 
invite more active community participation. ‘Good Governance’ is generally regarded to 
be about the legitimacy and accountability of rulers, and the capacity of the public sector to 
promote growth and equity. The global wave of democratisation over the past decade has 
raised expectations of participation, social equity, respect for human rights, and netter 
economic management. As the development agenda switches from ‘getting prices right’ to 
‘getting institutions right,’ understanding what governments efficient, effective, and 
responsive to citizens’ needs is becoming crucial to the success of a range of development 
policy initiatives.425 A better understanding of what makes government work well is a 
focus for policy-makers.
My qualitative research on provinces in PNG suggests that if government institutions are to 
perform well then it is necessary for there to be strong links with civil society. However, a 
healthy civil society involves more than community participation and engagement and the 
presence of many active groups and organisations. It also requires institutions and 
processes through which claims can be negotiated and mediated and which organise and 
structure social interactions. Government authority should be decentralized as far as 
possible to bring decisions to smaller, local jurisdictions, while recognizing and offsetting 
the potential negative effect of that decentralisation on equality and redistribution. 
Strengthening civil society may involve more than strengthening the ability of groups and 
organisations to represent and address community needs and interests.426 As Putnam 
himself explains that ‘to build bridging social capital requires that we transcend our social 
and political and professional identities to connect with people unlike ourselves. '427
However Putnam cautions that ‘the final lesson from this research is that most institutional
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history moves slowly. Where institution building (and not mere constitution writing) is 
concerned, time is measured in decades. ’428 The results of the quantitative research are 
much less clear and poor data, and lack of evidence of causality make it difficult to derive 
any substantial conclusions.
Development in PNG since independence has been traditionally dominated by the National 
and Provincial governments. However, an examination of the available evidence suggests 
that the nature of civil society and social capital in PNG has had a profound impact on 
development performance. It is found that development policies, and strategies, in PNG 
need to take into account the specific characteristics of civil society and social capital. In 
particular, community development is primarily about building relationships and social 
capital is fundamental to building relationships based on trust, and cooperation. 
Community development needs to use the civil society organisations that are predominant 
in the PNG context to build ‘'Driaging” social capital.
The overall conclusion from this study is that in PNG it seems that the different levels 
of performance of the provincial governments cannot be explained by their 
organisational and legal structures or only by their respective level of economic and 
financial resources which are the primary focus of Axline’s research. The evidence 
shows that provincial government effectiveness alone does not account for differences 
in provincial development. Rather the examination of the available evidence shows 
that the nature of social capital in PNG (i.e. ‘bonding’ social capital) has had a much 
more profound impact on development performance in the provinces over the longer 
term. This suggests that the ‘reform of laws and institutions can go only so far in 
contributing to improvement in governance... patterns of values, culture and behaviour play 
a large role in governance, which ultimately depends on the legitimacy of political 
institutions in the broader society. ’429 It has been argued, for instance, that decentralisation 
to democratised local authorities gives rise to improvements in political stability through 
the legitimation of differences in local needs and perspectives. The evidence here suggests, 
however, that this cannot be taken for granted, because decentralisation will most likely 
only be effective if it actually enhances the opportunity for civil society to put pressure on 
institutions of government to perform well. This is consistent with May and Regan who
argue that ‘if a high value is placed on local participation and there is acceptance of the
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possibility of regional diversity, decentralisation has a good chance of success. ’430 This 
study also highlights the need to undertake further research on the nature of social capital 
and government performance in PNG. Particularly for the quantitative analysis in this 
study the data in many cases are out of date and sometimes of doubtful accuracy. Updates 
of Axline’s study of performance and for development indicators at the provincial level 
would be invaluable. In addition it would be desirable, given the problems identifying 
causality to direct research efforts more towards micro-level studies as suggested by 
Durlauf and Fafchamps. They also argue that ‘there needs to be greater recognition of the 
limits to statistical analysis in contexts such as the evaluation of social capital... For 
example, sustained descriptive histories can teach us much about the ways that social 
structures influence individual conduct even if they are not constructed in the forms of 
claims about F-statistics and the like. ’431 What does seem clear from this research is that 
building trust across PNG society in the ‘modem’ government institutions, both national 
and provincial, is critically important. Similarly ‘bridges’ need to be established across 
ethnic divides so that social capital in PNG can be mobilised to benefit society as a whole.
Notes
412 Premdas, R.R., op cit., p.256.
4|j Putnam, R.D., 1993, op cit.
414 Serageldin, I., and Grootaert, C., 2000, op cit., p.45.
4l5Woolcock, M., and Narayan, D., 2000, op cit.. p.227.
410 Knack, S., 1999, op cit.
417 Ibid., p.208.
418 Seddon, N., 1995, op cit.. p.2.
419 May, R.J. and Regan, A.J., op cit., p.5.
420 Ibid
421 Durlauf, S.N., and Fafchamps, M., 2004, “Social Capital”, National Bureau o f Economic Research 
Working Paper 10485, Cambridge, M.A., p.53.
422 Crook, R., and Manor, J., 1995, “Democratic Decentralisation and Institutional Performance: Four Asian 
and African Experiences Compared”, Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 33(3), November, 
p.311.
423 Putnam, R.D., 1993, op cit., p.184.
424 Putnam, R.D., 2000, op cit., p.413.
425 Institute o f Development Studies, 1999, Can Aid Promote Good Government? Policy Briefing No 2, 
Sussex.
426 PIANGO, op cit.. p.6.
427 Putnam, R.D., 2000. op cit., p.411.
428 Putnam, R.D., 1993, op cit.. p. 184.
429 ibid., p.97.
430 May, R.J., and Regan, A.J., op cit., p.4.
4,1 Durlauf, S.N., and Fafchamps, M., op cit.. p.54.
231
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND APPENDICES
232
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ahai, N., 1998, The Development Problem in Papua New Guinea: An Indigenous 
Perspective, National Research Institute Discussion Paper No 88, Port Moresby.
Ahlburg, D.A., 1995, Income Distribution and Poverty in Fiji, United Nations 
Development Programme, Suva.
Akram-Lodhi, A Haroon., 1996, ‘Structural Adjustment in Fiji under the Interim 
Government, 1987-1992’, The Contemporary Pacific, 8(2):259-290.
Allen, B., Bourke, M., Hanson, L., and McCarthy, T., 2000, District Profiles for  
Papua New Guinea, Land Management Project, Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra.
Arrow, K., 1972, ‘Gifts and Exchanges’, Philosophy and Public Affairs l(4):343-67.
Asian Development Bank, 1993, Solomon Islands: Economic Situation, Policies and 
Prospects, South Pacific Office, Port Vila, Vanuatu.
Asian Development Bank, 1995, Governance: Sound Development Management, 
Manila.
Asian Development Bank, 1999, Economic and Policy Analysis in Pacific Island 
Developing Member Countries: Public Sector Management and Governance,
Manila.
Asian Development Bank, 2000, Papua New Guinea Country Assistance Plan 2001- 
2003, Manila.
AusAID, 1997, Australia-PNG Development Cooperation Program: Study o f  
Effectiveness, Final Report, Canberra.
AusAID, 1997, Promoting Good Governance and Human Rights through the Aid 
Program, an address by the Hon Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at the DFAT/NGO Human Rights Consultations, Canberra.
AusAID, 1997, PNG Western and G ulf Provinces Coastal Zone Management Plan: 
Feasibility Study Completion Report, Volume 1 and 2, Canberra.
AusAID, 1997, Economic Survey o f  Papua New Guinea, Canberra.
AusAID, 1998, Evaluation findings: a compilation o f  AusAID’s evaluation and 
review reports 1992-1997, Evaluation No 1, April, Canberra.
AusAID, 1998, PNG Cluster Evaluation o f  Three Institutional Strengthening 
Projects, Evaluation No 3, May, Canberra.
AusAID, 1998, South Pacific Cluster Evaluation, Evaluation No 8, September 1998, 
Canberra.
233
AusAID. 1998, Pacific Islands Development Strategy 1999 to 2001, Canberra.
AusAID, 1998, Papua New Guinea, Budgets, Finance and Accounting: Implications 
fo r  the Successful Implementation o f  AusAID Programs, Canberra.
AusAID, 1999, Papua New Guinea Development Strategy 2000 to 2003. Canberra.
AusAID, 1999, Provincial Financial Management Training Program (PFTMP) 
Project Design Document, Canberra.
AusAID, 2000. Western Province, Papua New Guinea: Development Status and 
Prospects, Canberra.
AusAID, 2001, Enclaves or equity: The rural crisis and development choice in 
Papua New Guinea, International Development Issues No 54, Canberra.
AusAID, 2003, The role o f  churches in development in Papua New Guinea, 
Canberra.
Axline, W.A., 1986, Decentralisation and Development Policy: Provincial 
Government and the Planning Process in Papua New Guinea Monograph No 26, 
PNG Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, Boroko.
Axline, W.A., 1988, “Policy implementation in Papua New Guinea:
Decentralisation and Redistribution,” The Journal o f  Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, xxvi(l): 72-103.
Axline, W.A., 1993, Governance in Papua New Guinea: Approaches to Institutional 
Reform, Institute o f National Affairs Discussion Paper No 58, Port Moresby.
Bank of Hawaii, 1998, Solomon Islands Economic Report, Honolulu.
Bank o f Hawaii, 1998, Fiji Economic Report, Honolulu.
Bank o f Hawaii,, 1998, PNG Economic Report, Honolulu.
Bank of Papua New Guinea, (various issues), Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Port 
Moresby.
Bates, R., 1991, “The Politics of Economic Policy Reform: A Review Article”, 
Journal o f  African Economies 23: 417-433.
Bates, R., 1999, Ethnicity, Capital Formation, and Conflict, Social Capital Initiative 
Working Paper No 12, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Bauer, P., Siwatibau, S., and Kasper, W., 1991 ,A id  and Development in the South 
Pacific, Centre for Independent Studies, Australia.
Booth, A., 1994, Development Changes in a Poor Pacific Economy: The Case o f  
Papua New Guinea, School of Oriental and African Studies, Working Paper no 38.
234
Bourke. R.M., Allen, B.J., Hide, R.L., Fritsch, D., Geob, T., Grau, R., Heai, S., 
Hobsbawn, P., Ling, G., Lyon, S., and Poienou, M., 1996, East New Britain 
Province: Text Summaries, Maps, Code Lists and Village Identification,
Agricultural Systems of Papua New Guinea Working Paper No. 14, Department of 
Human Geography, Australian National University, Canberra.
Bourdieu, P., 1986, “The forms of capital” in Richardson, J. (ed), Handbook o f  
Theory and Research for the Sociology o f Education, Greenwood Press, New York.
Brown, David, L., and Ashman, D., 1996, “Participation, Social Capital, and 
Intersectoral Problem Solving: African and Asian Cases,” World Development 
24(9), pp. 1467-1479.
Bullen, P., et al, 1999, Social Capital: Family Support Services and Neighbourhood 
and Community Centres in NSW, Local Community Services Association and 
Family Support Services Association of NSW, Sydney.
Burton, J., 1998, “Mining and Maladministration in Papua New Guinea”, in 
Larmour, P., (ed), Governance and reform in the South Pacific, Australian National 
University, Canberra.
Callick, R., 2000, “A nation searches for a way between two worlds”, Australian 
Financial Review, 25 May.
Callick, R., Hughs, H., Vincent, D. and Weiseman, E., The Papua New Guinea 
Handbook, National Centre for Development Studies, Canberra.
Camdessus, M., 1997, Good Governance: The IMF’s Role, an address to the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council July 2, 1997.
Cassen, R., and Associates, 1994, Does Aid Work? Second Edition, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford.
Central Bank of the Solomon Islands, Annual Report, (various issues), Government 
Printer, Honiara.
Chand, S., 1997, Ethnic conflict, income inequity, and growth in independent Fiji, 
Discussion Paper No. 97/6, State Society and Governance Project, The Australian 
National University, Canberra.
Chand, S., 1998, “Current events in Fiji: an economy adrift in the Pacific”, Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 13(1): 1-17.
Chand, S and Stewart, R., 1997, “Economic reforms and structural change in Papua 
New Guinea: progress, performance and prospects”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 
12(2):53-69.
Chung, M., 1995, “Should the economy do better than the people? or Investing in 
people”, in Grynberg, R., (ed), Economic Prospects for the Pacific Islands in the 
21st Century, University of the South Pacific, Suva.
235
Coleman, J., 1988, “Social capital in the creation of human capital”, American 
Journal o f Sociology 94: 95-120.
Coleman, J., 1990, Foundations o f  Social Theory, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.
Collier, P., 1998, Social Capital and Poverty, Social Capital Initiative Working 
Paper No 4, The World Bank.
Collier, P., 1998, “The Political Economy of Ethnicity”, paper prepared for the 
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C., 
April 20-21.
Collier, P., 1999, “The Implications of Ethnic Diversity”, paper presented at the 31st 
Economic Policy panel meeting, London, April 14-15.
Comaroff, John. L. and Jean, 1999, Civil Society and the Political Imagination in 
Africa: Critical Perspectives, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Community Development Initiatives Foundation Trust Fund, 2002, Strategic Plan 
2003-2007, Port Moresby.
Connell, J., 1997, Papua New Guinea: The Struggle fo r  Development, Routledge, 
London.
Corbo, V., S. Fischer and S.B. Webb, 1992, Adjustment Lending Revisited: Policies 
to Restore Growth, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Corkery, J., 1997, International Experience with Institutional Development and 
Administrative Reform: Some Pointers for Success, ECDPM Working Paper No 15, 
Maastricht.
Corkery, J. and Land, A., 1996, Civil Service Reform in the Context o f  Structural 
Adjustment, ECDPM, Maastricht.
Comia, G.A., R. Jolly and F. Stewart, (eds), 1987, Adjustment with a Human Face: 
Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Crocombe, R., and Tuza, E., 1992, Independence, Dependence, Interdependence: 
The First 10 Years o f  Solomon Islands Independence, Government Printing, 
Honiara.
Crook, R.C., and Manor, J., 1995, “Democratic Decentralisation and Institutional 
Performance: Four Asian and African Experiences Compared”, Journal o f  
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 33(3), November: 309-334.
Dasgupta, P., and Serageldin, I., (eds), 2000, Social Capital: A Multifaceted 
Perspective, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
236
de Albequerque, K., and D’sa, E., 1984, Spatial Inequalities in Papua New Guinea:
A Provincial Level Analysis, Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, 
Mimeographed, Port Moresby.
de Albequerque, K., and D’sa, E., 1986, Spatial Inequalities in Papua New Guinea:
A District Level Analysis, Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research 
Discussion Paper No 49, Port Moresby.
de Renzio, P., and Kavanamur, D., 1999, “Tradition, society and development: 
social capital in Papua New Guinea,” Pacific Economic Bulletin, 14(2).
Demery, L., and Squire, L., 1996, “Macroeconomic Adjustment and poverty in 
Africa: an emerging picture”, The World Bank Research Observer, 11(1): 39-59.
Devine, A.G.T., 1994, “Institutional Development in Papua New Guinea”, Training 
and Development in Australia, November, Canberra.
Dickerson-Putnam, J., 1994, “Women, development and stratification in the Eastern 
Highlands of Papua New Guinea”, Urban Anthropology and Studies o f  Cultural 
Systems and World Economic Development, 23(1): 13-38.
Di^kson-Waiko, A., “Civil Society and development, nongovernment organisations 
and churches”, Development Bulletin 50, Canberra.
Dinnen, S., 2003, “Building Bridges -  Law and Justice Reform in Papua New 
Guinea”, in Jowitt, A., and Newton Cain, T., (eds), Passage o f  Change: Law,
Society and Governance in the Pacific, Pandanus Books, Sydney.
Dogan, M and Pelassy, D., 1990, How to Compare Nations: Strategies in 
Comparative Politics, Chatham House, NJ.
Domey, S., 2000, Papua New Guinea: people, politics and history since 1975, ABC 
Books, (2nd edition), Sydney.
Driscoll, D.D., 1997, What is the International Monetary Fund, External Relations 
Department, Publication Services, Washington, D.C.
Duncan, R., and Gupta, D., 1999, “The Economy of Eastern Highlands Province”, in 
Economic Insights Pty Ltd, Papua New Guinea -  Macroeconomic Policies: 
Implications for Growth and Development in the Informal Sector, International 
Development Issues No 53, AusAID, Canberra.
Durutalo, A., 1995, “Social Consequences of Economic Policy”, in Grynberg, R., 
(ed), Economic Prospects for the Pacific Islands in the 21st Century, University of 
the South Pacific, Suva.
Easterly, W., and Levine, R., 1997, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions,” Quarterly Journal o f  Economics, November: 1203-1250.
237
Economic Insights Pty Ltd, 1994, The Solomon Islands Economy: Achieving 
Sustainable Economic Development, International Development Issues No 37, 
AusAID, Canberra.
Economic Insights Pty Ltd, 1994, Papua New Guinea: The Role o f Government in 
Economic Development, International Development Issues No 33, AIDAB, 
Canberra.
Economic Insights Pty Ltd, 1995, The Economy o f  Fiji: Supporting Private 
Investment, International Development Issues No 40, AusAID, Canberra.
Economic Insights Pty Ltd, 1996, The Economy o f  Papua New Guinea: 1996 
Report, International Development Issues No 46, AusAID, Canberra.
Economic Insights Pty Ltd, 1998, Papua New Guinea: Coping with Shocks and 
Achieving Broad-Based Economic Development, International Development Issues 
No 52, AusAID, Canberra.
Economic Insights Pty Ltd, 1999, Papua New Guinea -  Macroeconomic Policies: 
Implications for Growth and Development in the Informal Sector, International 
Development Issues No 53, AusAID, Canberra.
Edwards, B., and Foley, M.W., 1998, “Civil Society and Social Capital beyond 
Putnam”, American Behavioral Scientist 42( 1): 124-139.
Edwards, M., 1999, Enthusiasts, Tacticians, and Sceptics: The World Bank, Civil 
Society and Social Capital, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Elson, D., 1992, “From Survival Strategies to Transformation Strategies: Women’s 
Needs and Structural Adjustment”, in Bemia, L., and Feldman, S., (eds), Unequal 
Burden: Economic Crisis, Persistent Poverty and Womens Work, Westview Press, 
Boulder.
Esman, M., 1994, Ethnic Politics, Cornell University Press, NY.
Filer, C., 1990, “The Bougainville Rebellion and the process of social 
disintegration”, in May, R.J., and Spriggs, M., (eds), The Bougainville Crisis, 
Crawford House Press, Bathurst.
Fine, B., 1999, ‘The Developmental State is Dead -  Long Live Social Capital?’ 
Development and Change 30.
Fine, B., 2001, Social capital versus social theory: political economy and social 
science at the turn o f the millennium, Routledge, London.
Finin, G.A., and Wesley-Smith, T.A., 2000, Coups, Conflicts and Crisis: The New 
Pacific Way? East-West Center Working Paper No 13, June, Honolulu.
Finzi, U., 1997, The World Bank and Project Analysis: An Introduction, Economic 
Development Institute of the World Bank, New York.
238
Foley, M.W., and Edwards, B., 1998, “Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and 
Social Capital in Comparative Perspective”, American Behavioral Scientist, 42(1 ):5- 
20 .
Forsyth, D.J.C., 1996, “Fiji economy at the crossroads”, Pacific Economic Bulletin,
11 (1): 1 -30.
Foster, R.J., (ed), 1995, Nation Making: Emergent Identities in Postcolonial 
Melanesia, University of Michigan Press, Michigan.
Fox, C.E., 1975, The Story o f  the Solomons, Pacific Publications, Sydney.
Fowler, A., 2000, “Civil Society, NGDOs and Social Development: Changing the 
Rules of the Game”, UNRISD Occasional Paper No 1, Geneva.
Francis, P.„ Adelabu, S.P.I., Agi, S., Ogoh Alubo and Owoicho Akbo, 1998, Hard 
Lessons: Primary School, Community and Social Capital in Nigeria, 1 -64 World 
Bank Technical Paper, Washington, D.C.
Geertz, C., 1963, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil 
Politics in the New States,” in Geertz, C., (ed), Old Societies and New States: The 
Quest fo r Modernfr in Asia and Africa, Free Press, New York.
Gelu, A., 2000, “The Emergence of a Non-Liberal Democratic Political Culture in 
Papua New Guinea”, in Rynkiewich, M., and Serb, R., (eds), Politics in Papua New 
Guinea: Continuities, Changes and Challenges, Melanesian Institute, Goroka.
Ghai, Yash, (ed), 2000, Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in 
Multi-ethnic States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Goode, B., 1983, “The Village Perspective: Voter Decision-Making in a Tairora 
Village, Obura-Wonenara Open”, in Hegarty, D., (ed), Electoral Politics in Papua 
New Guinea: Studies on the 1977 National Elections, UPNG Press, Port Moresby.
Goodman, R., Lepani, C., and Morawetz, D., 1985, The Economy o f Papua New 
Guinea, National Centre for Development Studies, Canberra.
Goudie, A., 1998, International Development: Beyond the White Paper. Is a Good 
Government Agenda Practical? An Approach to Governance, Overseas 
Development Institute, London.
Government of Australia, 1996, Australia’s Renewed Commitment to the South 
Pacific, an address by the Hon. Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to the Centre for South Pacific Studies, University of New South Wales on 
18 July, 1996.
Government of Australia, 1997, One Clear Objective: poverty reduction through 
sustainable development, Report of the Committee of Review into the Australian 
Overseas Aid Program, AGPS, Canberra.
239
Government of Australia, 1999, Australia ’s Overseas Aid Program 1999-2000, 
Auslnfo, Canberra.
Government of the Republic of Fiji, 1991, 1990/91 Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey, Bureau of Statistics, Suva.
Government of the Republic of Fiji, 1993, Opportunities fo r  Growth: Policies and 
Strategies for Fiji in the medium term, Government Printer, Suva.
Government of the Solomon Islands, 1997, Policy and Structural Reform 
Programme, Government Printer, Honiara.
Government of Papua New Guinea, 1992, Report o f  the Auditor General, Port 
Moresby.
Government of Papua New Guinea, 1995, Organic Law on Provincial Governments 
and Local-Level Governments, Port Moresby.
Government of Papua New Guinea, 1995, Economic and Development Policies,
1995 Budget Papers, Department of Finance, Port Moresby.
Government of Papua New Guinea, 1996, Economic and Development Policies,
1996 Budget Papers, Department of Finance, Port Moresby.
Government of Papua New Guinea, 1997, Economic and Development Policies,
1997 Budget Papers, Department o f Finance, Port Moresby.
Government of Papua New Guinea, 1999, Papua New Guinea Human Development 
Report 1998, Office of National Planning, Port Moresby.
Graham, C , Safety Nets, Politics and the Poor, Transitions to Market Economies, 
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Grimes, B.F., (ed), 2001, Ethnologue: languages o f  the world, 14 the edition, 
Summer Institute of Lingustics, Dallas.
Grindle, M., (ed), 1997, Getting Good Government: capacity building in the public 
sector o f  developing countries, Harvard University Press, Harvard.
Grindle, M., and Thomas, J., 1991, Public Choices and Policy Change: the political 
economy o f reform in developing countries, John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore.
Gupta, D., and Ivarature, H., 1996, “The Organic Law in Papua New Guinea”, 
Pacific Economic Bulletin, 11(2).
Gupta, D., and Ivarature, H., 1997, “Restructuring decentralisation: political and 
economic issues,” in Temu, I., (ed), Papua New Guinea: A 20/20 Vision, Australian 
Nation University, Canberra.
240
Hage, J., and Finsterbusch, K., 1987, Organisational Change as a Development 
Strategy: Models & Tactics for Improving Third World Organizations, Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder and London.
Hall, P., 1999, ‘Social Capital in Britain’, British Journal o f  Political Science 29: 
417-461.
Hanifan, L.J., 1916, “The Rural School Community Centre”, Annals o f  the 
American Academy o f  Political and Social Science 67: 130-38.
Hanson, L.W., Allen, B.J., Bourke, R.M., and McCarthy, T.J., 2001, Papua New 
Guinea Rural Development Handbook, The Australian National University, 
Canberra.
Harriss, J., and De Renzio, P., 1997, ‘’’Missing link” or analytically missing? The 
concept of social capital. An introductory bibliographic essay’, Journal o f  
International Development 9(7): 919-937.
Hegarty, D., (ed), 1983, Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea: Studies on the 
1977 National Elections, University of Papua New Guinea Press, Port Moresby.
Helliwell, J.F., 1996, “Economic Grow+h and Social Capital in Asia”, in R. Harris, 
Richard, (ed), The AsiaPacific Region in the Global Economy: A Canadian 
Perspective, University of Calgary Press, Calgary.
Helliwell, J.F., and Putnam, R.D., 1995, “Economic Growth and Social Capital in 
Italy,” Eastern Economic Journal 21(3), Summer.
Herlihy, J.M., 1982, “Decolonisation Politics in Solomon Islands: The model that 
never was”, in May, R.J., and Nelson, H., (eds), Melanesia: Beyond Diversity, 
Australian National University, Canberra.
Hide, R.L., Bourke, R.M., Allen, B.J., Fereday, N., Fritsch, D., Grau, R., Lowes, E., 
and Woruba, M., 1993, G ulf Province: Text Summaries, Maps, Code Lists and 
Village Identification, Agricultural Systems of Papua New Guinea Working Paper 
No. 5, Department of Human Geography, Australian National University, Canberra.
Higgott, R.A., 1983, Political Development Theory, International Series in Social 
and Political Thought.
Hooper, A., and James, K., 1994, Sustainability and Pacific Cultures, Pacific 
Islands Development Series No 1, East-West Center Working Papers, Honolulu.
Horowitz, D., 1985, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, 
Berkely.
Huffer, E., and Molisa, G., 1999, Governance in Vanuatu: In Search o f  the Nakamal 
Way, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 99/4, Australian 
National University, Canberra.
241
Hughes, A.V., 1998, Solomon Islands Policy and Structural Reform Program: An 
account o f  the first ten months. November 1997 to August 1998, ESCAP, Vila.
Hughes, A.V., 1998, A Different Kind o f Voyage: Development and Dependence in 
the Pacific Islands, ADB, Manila.
Husain, I., and Faruqee, R., 1994, Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Country Case 
Studies, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Institute o f Development Studies, 1995, Can Aid Promote Good Government?
Policy Briefing No 2, Sussex.
International Monetary Fund, 1992, Structural Adjustment and Macroeconomic 
Policy Issues, Washington, D.C.
Israel, A., 1987, Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Ivarature, H., 1993, “The Rise and Fall of the Toaripi Association”, Research in 
Melanesia 17:81-111.
Jacobs, C., 1996, Institutional Strengthening and Technical Cooperation: 
Developing a Best Practice Model, Human Resources in Development Group 
Working Paper No 5, University of Manchester, Manchester.
Jayarajah, C., and Branson, W., 1995, Structural and Sectoral Adjustment: World 
Bank Experience, 1980-92, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Jayarajah, C., Branson, W., and Sen, B., 1996, Social Dimensions o f Adjustment: 
World Bank Experience, 1980-93, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Jenkins, C., 1996, “Poverty, Nutrition and Health Care in Papua New Guinea: A 
Case Study in four Communities”, Background Paper for Poverty Assessment, 
Goroka.
Johnson, J.H., and Sulaiman, S., 1993, Borrower Ownership o f  Adjustment 
Programs and the Political Economy o f  Reform, The World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
Kavanamur, D., 1997, “The politics of structural adjustment in Papua New Guinea: 
some policy lessons,” in Larmour, P., (ed), 1997. Governance and Reform in the 
South Pacific, Australian National University, Canberrra.
Kavanamur, D., 2000, “Comments at a Workshop on Provincial Capacities in Papua 
New Guinea, 18-19 May, Canberra.
Killick, T., 1995, “Structural Adjustment and Poverty Alleviation: An Interpretive 
Survey", Development and Change, Vol. 26, No.2, pp. 305-331.
242
Knack, s., 1999, “Social Capital, Growth, and Poverty: A Survey of Cross-Country 
Evidence”, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper 7, The World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Knack, S., and Keefer, P.„ 1996, “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? a 
cross country investigation,” Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 112: 1137-1150.
Kottack, C.P., 1995, “Participatory Development: Rhetoric and Reality”, 
Development Anthropologist, 13(1 &2).
Krishna, A., 2000, “Creating and harnessing social capital,” in Dasgupta, P., and 
Serageldin, I., (eds). 2000, Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Krishna, A., and Shrader, E., 1999, Social Capital Assessment Tool, Prepared for the 
Conference on Social Capital and Poverty Reduction, The World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
La Porta, R., Florencio, L., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1999, “The Quality of 
Government,” Journal o f  Law, Economics and Organisation, 15(1 ):222-279.
Larmour, P., 1992, “The politics of race and ethmoity: theoretical perspectives on 
Papua New Guinea”, Pacific Studies, 15(2): 87-108.
Larmour, P., 1995, “State and Society”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 10(1), National 
Centre for Development Studies, ANU.
Larmour, P., 1996, “State versus Governance In Melanesia”, 
<http:/sunsite.anu.edu.au>.
Larmour, P., (ed), 1997, Governance and Reform in the South Pacific, Australian 
National University, Canberra.
Larmour, P., 2000, “Explaining Institutional Failure in Melanesia”, paper prepared 
for the NCDS/James Cook University, PNG Update, October.
Levi, M., 1996, “Social and Unsocial Capital: A review essay of Robert Putnam’s 
Making Democracy Work”, Politics and Society 24(l):45-56.
Linnekin, J., and Poyer, L., 1990, (eds), Cultural Identity and ethnicity in the 
Pacific, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
Li Puma, E., 1995, “The Formation of Nation-States and National Cultures in 
Oceana,” in Foster, R.J. (ed), Nation Making: Emergent Identities in Postcolonial 
Melanesia, University of Michigan Press, Michigan.
Lijphart, A., 1995, “Multiethnic Democracy” in Lipset, S.M., (ed), The 
Encyclopedia o f  Democracy, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, D.C.
243
Mailau, P.K.K., 1989, “The Elections in G ulf’, in King, P., (ed), Pangu Returns to 
Power: The 1982 Elections in Papua New Guinea, Research School of Pacific 
Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra.
Manning, M., 1997, “Developments in Papua New Guinea - 1997”, Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 12(2): 1-15.
Mannur, H. G., 1993, "The Economy: resource wealth and frustrated development", 
in Nowak, R., and Atkinson, J., (eds), Development in Papua New Guinea: 
Alternative Perspectives, Community Aid Abroad Background Report No 3.
Manueli, P., 1992, “Fiji: National economic policies”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 
7(2): 19-24.
Mawuli, A., 1997, Macroeconomic crisis and structural reforms in Papua New 
Guinea, Economics Division Working Papers, The Australian National University, 
Canberra.
May, R.J., 1997, “Postscript: The Organic Law on Provincial Governments and 
Local Level Governments,” in May, R.J., and Regan, A.J., (eds), Political 
Decentralisation in a New State: The Experience o f  Provincial Government in 
Papua New Guinea, Crawford House, Bathurst.
May, R.J., 2003, “Harmonising Linguistic Diversity in Papua New Guinea”, in 
Brown, M.E., and Ganguly, S., (eds), Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic 
Relations in Asia, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
May, R.J., 2003, “Disorderly Democracy: Political Turbulence and Institutional 
Reform in Papua New Guinea,” State, Society and Governance in Melanesia 
Discussion Paper 2003/3, The Australian National University, Canberra.
May, R.J., and Nelson, H., (eds), Melanesia: Beyond Diversity, Australian National 
University, Canberra.
May, R.J., and Regan, A.J., (eds), 1997, Political Decentralisation in a New State: 
The Experience o f  Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House, 
Bathurst.
May, R.J., and Spriggs, M., (eds), The Bougainville Crisis, Crawford House Press, 
Bathurst.
McGavin, P.A., 1986, The Labour Market in Papua New Guinea, Institute of 
National Affairs, Port Moresby.
Mentz, J.C.N., 1997, Personal and institutional factors in capacity building and 
institutional development, ECDPM Working Paper 14, ECDPM, Maastricht.
Miguel, E., Gertler, P., and Levine, D., 2001, “Did Industrialization Destroy Social 
Capital in Indonesia?”, mimeo, Department of Economics, University of California 
at Berkeley.
244
Millet, J., 1990, Private Sector Development in Papua New Guinea, Institute ol 
National Affairs, Port Moresby.
Millet, J., 1997, “ Institutional Strengthening in Papua New Guinea,” Pacific 
Economic Bulletin, 12(2).
Minister for Provincial and Local Government Affairs, 1998, Status o f the 
Provincial and Local-Level Government Reforms, Statement to Parliament, June,
Port Moresby.
Minogue, M., Polidano, C., and Hulme, D., (eds), 1998, Beyond the New Public 
Management: changing ideas and practices in governance, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenam.
Mohan, G., and Stokke, K., 2000, “Participatory development and empowerment: 
the dangers of localism,” Third World Quarterly, 21(2): 247-268.
Moore, M., 1995, Institution Building as a Development Assistance Method: A 
Review o f Literature and Ideas, Swedish International Development Authority, 
Stockholm.
Moser, G., Rogers, S., and Til, R.V., 1997, Nigeria: Experience wHh Structural 
Adjustment, International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper 148, Washington, D.C.
Mosley, P., 1987, Conditionality as bargaining process: structural adjustment 
lending 1980-86, Princeton Essays in International Finance, Princeton.
Mosley, P., 1991, “Structural Adjustment: A General Overview, 1980-89”, in V.N. 
Balasubramanyan and S. Lall, (eds), Current Issues in Development Economics, 
Macmillan, London.
Mosley, P., J. Harrigan and J. Toye, 1991, Aid and Power: The World Bank and 
Policy-based Lending, Volume 1: Analysis and Policy Proposals, Routledge, 
London.
Mosley, P., J. Harrigan and J. Toye, 1991, Aid and Power: The World Bank and 
Policy-based Lending, Volume 2: Case Studies, Routledge, London.
Mosley, P., and Weeks, J., 1993, “Has recovery begun? Africa’s adjustment in the 
1980s Revisited”, World Development, 21(10): 1583-99.
Morris, M., 1998, Social Capital and Poverty in India, IDS Working Paper No 61, 
Sussex.
Narayan, D., 1998, Global Social Capital Survey, Republic o f  Uganda, PREM, The 
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Narayan, D., 1999, Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty, Policy Research 
Working Paper No 2167, The World Bank.
245
Narayan, D., and Pritchett, L., Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social 
Capital in Rural Tanzania. Policy Research Working Paper 1796, The World Bank.
Narayanasuwami, C., 1991, “ Institution Building for Development: Lessons Learnt 
and Tasks Ahead,” Asian Development Review 9(2).
National Monitoring Authority (PNG), 1998, Handbook on the Roles and 
Responsibilities o f Different Levels o f Government under the Reforms, vol 1, Port 
Moresby.
Nekitel, O., 1998, Voices o f  Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Language, Culture 
and Identity, UBS Publishers, New Delhi.
North, D., 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
North, D., 1994, “Economic performance through time”, American Economic 
Review, 84: 359-68.
Norton, A., 1997, “Social capital and civil society: Some definitional issues”, in 
Norton, A., Latham, M., Sturgess, G., and Stewart-Weeks, M., Social Capital: The 
Individual, Civil Society and the State, Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney.
OECD, 1997, Evaluation o f Programs Promoting Participatory Development and 
Good Governance: Synthesis Report, DAC Expert Group on Aid Evaluation, 
OECD, Paris.
OECD, 2001, The Well-being o f  Nations: The Role o f  Human and Social Capital, 
OECD, Paris.
Okole, H., 2002, “Crisis in governance and institutional decay in parliamentary 
democracies: The case of Papua New Guinea,” Paper presented to the South Pacific 
Futures Symposium, July, Brisbane.
Oliver, M., 1989, “Kerema Open Constituency”, in Oliver, M., (ed), Eleksin: The 
1987 National Election in Papua New Guinea, University of PNG, Port Moresby.
Oliver, M., 1997, “Gulf Province, 1977-1988,” in May, R.J., and Regan, A.J., (eds), 
Political Decentralisation in a New State: The Experience o f  Provincial 
Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House, Bathurst.
Overseas Development Administration, 1995, Public Sector Institutional 
Strengthening, ODA, London.
Parkop, P., 1993, “Who should determine the development path?” in Nowak, R & 
Atkinson, J., (eds), Development in Papua New Guinea: Alternative Perspectives, 
Community Aid Abroad Background Report No 3.
Parsons, W., 1995, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice o f  
Policy Analysis, Edward Elgar, Aldershot.
246
Pearson, C., 2001, “How Best to back Morata”, The Australian Financial Review,
26 March.
PIANGO, 2000, Issues affecting the development o f key relationships underpinning 
a healthy civil society and good governance in general within Pacific societies, 
Stakeholders Workshop, Vanuatu.
Pinto, R.F., and Mrope, A.J., 1997, Projectizing the Governance Approach to Civil 
Service Reform: An Institutional Environment Assessment for Preparing a Sectoral 
Adjustment Loan in the Gambia, World Bank Discussion Paper No 252, Washington 
DC.
PNG Auditor-General’s Office, 1990, “Report o f the Auditor-General on Gulf 
Provincial Govemmenf’, Government Printer, Port Moresby.
PNG Auditor-General’s Office, 1991, “Report of the Auditor-General on East New 
Britain Provincial Government”, Government Printer, Port Moresby.
PNG Department of National Planning and Monitoring, 2002, District Planning 
Handbook: Guidelines for Preparation o f Five-Year District Development Plans, 
Port Moresby.
PNG Deoartment of Trade and Industry, 1993, Beyond the minerals boom. A 
strategic plan for developing the industrial, construction and national business 
sectors in Papua Hew Guinea by the year 2000, Port Moresby.
PNG National Economic and Fiscal Commission, 2001, “An Assessment of the 
Distribution and Extent of Government Services at the District Level,” Port 
Moresby.
PNG Electoral Commission, 1997, Report to the Sixth Parliament on the 1997 
National Election, July, Port Moresby.
PNG National Statistical Office, 2001, 2000 National Census o f  Population and 
Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Preliminary Figures, NSO, Port Moresby.
PNG National Statistical Office, 2002, 2000 National Census o f  Population and 
Housing -  Papua New Guinea -  Data Sheet, NSO, Port Moresby.
Portes, A., 1998, ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modem 
Sociology,’ Annual Review o f  Sociology 24.
Posner, D.N., 2000, “Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa: How should it be 
measured? What Does it Explain about Economic Growth? Paper presented to the 
World Bank Development Research Group Seminar, 29 March.
Prasad, B.C., and Asafii-Adjaye, J., 1998, “Macroeconomic policy and poverty in 
Fiji”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 13(1): 47-55.
Premdas, R.R., and Pokwin, S., (eds), 1980, Papua New Guinea: The Experiment in 
decentralisation, University of PNG Press, Waigani.
247
Premdas, R.R, “Ethnicity and Nation Building: The Papua New Guinea Case.” In 
Linnekin, J., and Poyer, L., (eds). Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific, 
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
Przworski, A., and Teune, H., 1970, The Logic o f  Comparative Inquiry, Wiley, New 
York.
Punch, K.F., 1998, Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches, Sage Publications, London.
Putnam, R.D., 1993, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Putnam, R.D., 1993, “The prosperous community: social capital and public life”,
The American Prospect, 13 (Spring).
Putnam, R.D., 2000, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival o f  American 
Community, Simon and Schuster, New York.
Putterman, L., 1995, “Social capital and development capacity: the example of rural 
Tanzania”, Development Policy Review, 13:5-22.
Putzei, J., 1997, “Accounting for the ‘dark side’ of social capital: Reading Robert 
Putnam on democracy’, Journal o f  International Development 9(7): 939-949.
Rabushka, A., and Shepsle, K., 1972, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory o f  
Democratic Instability, Merrill, Columbus.
Ram, K., 1993, Globalisation and Structural Adjustment: Social and Economic 
Impact of Structural Adjustment in Fiji, Paper presented to South Pacific Peoples 
Foundation Conference on Globalisation and Structural Adjustment, Victoria, 
Canada, May 1993.
Randall, V., and Theobald, R., 1998, Political Change and Underdevelopment: A 
Critical Introduction to Third World Politics, Duke University Press, Durham.
Rannells, J., 1995, PNG: A fact book on modern Papua New Guinea, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne.
Reddy, M., and Prasad, B.C., 1998, Manufacturing and Trade Performance in Fiji, a 
paper presented to the Fiji Update Conference, Suva.
Regan, A.J., 1997, “The Politics of Provincial Government,” in May, R.J., and 
Regan, A.J., (eds), Political Decentralisation in a New State: The Experience o f  
Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House, Bathurst.
Regan, A.J., 1997, “East New Britain Province 1976-1992,” in May, R.J., and 
Regan, A.J., (eds), Political Decentralisation in a New State: The Experience o f  
Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House, Bathurst.
248
Regan, A.J., 1997, “The Papua New Guinea policy-making environment as a 
window on the Sandline controversy,” in Dinnen, S., May, R.J., and Regan, A,J., 
(eds), Challenging the State: the Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, Australian 
National University, Canberra.
Regan, A.J., 2002, “Constitutions as limits on the State in Melanesia: Comparative 
Perspectives on Constitutionalism, Participation and Civil Society,”
Reilly, B., 2001, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for  
Conflict Management, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Reilly, B., 2000, “Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict:
Confused Theories, Faulty Data and the ‘Crucial Case’ of Papua New Guinea”, 
International Security, 25(3).
Republic of Vanuatu, 1997, Comprehensive Reform Programme, Office of the 
Prime Minister, Port Vila.
Reserve Bank of Fiji, (various issues), Quarterly Review, Suva.
Roberts, G.K. 1971, A dictionary o f  political analysis, Longman, UK.
Rodriguez, M..P., 1997, Social Capital in Developing Societies: reconsidering the 
links between civil agency, economy and the state in the development process, 
Institute of Social Studies Working Paper 248, The Hague.
Rodrik, D., 1996, “Understanding economic policy reform”, Journal o f  Economic 
Literature, 34(1): 9-14.
Rondinelli, D.A., 1981, “Government decentralization in comparative perspective: 
theory and practice in developing countries”, International Review o f  Administrative 
Science 47(2): 133-45.
Rondinelli, D.A., 1993, Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An adaptive 
approach to development administration, Routledge, London and New York.
Rose, R., 1996, “Social Capital: definition, measure, implications,” Remarks at a 
World Bank Workshop on Social Capital, 16-17 April.
Roughan, J., 1998, Pacific Islands Non Government Organisations: Civil Society’s 
Political Activist, Macmillan Brown, University o f Canterbury, Christchurch.
Rowley, C.D., 1965, The New Guinea Villager: A Retrospect from 1964, Cheshire, 
Melbourne.
Ryan, D., 1963, “The Toaripi Association: Some Problems of Economic 
Development in Papua”, Mankind 6(1 ):11-15.
Rynkiewich, M., and Serb, R., (eds), 2000, Politics in Papua New Guinea: 
Continuities, Changes and Challenges, Melanesian Institute, Goroka.
249
Saffu, Y., 1989, "‘Survey Evidence on Electoral Behaviour in Papua New Guinea” in 
Oliver, M. (ed), Eleksin: The 1987 National Election in Papua New Guinea, 
University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby.
Saffu, Y., (ed), 1996, “Continuity and Change in PNG Electoral Politics”, in Saffu, 
Y. (ed), The 1992 Papua New Guinea Election: Change and Continuity in Electoral 
Politics, Political and Social Change Monograph 23, Australian National University, 
Canberra.
Salisbury, R.F., 1971, Vunamami, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne.
Schick, A., 1998, “Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's 
Reforms”, The World Bank Research Observer 13(1), pp. 123-31.
Schoeffel, P., 1983, Women ’s associations in the rural economy o f the South 
pacific: case studies from Western Samoa and East New Britain Province, Papua 
New Guinea, South pacific Commission Occasional Paper No 19, Noumea.
Schoeffel, P., 1996, Sociocultural Issues and Economic Development in the Pacific 
Islands, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Schoeffel, P., 1997, “Building assistance for development on firmer foundations”, 
Development Bulletin 43, October.
Schoeffel, P., 1997, Myths o f  Community Management: Sustainability, the State and 
rural development in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. State, 
Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper No 97/8, Australian 
National University, Canberra.
Schuller, T., 2000, “Social and Human Capital: the Search for Appropriate 
Technomethodology,” Policy Studies, 21(1): 25-36.
Scruton, R., 1982, A Dictionary o f Political Thought, Macmillan Press, UK.
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 1998, South Pacific Economies Statistical 
Summary No 14, Noumea.
Seddon, N., 1995, “Reciprocity, Exchange and Contract”, Melanesian Law Journal, 
UPNG.
Serageldin, L, and Grootaert, C., 2000, “Defining social capital: an integrating 
view,” in Dasgupta, P and Serageldin, I (eds). 2000, Social Capital: A Multifaceted 
Perspective, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Serra, R., 1998, Putnam in India: Is social capital a meaningful and measurable 
concept at Indian State level? IDS Working Paper 92, University o f Sussex.
Sillitoe, P., 1979, Give and Take: Exchange in Wola Society, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra.
250
Sillitoe, P„ 1998, An Introduction to the Anthropology o f Melanesia, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
Sillitoe, P., 2000, Social Change in Melanesia: Development and History,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Simpson, G.J., and McKillop, R.F., 1994, Public administration, planning and 
budgeting in Papua New Guinea, AIDAB, Canberra.
Singer, H.W., 1994, “Structural Adjustment Programmes: Evaluating Success” in 
J.W., Gunning, H., Kox, W., Tims and Y. de Wit, (eds), Trade, Aid and 
Development, Macmillan, London.
Siwatibau, S., 1994, “Policy discipline from outside?”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 
9(2): 46-50.
Slemrod, J., and Katuscak, P., 2002, Do Trust and Trustworthiness Pay Off?
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9200, Cambridge, MA.
Smith, A.D., 1981, The Ethnic Revival, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Smith, A.D., 1986, The Ethnic Origins o f  Nations, Basil Blackwell, NY.
Snowden, C., 1981, “Copra Co-operatives”, in Denoon, D, and Snowden, C., (eds),
A Time to Plant and a Time to Uproot: A History o f  Agriculture in Papua New 
Guinea, University of PNG and Institute of PNG Studies, Port Moresby.
South Pacific Forum Secretariat, 1998, Forum Economic Ministers Meeting, Press 
Statement, Suva, 2 July 1998.
Spriggs, M., 1997, The Island Melanesians, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
Standish, W.A., 1979, Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea: Early Lessons 
from Chimbu, Institute for Advanced Social and Economic Research, Port Moresby.
Standish, W.A., 1992, Simbu Paths to Power: Political Change and Cultural 
Continuity in the Papua New Guinea Highlands, unpublished PhD thesis, ANU, 
Canberra.
Standish, W.A., 1994, “Papua New Guinea: The search for security in a weak state’, 
in Thompson, A. (ed), Papua New Guinea: Issues for Australian Security Planners, 
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.
Standish, W.A., 1996, “Elections in Simbu: Toward Gunboat Democracy?” in Saffu, 
Y. (ed), 1996, The 1992 Papua New Guinea Election: Changeand Continuity in 
Electoral Politics, Political and Social Change Monograph 23, Australian National 
University, Canberra.
Standish, W.A., 1999, Papua New Guinea 1999: Crisis o f  Governance, Department 
of the Parliamentary Library, Research Paper No 4, Canberra.
251
Standish, W.A., 2002, “Electoral Governance in Papua New Guinea: Chimbu Poll 
Diary”, unpublished paper, SSGM, The Australian National University, Canberra.
Stewart, F., 1991, “The Many Faces of Adjustment”, World Development, 
(19)12:1847-1864.
Stewart, F., 1995, Adjustment and poverty: Options and choices, Routledge,
London.
Stewart, R.G., 1997, “Eastern Highlands Province; 1977 -  1990”, in May, R..J., and 
Regan, A.J., (eds), Political Decentralisation in a New State: The Experience o f  
Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House, Bathurst.
Stiglitz, J., 1996, “Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle”, The World Bank 
Research Observer 11 (2): 151-177.
Strathem, Andrew, J., 1974, Anthropology and Problems o f  Social Change in Papua 
New Guinea, University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby.
Strathem, Andrew, J., 1993, Voices o f  Conflict, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh.
Sutherland,W., 2000, “Global Imperatives and Economic Reform in the Pacific 
Island States,” Development and Change 31.
Temu, I., (ed), 1997, Papua New Guinea: A 20/20 Vision, Australian National 
University, Canberra.
Tendier, J., 1997, Good Government in the Tropics, John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore.
Thompson, J., 1995, “Participatory Approaches in Government Bureaucracies: 
Facilitating the Process of Institutional Change,” World Development 23(9).* 1521 - 
1554.
Turner, M., and Hulme, D., 1997, Governance, Administration and Development: 
Making the State Work, Kumarian Press, USA.
Turner, M., 1990, Papua New Guinea: The Challenge o f  Independence, Penguin 
Books, Sydney.
Turner, M., 1997, Institutional Strengthening Issues in Papua New Guinea,
AusAID, Canberra.
Unisearch Ltd, 1997, Economic Survey o f  Papua New Guinea, AusAID, Canberra.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1997, Trade and 
Development Report, 1997: Globalization, Distribution and Growth, Document 
Number E.97.II.D.8.
United Nations Development Programme, 1994, Pacific Human Development 
Report: Putting People Eirst. Suva, Fiji.
252
United Nations Development Programme, 1995, Human Development Report 1995. 
Oxford University Press, New York.
United Nations Development Programme, 1997, Governance for sustainable human 
development, New York.
United Nations Development Programme, 1997, UNDP and Governance: 
Experiences and Lessons Learned, Lessons-Learned Series No 1, Management 
Development and Governance Division, New York.
Varshney, A., 2001, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, 
Yale University Press, New Haven.
Waiko, J. D., 1993, A Short History o f  Papua New Guinea, Oxford University Press. 
Melbourne.
Wallis, J., and Dollery B., 2001, “Government Failure, Social Capital and the 
Appropriateness of the New Zealand Model for Public Sector Reform in Developing 
Countries”, World Development 29(2):245-263.
Warry, W., 1987, Chuave Politics: Changing Patterns o f  Leadership in the Papua 
New Guinea Highlands, Political and Social Change Monograph 4, The Australian 
National University, Canberra.
Westermark, G.D., 1983, “Local Alliances and Politics: Kainantu Open”, in 
Hegarty, D., (ed), Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea: Studies on the 1977 
National Elections, UPNG Press, Port Moresby.
Williamson, O.E., 1994, “The Institutions and Governance o f Economic 
Development and Reform”, Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on 
Development Economics, 171-197.
Wilson, R.K., 1974, Socio-economic indicators applied to sub-districts o f  Papua 
New Guinea, Economic Geography Department Discussion Paper No 1, University 
of Melbourne, Melbourne.
Woolcock, M., 1998, ‘Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a 
Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework’, Theory and Society 27(1)
Woolcock, M., 1999, Managing Risk, Shocks, and Opportunity in Developing 
Economies: The Role o f  Social Capital, Development Research Group, The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Woolcock, M., and Narayan, D., 2000, “Social Capital: Implications for 
Development Theory, Research and Policy,” The World Bank Research Observer, 
15(2): 225-49.
World Bank, 1975, The Assault on World Poverty, John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore.
253
World Bank. 1991, World Development Report 1991: The Challenge o f  
Development, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1991, Papua New Guinea: Structural Adjustment, Growth and Human 
Resources Development, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1993, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, 
Oxford University Press, Washington D.C.
World Bank, 1993, Pacific Island Economies: Toward Efficient and Sustainable 
Growth, Volume 2, Fiji, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1993, Pacific Island Economies: Toward Efficient and Sustainable 
Growth, Volume 5, Solomon Islands, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1993, Governance: The World Bank's Experience. Oxford University 
Press, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1994, Adjustment in Africa: reforms, results and the road ahead, A 
World Bank policy research report, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1995, Pacific Island Economies: Building a Resilient Economic Base 
fo r  the Twenty-First Century, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1997, The State in a Changing World: World Development Report, 
Oxford University Press, New York.
World Bank, 1998, Enhancing the Role o f  Government in the Pacific Island 
Economies, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, East Asia and 
Pacific Region, Washington DC.
World Bank, 1999, Civil Service Reform: A Review o f  World Bank Assistance, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 1999, Papua New Guinea: Improving Governance and Performance, 
Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 2001, Papua New Guinea: Strategies fo r  Agriculture and Rural 
Development -  Issues and Challenges, Washington, D.C.
Zahariadis, N., 1998, Theory, Case and Method in Comparative Politics, Harcourt 
Brace College Publishers, New York.
Zak, P., and Knack, S., 2001, ‘Trust and Growth,’ Economic Journal III (April).
254
Newspapers, Magazines and Media.
Australian Financial Review 
The Canberra Times 
PNG National 
PNG Post Courier 
PNG Independent
255
APPENDIX A
Language Groups by Province
Province
Western
Yonggom
Kiwai
Gogodola
Kaeti
Awin
Faiwol
Bamu
Beami
Ninggerum
Samo-Kubo
Bine
Nambu
Pare
Suki
Boazi
Gidra
Zimakani
Gobasi
Agob
Waia
Yei
Tirio
Idi
Gizra
Miriam-Mir
Tonda
Aramba
Kauwol
Tao-Suamato
Bainapi
Konai
Mutum
Kamula
Rouku
Kanum
Agala
Tomu
Bogaya
Peremka
Total Popn
153304
17.000
15.800
10.000
10,000
8,000
4.500
4.400 
4,200
4.000 
2,900
2.000
2,000
2,000
2,000
1,962
1.800
1.500
1.400
1,100
1,000
1,000 
950 
900 
700 
700 
600 
602 
500 
500 
400 
400 
400 
400 
350 
320 
300 
300 
300 
299
No of Language Gps 
39
Gulf 16 106,898
Hamtai
Toaripi
256
40.000
23.000
O ro k o lo 13 .000
P u rari 7 ,000
P o d o p a 3 ,0 0 0
K e re w o 2 ,2 0 0
A n k a v e 1,600
K ib iri 1 ,100
K airi 1 ,000
A n g o y a 900
Ivo ri 800
O m a ti 800
M o rig i 700
Ik o b i-M e n a 650
M in a n ib a i 300
T a te 26 6
Ip ik o 200
C en tra l 25 183,983
K e o p a ra 16,423
M o tu 15,000
F u y u g e 15,000
S in a g o ro 12 ,026
M e k eo 12,000
K u n im a ip a 11 ,000
T a u a d e 11,000
N a ra 7 ,627
H u la 3 ,2 5 0
K o ita 3 ,0 0 0
K u n i 2 ,4 0 0
M a ria 2 ,105
K w a le 2 ,0 0 0
K o ia ri G ra ss 1 ,800
K o ia li M tn 1,700
K a b a d i 1,500
D o ro m u 841
D o u ra 800
B in a h a ri 770
M o ra w a 755
A n e m e w a k e 650
D o m u 482
H u m e n e 438
B a u w ak i 378
M a g o ri 200
M ilne B ay 50 210,412
D o b u 108 ,000
K iliv ila 2 2 ,0 0 0
S u au 20 ,7 9 5
M ism a -P a n e a ti 12 ,000
T a w a la 10,000
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Dobu 8,000
Suau 6,795
Duau 6,050
Daga 6,000
Induna 6,000
Bw aidoka 5,382
Yele 3,300
M orim a 3,186
M uyuw 3,000
W edau 3,000
Iamalele 2,800
Taupota 2,700
M aiwa 2,500
Um anakaina 2,400
G apapaiw a 2,000
Kanasi 2,000
Tagula 2,000
Tubetube 2,000
Galeya 1,876
Boanaki 1,700
Dawawa 1,700
Sew a Bay 1,516
Bunam a 1,500
M inavega 1,400
Are 1,231
Kukuya 1,230
Diodio 1,200
W agawaga 1,165
N im ow a 1,100
Bohutu 1,065
A uhelaw a 935
Igora 880
Ginum an 775
Kalokalo 722
Anuki 542
Jim aJim a 542
Bosilewa 350
Sinaki 326
M apena 274
Gamasi 250
Garuwahi 225
D oga 200
W atalum a 190
Budibud 170
M watebu 166
Oro 23 133,065
Orokaiva 27,000
Ewage-Notu 12,000
M anagalasi 5.000
258
H u n ja ra 4 ,3 0 0
K o ra te 4 ,2 0 0
B in a n d e re 3 ,300
B ara i 3 ,0 0 0
A e k a 2 ,0 0 0
A rif im a -M in ia f ia 2 ,1 4 7
M a is in 1,800
A m b a s i 1,200
G a in a 1,130
O m ie 1,100
B a ru g a 1,051
U b ir 1,000
M a w a e 943
Y e g a 900
Y a re b a 750
M o ik o d i 571
B ariji 256
N  a  w a rn 190
O n ja b 160
D o g o ro 119
Southern H ighlands 15 546,265
H u li 7 0 ,0 0 0
A n g a l H en en g 5 5 ,0 0 0
K e w a 4 0 ,0 0 0
W iru 15,292
D u n a 11,000
E to ro 6 ,0 0 0
S a m erig i 3 ,125
F o i 2 ,8 0 0
B o sa v i 2 ,0 0 0
K a su a 1,200
A im e le 500
O n a b a su lu 433
S o n ia 40 9
K w a re 40 0
F iw a g a 300
Enga 08 295,031
E n g a 2 3 8 ,0 0 0
K y a k a 15,368
Ip ili 7 ,7 6 4
L e m b e n a 4 ,0 0 0
P in a i 1,500
N e te 1,000
W api 1,000
H ag ah a i 300
259
Western Highlands 12 440,025
M elpa 130,000
Kangel 60,000
Wahgi 60,000
Um bo Ungu 23,000
M iyem u 23,000
Gimi 22,463
Nembi 20,000
Imbo Ungu 16,000
Nii 13,000
M aring 8,000
Narak 5,000
Kandawo 4,000
Simbu 13 259,703
Kuman 71,731
Golin 51,105
Sinasina 50,079
Chuave 23,107
Dadibi 10,000
Dom 9,832
Hakoa 6,868
Salt 6,500
N om ane 4,645
Sua 4,290
Paw aia 4,000
Kumai 3,938
N agane 1,000
Eastern Highlands 24 432,972
Kam ana-Y  agaria 50,000
Asaro 30,000
Siane 25,000
Benabena 20,315
Fove 16,655
Alekano 16,103
Agarabi 16,000
Tairora 13,291
Usarufa 13,000
Gadsup 13,000
Inoke-Yate 8,000
Kanite 8,000
Awiyana 6,500
Baruya 6,000
Zuhuzuho 6,000
Simbari 3,000
Kosena 2,000
260
Y aw eyuha 2.000
A wa 1.789
Fasu 1.200
Kenati 640
O uw enia 349
Binum arien 300
K am baira 135
M o ro b e  94 539,404
Kate 86,000
A dzera 20,675
M enya 15,000
K om ba 12,235
N abak 12,000
Tim be 11,000
Bukaw a 9,694
Y agw oia 9,000
W antoat 7,316
Burum -M indik 7,000
Selepet 7,000
Y upna 7,000
Buang 6,666
M um eng 6,600
G uhu-Sam ene 6,289
Kate 6,125
M ongi 6,000
O no 5,400
W am par 5,150
M ape 5,117
D edua 5,000
Kovai/Um boi 4,500
W eri 4,163
Sio 3,500
Z ia 3,400
H ote 3,000
Uri 2,500
A m peeli-W ojokeso 2,388
N um anggang 2,274
Suena 2,272
Tobo 2,230
M angap 2,200
Y anta 2,154
Y abim 2,084
M indik 2,078
M esem 1,800
Patep 1,700
Yau 1,700
M utu 1,642
Labu 1,600
Nek 1,500
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Nimi 1,381
Watut 1,223
Silisili 1,199
Kosorong 1,175
Migabac 1,050
Kela 2,145
Inal 1,500
Biangai 1,400
Irumu 1,300
Breri 1,100
Waffa 1,060
Nuk 1,009
Angaatiha 1,000
Sukurum 990
Nakama 983
Barim 915
Tami 904
Zenang 873
Nomu 807
Gusan 794
Yekora 674
Yamap 670
Sialum 642
Sauk 605
Yalu 593
Lukep 591
Wasembo 586
Kumukio 552
Ufim 550
Komutu 510
Sakam 510
Yagawak 492
Gitua 483
Finungwa 469
Unank 465
Guwot 398
Bam 393
Momare 374
Ngariawan 367
Dangal 365
Warn pur 360
Nenaya 315
Siboma 270
Misim 251
Latep 220
Kinalakna 219
Weliki 200
Mamaa 198
Maralango 171
Sirak 145
Dengula 140
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Musom
Munkip
Piu
139
137
130
M a d a n g  151 365,106
Kalam 15,000
Takia 12,000
Waskia 12,000
Gende 8,000
Mikarew 8,000
Rawa 7,138
Botin 7,000
Manam 6,500
Nahu 5,400
Amele 5,300
Kobon 4,671
Girawa 4,003
Bargam 4,000
Rao 3,340
Katiati 3,286
Banaro 3,000
Tanggu 3,000
Gedaged/Bel 2,764
Sumau 2,509
Maia 2,500
Nankina 2,500
Maiani 2,496
Abu 2,400
Nobando 2,277
Arop 2,200
Garus 2,107
Borei 2,000
Kire 2,000
Mauwake 2,000
Nent 2,000
Gants 1,884
Bau 1,787
Dimir 1,700
Nokopo 1,669
Usino 1,630
Miani 1,500
Wagi 1,500
Dami 1,495
Urigina 1,404
Usan 1,400
Anjam 1,300
Ngaing 1,101
Hinihon 1,100
Andarum 1.084
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Ik u n d u n 1,047
K a m b a 1,020
H aru a i 1 ,000
T ai 1,000
D a h a tin g 9 4 6
K o g u m a n 943
Iseb e 913
K w a to 90 0
M e g ia r 859
K e w ie n g 820
M id s iv in d i 809
M ari 806
B ilia u 800
M a la 769
A b a sa k u r 761
A io m e 751
B o sn g u n 717
Y a b e n 702
B ernal 700
B ilb il 700
S irio 700
M u sa r 68 4
M o ra fa 672
A sa t 659
D o m u n g 63 4
P o n d o m a 597
R e m p i 592
S a e p 584
U tu 583
O su m 577
A n o r 574
A  w a r 572
A p a l 548
W a d a g in in 546
K e sa w a i 538
W a n d a b o n g 517
T a n g u a t 506
O g e a 5 0 0
B u n a b u n 498
S au si 495
W a n am b re 4 8 9
S in sa u ru 4 7 6
D u d u e la 4 6 9
B a im a k 441
N e k g in i 4 3 0
M e d e b u r 4 2 9
P a raw e n 4 2 9
S ep en 428
B o n g u 415
J ilim 4 0 9
M ale 393
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R o m k u n 389
K are 384
B iy o m 379
W a ta m 37 6
Y a b o n g 37 0
A m a im o n 3 6 6
D e g e n a n 358
M u sa k 355
T a u y a 347
M u n it 345
M a la lam a i 341
A sa s 333
R a p tin g 332
S o n g u m 3 2 6
K a ia n 322
M e b u 31 9
N e k o 315
S ih a n 314
M u ru p i 301
G a b u ta m o n 302
K o lik u 3 0 0
Isab i 2 8 0
G ira 275
G u m a lu 271
M aw an 2 6 9
S ep a 268
Y o id ik 26 6
D u m p u 261
S ile ib i 2 5 9
B o n k im a n 2 5 0
M ate p i 2 3 8
R e ra u 235
R o in ji 2 2 7
G al 2 2 4
M a la s 2 2 0
M a t u k  a r 2 1 9
K o lo m 20 9
K o ra k 205
M o re sa d a 197
A k ru k a y 191
Y a n g u la m 180
L e m io 175
N a k e 173
F o ra k 163
G a n g la u 154
P a n im 152
P a y n a m a r 150
W ab 142
S ilo p i 140
Y ag o m i 137
W arn as 135
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U k u rig u m a 134
G u ia ra k 131
S a ru g a 129
P u la b u 116
D a n a ru 115
E a s t  S e p ik  86 343 ,181
A m b u la s 4 4 ,0 0 0
B o ik e n  Y a n g o u ru 4 0 ,0 0 0
K w a n g a 13,305
la tm u l 12,000
A ra p e sh  S o u th e rn 11,000
A ra p e sh  B uki 10,304
S a w o s 9 ,000
A n g o ra m /P o n d o 6 ,2 0 0
K w a se n g e n 6 ,008
U ra t 6 ,0 0 0
W o rn /W arn 4 ,885
K a iiu ru 3 ,507
U rim 3 ,200
Iw am 3,000
K w o m a 2,865
K o m b io 2 ,545
B u n g a in 2,451
A ra p e sh  B u m b ita 2 ,353
M a n a m b u 2 ,058
B em b i 1,854
C h a m b ri 1 ,700
B iw a t 1,642
A la m b la k 1,500
M u rik 1,476
B ie m 1,455
K a p rim a n 1,450
T a b r ia k 1,300
B im a 1,259
W o g e o 1,237
B u n a 1,205
Y e ssa n -M a y o 1,200
Ig o m 1,082
M e k m e k 1,038
K y e n e le 1 ,000
T o ric e lli 953
Y a m b e s 860
A io n 857
U rim o 835
M u n iw a ra 826
Y aul 814
K a m a sa u 787
A ra fu n d i 733
G a ik u n d i 700
266
S a n iy o -H iy o w e 644
M i yak 548
Y a m b iy a m b i 500
C h a n g r iw a 498
M o n u m b o 45 9
K o iw a t 4 5 0
L ilau 44 9
N im o 413
A m a 4 0 0
B a h in e m o 4 0 0
N ik se k 398
B is is 395
E itie p 394
Y erak a i 390
A m a l 388
K a m n u m 377
W o g a m u s in 368
Y im as 350
M o n g o l 338
K o m in im u n g 328
K a n in g ra 327
M a ra m b a 300
S e n g o 300
B ita ra 256
L a n g a m 254
B iso rio 230
Y e lo g u 230
K o p a r 229
O u w in ig a 2 2 2
I tu ta n g 220
K is 216
B u n 194
C h e n a p ia n 187
M an d i 162
W a ta k a ta u i 160
B u ru i 150
K a ie p 150
L a to m a 150
E lep i 149
N g a la 136
M ari 120
Ig a n a 114
T u ru b u 50
S an d au n  89 185,741
O lo 12,000
N g a lu m 8 ,000
O k sa p m in 7 ,0 0 0
A b a u  A ra p e sh 5 ,0 0 0
A u 5 ,000
267
S issa n o -A ro p 4 .8 6 6
T e le fo l 4 .8 0 0
A b a u 4 ,545
M e h ek 4 ,0 2 7
A m a n a b 4 ,0 0 0
E d aw ap i 3 ,8 0 0
N a rn ia 3 ,500
M a lo l 3 ,330
T ifa l 3 ,200
W a m sa k /M e n d e 3 ,180
W a ra p u 2,991
A n g g o r 2,565
A u n a le i 2 ,2 0 6
K ilm e ri 2 ,2 0 0
M ia n m in 2 ,2 0 0
W a ris 2 ,160
H e w a 2 ,1 4 7
Y ili 2 ,134
Y a k a m u l/A li 2 ,118
B im in 2 ,000
D ia 1,880
A rin u a 1,872
F as 1,597
M a k arim 1,500
B eli 1,453
E lk e i 1,427
V a n im o 1,395
S u a in 1,369
K a rk a r-Y u ri 1 ,200
Y a h a n g 1,182
P ag i 1,100
S o w a n d a 1,100
G n a u 980
K w o m ta ri 900
K a lo u 820
A ik u 819
W a n ap 769
S u g a n g a 700
V a lm a n 700
K a m b e ra ta ro 687
T u m e le o 675
A g i 670
A rü e k 614
Y ad e 600
P ah i 578
W iak i 561
Y au an 550
L a e k o -L ib u a t 538
N in g il 525
B o u y e 520
R aw o 506
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Y is 4 8 9
M ita n g 484
B ia k a 45 4
S e ra 43 2
W u tu n g 4 1 0
U ra p m in 394
A w u n 384
P u ari 371
K risa 347
B ra g a t 335
A ro p 330
B u sa 307
R o c k y  P eak 275
B a ib a i 271
S im o g 270
S ilip u t 263
N in g e ra 25 0
A m to 23 0
Pei 208
Si n a g e n 208
S e ta m a n 20 0
U m e d a 20 0
B o /P o 175
P asi 161
S e ta 155
S u a rm in 145
W a lio 142
Y au 140
D a o n d a 135
A la til 125
T u w ari 122
S eti 113
A in b a i 110
M an u s 29 4 3 ^ 8 7
L in d ro u 3 ,0 0 0
T ita n 2 ,4 0 0
K u rti 2 ,3 0 0
N a li 1 ,800
B o h u a i 1 ,400
L e le 1,300
L e v e i-N d re h e t 1,160
B a lu a n -P a m 1,000
W u v u lu -A u a 1,000
P a k -T o n g 9 7 0
A n d ra -H u s 810
L e ip o n 6 5 0
S e im a t 600
L ou 600
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Kele 600
Sori-Harengan 570
Penchal 550
Bipi 530
Papitalai 520
Loniu 460
Ponam 420
Koro 400
M ondropolon 300
N ane 300
Lenkau 250
Elu 216
Okro 200
M okerang 200
N auna 130
N e w  Ir e la n d  18 1 1 8 ,3 5 0
Tungak 10,000
Lihir 6,000
Tigak 6,000
Patpatar 6,000
Tangga 4,976
Kara 4,800
M ussau 3,651
M andak 3,000
Sursurunga 3,000
N alik 2,618
M andara 2,500
Siar 2,500
Barok 1,878
Notsi 1,600
Lavatbura-Lam usong 1,308
Kuot 1,000
Konom ala 800
Tiang 791
Kandas 480
E a st  N e w  B r ita in  11 2 2 0 ,1 3 3
K uanua 80,000
Ram oaaina 8,600
M engen 8,400
Baining 6,000
M amusi 6,000
Uvol 4,200
Kol 4,000
Sulka 1,900
Gaktai 1,000
Taulil-Butam 826
Tom oip 700
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West New Britain 28 184,508
N a k a n a i 13,000
B a li-V itu 8 ,718
B o la 7 ,533
A v a u 6 ,0 0 0
K a lia i 5 ,625
M a le u -K ile n g e 5 ,0 0 0
G im i 3 ,6 9 7
K a u lo n g 3 ,0 0 0
K o v e 3 ,0 0 0
A ro v e 2 ,2 0 0
P u lie -R a u to 2 ,0 0 0
P e le -A ta 1,900
M e ra m e ra 1,561
B a ria i 1 ,500
M a n g s in g 1,500
H a ru a 1,339
A ria 1,165
B ao 1,105
B eb e li 1 ,050
L a m o g a i 1 ,000
A k o le t 954
L e s in g -A tu i 929
E re 800
M o k 626
B u lu 566
A n e m 500
S e n g se n g 453
M iu 394
Bougainville 25 175,160
B u in 18 ,000
N is sa n 15 ,000
H a lia 14 ,000
N a s io i 10 ,000
P e ta ts 10 ,000
S iw ai 7 ,2 0 0
T e o p 5 ,0 0 0
N a g o v is i 5 ,0 0 0
R o to k a s 4 ,3 2 0
T in p u tz 3 ,9 0 0
S o lo s 3 ,2 0 0
K u n u a 2 ,5 0 0
K o o m ira 1,562
H ah o n 1,300
E iv o 1,200
S ap o sa 1,200
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Uisai 1.060
Banoni 1.000
Keriaka 1.000
Torau 605
Nagarige 550
Takuu 250
Nuguria 200
Nukumanu 200
Papapana 150
Source: Nekitel, O. 1998, Voices o f  Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Language, 
Culture and Identity, UBS Publishers, New Delhi.
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APPENDIX B
Provincial Abbreviations Used in Scattergrams
Abbreviation Province
W est W estern
G u lf G u lf
C ent Central
M B ay M ilne Bay
O ro Oro
SH P Southern  H igh lands
Enga Enga
W H P W estern H igh lands
Sm b Sim bu
EH P Eastern H igh lands
M or M orobe
M ad M adang
ESep East Sepik
Sand Sandaun
M an Manus
N IP N ew  Ireland
EN B East N ew  B ritain
W N B W est N ew  B rita in
B oug B ougainville
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APPENDIX C
Development Level Social Indicators
• Population density (includes non-citizens)
• Sex ratio
• Youth dependency ratio
• Aged dependency ratio
• Total dependency ratio 1
• Total dependency ratio 2
• Child-women ratio 1
• Child-women ratio 2
• Non-citizens per 1,000 population
• Average distance to nearest town
• Per cent population in the rural non-village sector
• Per cent urban (includes non-citizens)
• Intra-provincial in-migration rate
• Inter-provincial in-migration rate
• Per cent population 10 years + in wage employment
• Females as a percentage of all wage workers
• Per cent population 10 years + farming and fishing for food/money.
• Per cent population 10 years + in big or small-scale business.
• Per cent population 10 years + farming and fishing for subsistence
• Per cent population 10 years + unemployed/underemployed
• Economic dependency ratio
• Per cent at school o f the total enumerated population 5-25 years
• Per cent not at school aged 25+ with no education
• Per cent not at school who have completed grade 6
• Per cent males aged 7-12 enrolled in school
• Per cent females aged 7-12 enrolled in school.
• Health centre or aid post less than 1 hour away (per cent within threshold)
• Primary drinking water source less than 15 minutes away (per cent within threshold)
• Community school less than 1 hour away
• Road less than one hour away
• Community Health Nursing Services -  per cent coverage of children aged 0-4.
• Community Health Nursing Services -  per cent antenatal coverage.
Source: de Albequerque, K and D’sa, E. 1986, Spatial Inequalities in Papua New 
Guinea: A District Level Analysis, Institute of Applied Social and Economic 
Research Discussion Paper No 49, Port Moresby.
274
D
is
tr
ic
t 
R
an
ki
ng
s:
 A
N
U
 L
an
d 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
G
ro
up
R
an
k - - CO co co CD CD CD CO CO CO CD CD 'M- T— CM CM
'I--
CM CM CM CM
In
de
x 
o
f
d
is
ad
va
n
ta
g
ed
di
st
ri
ct
s
x— CM CM CM CO CO CO CO CO co CO CO
T—
'5*- I D
T—
m m m m i n
C
h
ild
m
al
n
u
tr
it
io
n
CM CO CM CM CM CO CO CO CM CO CM CM CM CM CO CO CO CM CO CM c o co ■M- CM
In
co
m
e
T— CM CM CM CM CM CM CO CO co
A
cc
es
s 
to
 
se
rv
ic
es
CM CO CM CM CO CO CM c o ■M- CO CO CM CO CM 'S»- ■M- CM CO CO M - M - CM CO
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l
pr
es
su
re
...
i n i n CM i n i n m CO m CO m CO m m I D m m CO CO m m m m CO m m
La
nd
po
te
nt
ia
l
CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CO CM CM CM CO CM CM CM CM CM c o CM
D
is
tr
ic
t 
na
m
e
M
id
dl
e 
R
am
u
T
el
ef
om
in
K
an
de
p
P
om
io
U
si
no
-B
un
di
F
in
sc
hh
af
en
e
-Q
E
<l
E
CO
Ö .
E
o
* K
or
ob
a-
La
ke
 K
op
ia
go
La
ga
ip
-P
or
ge
ra
M
en
ya
m
ya
N
ip
a-
K
ut
ub
u
J=
-e
o
z R
ai
 C
oa
st
A
lo
ta
u
G
oi
la
la
I J
im
l
K
un
di
aw
a
M
en
di
R
ig
o
I V
an
im
o-
G
re
en
 R
iv
er
A
ng
or
am
K
ab
w
um
K
ag
ua
-E
ra
ve
K
ai
ru
ku
-H
iri
K
an
dr
ia
n-
G
lo
uc
es
te
r
K
er
em
a
P
ro
vi
n
ce
 n
am
e
M
ad
an
g
S
an
da
un
E
ng
a
E
as
t 
N
ew
 B
rit
ai
n
M
ad
an
g
M
or
ob
e
COCT
c
LU S
ou
th
er
n
H
ig
hl
an
ds
E
ng
a
M
or
ob
e
S
ou
th
er
n
H
ig
hl
an
ds
W
es
te
rn
M
ad
an
g
M
iln
e 
B
ay
C
en
tr
al
W
es
te
rn
 H
ig
hl
an
ds
S
im
bu
S
ou
th
er
n
H
ig
hl
an
ds
C
en
tr
al
S
an
da
un
E
as
t 
S
ep
ik
CD
O
O
S
ou
th
er
n
H
ig
hl
an
ds
C
en
tr
al
W
es
t 
N
ew
 B
rit
ai
n
G
ul
f
275
CG
E
• c
CO
E>
CO
ö
Eo
CO 
£
C 0  
cb 
£
( 0  > -
cö O
c
<D _xz £■*-’ f—
rj
CDO)co
.Q
E
276
Ea
st
 S
ep
ik
 
1 
M
ap
rik
5
3
 
1
5
3
5
3
E
9 coCD 6
3
6
3
6
3 co
CD
I 
6
9
6
9
h-
T—
r - 7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
3
7
9 7
9 T—00 CO
T—
OO 00 8
5
00T—CO ooT— CD CD CDT— CT> CD CDT— 20 20 CM o i CMCM 22
CM
CM 2
2
2
2
i 
2
2 COCM
1
2
3
“
2
4
2
4
2
4 M-
CM 2
5
CM CO CO CM -«a- CM m m CO m m ■M- m m m m m m •M- M- m
CO CM CM CM ■M- m •M- •M- CM •M- ■M" co co M’ •<* m in m
-M" ■M- CO CO co ■M- -a m 'M- m ■M- in m m m m
m m m m m m m m m M- m m m m m m m m m m m m m i n m
CO m ■M- CO CO CO co m CO m co in co m m m m m m in m m m m
W
ab
ag
W
o
se
ra
-G
au
i
Y
an
g
o
ru
-S
au
ss
ia
C
en
tr
al
 B
o
u
g
ai
n
vi
lle
K
av
le
n
g
M
an
u
s
M
ar
kh
am
N
am
at
an
ai
S
u
m
ka
r
B
al
ye
r-
M
u
l
T
a
la
s
e
a
S
o
h
e
U
n
g
g
ai
-B
en
a
A
n
g
al
im
p
-S
o
u
th
W
ah
g
i
D
au
lo
K
er
o
w
ag
i
N
o
rt
h
 B
o
u
g
ai
n
vi
lle
T
am
b
u
l-
N
eb
ily
er
W
a
p
e
n
a
m
a
n
d
a
D
ei
1 
N
o
rt
h
 W
ah
g
i
G
o
ro
ka
H
ag
en
oCL
o
o
R
ab
au
l
1 
G
a
ze
ll
e
co
O)c
LU E
as
t 
S
ep
ik
E
as
t 
S
ep
ik
B
o
u
g
ai
n
vi
lle
1 
N
ew
 I
re
la
n
d
M
an
u
s
M
o
ro
b
e
N
ew
 I
re
la
n
d
M
ad
an
g
W
es
te
rn
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s
W
e
s
t 
N
e
w
 B
ri
ta
in
O
ro
1 
E
as
te
rn
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s
W
es
te
rn
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s
E
as
te
rn
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s
S
im
b
u
B
o
u
g
ai
n
vi
lle
I 
W
es
te
rn
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s 
I
E
n
g
a
W
e
s
te
rn
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s
I 
W
e
s
te
rn
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s
E
as
te
rn
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s
W
e
st
er
n
 H
ig
h
la
n
d
s
E
as
t 
N
e
w
 B
ri
ta
in
E
as
t 
N
ew
 B
ri
ta
in
| 
E
as
t 
N
e
w
 B
ri
ta
in
277
APPENDIX E
List of Political Parties: Election 2002
1 .
Party Name Abbreviation
P a p u a  an d  N u ig in i U n io n  P a rty  P A N G U
No of Candidates
78
2. A d v a n c e  P N G  P arty A P N G P 36
3. C h r is tia n  D e m o cra tic  P arty C D P 33
4. M e la n e s ia n  A llia n c e  P arty M A P 23
5. N a tio n a l A llia n c e  P arty N A 83
6. N a tio n  T ra n sfo rm a tio n  P arty N T P 60
7. N a tio n a l V is io n  fo r H u m a n ity  P a rty N V H P 57
8. P N G  C o u n try  P arty P N G C P 59
9. P e o p le ’s A c tio n  P arty P A P 68
10. P e o p le ’s D e m o c ra tic  M o v e m e n t P D M 87
11. P e o p le ’s P ro g re ss  P arty P P P 80
12. P N G  N a tio n a l P a rty P N G N P 57
13. R u ra l P ip o l’s P ati R P P 30
14. S im p le  P e o p le ’s P arty S P P 34
15. T ru e  P e o p le ’s P arty T P P 32
16. U n ite d  P arty U P 56
17. P e o p le ’s N a tio n a l C o n g re ss P N C P 37
18. P N G  F irs t P a rty P N G F P 13
19. P N G  L a b o u r  P a rty P N G L P 65
2 0 . P e o p le ’s L a b o u r  P arty P L P 81
21 . P e o p le ’s S o lid a r ity  P arty P S P 32
22 . L ib e ra l P arty LP 12
23 . U n ite d  R e so u rce s  P arty U R P 14
2 4 . P e o p le ’s F re ed o m  P arty PFP 15
25 . P ip o l F irs t P a rty P F P 2 4
26 . H u m a n  R ig h ts  P ro te c tio n  P a rty H R P P 6
2 7 . M e la n e s ia n  L a b o u r  P arty M L P 25
2 8 . P N G  G reen s  P a rty P N G G P 25
29 . P e o p le ’s W e lfa re  P arty P W P 9
30. P N G  In teg rity  P a rty P N G IP 25
31 . Y u m i R e fo rm  P arty Y R P 34
32 . O n e  P e o p le  P a rty O P P 6
33. P e o p le ’s D e v e lo p m e n t P a rty P D P 32
34. P a r ty  fo r  Ju s tic e  an d  D ig n ity P JD 6
35. P N G  R ev iv a l P arty P N G R P 56
36. P e o p le ’s D estin y  and  D e v e lo p m e n t P a rty P D D P 28
37. P e o p le ’s H e ritag e  P arty P H P 24
38. N a tio n a l F ro n t P arty N F P 30
39. E c o n o m ic  E n d e a v o u r  P arty E E P 29
40 . P an  M e la n e s ia n  C o n g re ss  P a rty P M C P 41
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41. People’s Resource Awareness Party PRAP 14
42. Melanesian People’s Party MPP 63
43. People’s First Conservative Party PFCP 9
44. Independents IND 1247
T O TA L C AN D ID A TES 2875
Source: PNG Electoral Commission 2002
APPENDIX F
List of 2002 Election Candidates
EAST NEW BRITAIN 
East New Britain Provincial
Leo Dion 
Delmah Boden 
Albert Burua 
Oscar Pitar 
Pius Patrick Kosa 
James Agi 
Martin Ulalom 
Henry D Bobut
Gazelle Open
James M Anjo 
Sinai Brown 
Norbert Kubak 
Jack Sion 
John Rarau 
Isaac Wartovo 
Thomas Kalas 
Henry Ningo 
Elly Kinkin
Kokopo Open
Joe Ben Kuini 
Patrick Tamur 
Benjamin Amen Talai 
Rabbie L Namaliu 
Kelly Lyein
Ephraim Mararang Daula 
Ellison Okole 
John Robin T 
Leslie L Maneo 
Onias T Tomano
Pomio Open
Koimanrea Francis 
Tiensten Paul 
Leo Nicholas 
Komtagarea Michael 
Levi Silu Orong 
Thomas Gerry Iekenta 
Paisparea Michael
National Alliance 
PNG Country Party 
People’s Progress Party 
Independent 
Pan Melanesian 
Peoples Democratic 
Independent 
NVHP
People’s Labour Party 
National Alliance 
People’s Progress Party 
People’s Action Party 
Independent 
Independent 
Independent 
PDM
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
PANGU
Independent
Melanesian People’s Party 
People’s Progress Party 
PDM
Independent
Independent
PDM
People’s Progress Party 
Independent 
People’s Labour party 
Advance PNG Party 
People’s Action Party 
PANGU
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Rabaul Open
John Kaputin 
Robin Henry Minding 
John Topeono 
Thomas Tobunbon 
Kachialau Pondrilei Francis 
Paulias Nelson Eddie 
Papat Robin 
Allan Marat
EASTERN HIGHLANDS
Eastern Highlands Provincial
Soti Aizo Sihuvo 
Ori Beka Sasakila 
Kawak Katunu 
Jacob Boii Orona 
Malcolm Smith Kela 
Stanley Harry Gotaha 
Dick Steven 
Tony Fova 
Joshua Onio 
Dekot Koki 
Domonic Nema 
Ken Raisman Kanafo 
Dufe Tivai 
Tonny Yogiyo 
Peti Lafanama 
Julie Soso Akeke 
Apo Mathias 
Mono Ata Sasakila 
Oko Normi Tofunama 
Jack J Suao 
James Moliki 
Joe Joke Fokate 
Kopi Kabao 
Barra Amevo 
James B Kurun 
Samuel SiT
Daulo Open
Rober U Kasagutehe 
Paul Mania Mana 
Mondawe Wobo 
Tirin Gimiho Ohumane 
Gomane Sapovo
Independent
Independent
Independent
PANGU
Independent
National Alliance
NVHP
People’s Progress Party
MPP
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Advance PNG Party
Independent
National Front Party
Independent
Independent
Independent
True Peoples Peaty
Independent
PNG Country Party
Independent
People’s Labour Party
People’s Progress Party
Independent
Independent
PNG Labour Party
Independent
Independent
HRPP
Nation Transformation Party
Independent
Independent
Independent 
Independent 
People’s Progress Party 
Independent 
Independent 
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Ben Morere KLiagi 
Koima Harry M 
Michael Loru 
Ferdinand Moruwo Nalle 
Norrie Norihane Bomai 
Levi Yuai Kurakipa 
Pias Gandi Warima 
Benny Wally Ghabiliha 
Peter Duwe Dumba 
John Brown Mokonawal 
Tony Ombo 
Mande Samuel Sirifave 
Timothy Gena Mui 
Gigive Joseph Ombo 
William Kenderiso 
Robyn Belari Nenda 
Samson John Namo 
Henry Bagme Dua 
James Mobie Genaboro 
Sinake Giregire 
Billy Sasone Gale 
Atuwara Lundowe Momba 
Paul Gahare Akus 
Yange Karre 
August Kambrifo 
John Hiove Kindinive 
Daniel Afuti Andava 
Norman Mas 
William Kennedy Lunefa 
Rong Ganarafo 
Steven Yaila Lango Aiglas 
Sari Inaho
Ekime Mek Gorosahu 
John Kawage Gahare 
Simon Guri 
Jimmy Rende
Goroka Open
Himony Tom Lapiso 
Maus Sehuko Huve 
Johnson Luhuvae 
John Kokote Homine 
Petros Lapiso 
Leslie Hoffman Aize 
Joe Komba 
Pale Siwosawo 
Bob Urakusie 
Jack Gopave 
Amos Kindino Morokoro 
Alphones Popek Mathew
United Party 
Independent
Melanesian People’s Party
Pipol First Party
Independent
People’s Heritage Party
PNG Labour Party
Christian Democratic Party
People’s Action Party
PANGU
Independent
Economic Endeavour Party 
Independent 
Independent 
Independent 
Advance PNG Party 
PNG Revival Party 
People’s Welfare Party 
PANGU
PNG Country Party
Independent
Independent
Independent
National Alliance
People’s labour Party
Independent
Yumi Reform Party
Nation Transformation Party
PRAP
PDM
PNG Integrity Party
Independent
Melanesian Alliance
People’s Solidarity Party
Independent
PMCP
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
People’s Labour Party
NVHP
True People’s Party 
People’s Welfare Party 
PNG Country Party 
National Alliance 
People’s Progress Party 
Independent 
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Allen Oiyabo
John Blacky Tele
Michael Gotaha
Albert Akapite Wamiri
Pati Autha Herivi
Robert Goihae
Jimmy Hagove Akeke
Ronald Gesigonimo Napitalai
Ivan Gore
Henry Ninzo
Mairave Reynolds Oboti
Bire Kimisopa
Mark Gozapao
Huk Hukoro Awute
Thompson Wilson Orlegge
Samson Walizopa
Gatapo Paone
David Lulume Hasu
Henry Iyapo Smith
Peter Crutchy Asuo
George Herepe
Jack Gahe
Blackie Hative
Jack Jacob
Mathias Ijape
Eric Inamuga
James Gomae
Ben Kua Noel
Enoch Nupalivi Mie
Henganofi Open
Tota Bahanare Bun
Viviso Seravo
Tony E Seyao
Kansol Petrus Mosa
Billy Yukere
Anton Krahive Ruzape
Terry Kajona Okava
Sirumpa Ohi Akueva
Smith Hanikampa Hagawa
Marerime Kafe Forereme
Andrew Sufie
Montee Akike
Philip R Namaruremba
Peter Okka
Eron Hangunampa
Ako Arito Onnise
Moare Binefa Prihume
Robert Atiyafa
John Giheno
Independent
PANGU
Independent
Independent
Independent
Pipol First Party
Christian Democratic Party
Independent
Independent
Independent
Melanesian People’s Party
United Party
Independent
PMCP
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
PDM
Melanesian Alliance Party
National Front Party
People’s Heritage Party
Independent
Independent
PANGU
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Christian Democrat Party 
PDM
Independent
Independent
PANGU
Independent
PNG Labour Party
People’s Development Party
Independent
People’s Progress Party
Independent
National Alliance
PNG Country Party
Independent
United Party
Independent
PMCP
Independent
PANGU
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Kafe Kopi
Stena James Korarome 
Paul Kila Yate 
Peterson K Apore 
Danny Fezamo 
Hisile Monue
Kainantu Open
Eric Hinome
Tom Haga Mokupe
Kias Timere Inape
Mi mo Kanare
Maik Loya Kam
Tony Agoname
Kops Kopito Nepher
Bruce Boina
Peti Sanap Kazami
Jeffery Philip
Mila Kareo
Jorifa Yubiko
Kevin Oya
Bikus Lazuta Kako
Avusi Tanao
Yassi Tifati
Jimmy Sovo Joamo
William Hagahuno
Greg Sinopa
Susan T Mati
Simon Forofo
Kings Ave Serave
Sai-Sailon Besseoh
Robert Pamao
Yumtuvi Bao
Jocabeth Kunkunke
Robert Masahume Waure
Henry Ayomata
Billy Pintari
Afito Unero
Tonny Avaho Tamari
Baki Reipa
Aibis Karakume Ottu
Lawson Aiso
George Naki
Trexy Koi Nakime
Simon Anu Barai
John Notto Hureka
Michael Sesina Kapinu
Morris Tatufa Risepe
Johnson Tuke Ibo
People’s Labour Party
Independent
NVHP
National Front 
PNG Revival Party 
PDDP
Independent
Christian Democratic Party
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
People’s Action Party
Economic Endeavour Party
Independent
Independent
PNG Revival Party
Independent
Pipol First Party
People’s Progress Party
Melanesian People’s Party
PANGU
Yumi Reform Party
Rural Pipol’s Party
Independent
Independent
Independent
People’s Labour Party
People’s Welfare Party
PNG Country party
National Transformation Party
Independent
Independent
Independent
United Party
People’s Development Party
People’s Solidarity Party
Independent
PDDP
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
True People’s Party
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Lufa Open
Justin Yassi Akonari
Eddie Edward Mike
Kevin Agoyabo Kavagenia
Jeremiah Vakimwah Bakuta
Dick Kieguto Botume
Kanera Efu
Ikisingke Onafimo
Willie Ireva Fagino Benavepa
Rueben Siani Unavi
Jacob Lekupe
Warekec Vile Luakumo
Ellen C Hamena
Benny Ovo Asamole
Dorry Sunavi Otio
Yawa Silupa
Francis Wayamo
Mathias Karani
Rex Buwa Agumagu
John Unavi Koi
Jerry Kavori
Tralla B Pupuna Aruno
Ugi Kingsley Aramia
Obura-Wonenara Open
Aron Tisa Pano 
Keron Tane Meswa 
Jack Woweyaka 
Anna Darua 
Ken Tobiana 
Raymond Asee Ipahoi 
John Tasopi A wate 
Igitava Yoviga 
Dio Kano
Titus Gavadai Pameko 
Taiho Naakia Surua 
John Berao 
John Koigiri 
Charlie Tulie Bray 
John Havarika Boito 
Michael L Mosia Weompa 
Tim Teta Tuma 
Kiabu Auwato 
Puambu Bahi 
Jinos Seno Bavio Matui 
Yapuna Kaso 
Donald Dono Nia 
Kollen Tirori Upa 
Boha Baira
Independent
PMPC
Independent
Independent
Independent
NTP
MLP
Independent 
Independent 
PNG Labour Party 
PDP
Independent
Advance PNG Party
Independent
National Alliance
PANGU
PDM
Peoples National Congress
EEP
PSP
Peoples Progress Party 
Independent
Independent
Independent
NTP
PANGU
Independent
Independent
PNGIP
Independent
Advance PNG Party
NVHP
Independent
Independent
PSP
PNG Country Party 
UP
PNGRP
Independent
HRPP
People’s Labour Party 
PHP
PNG Labour Party 
People’s Progress Party 
Independent 
Independent
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Henry Kivi 
Joe Sahui Bumbandy 
Mathias A rumba 
Muki Samuel Taranupi 
Peter Papa Gaige 
David Tintao Kaiku
Okapa Open
Frank Fikena 
Bayau B Malie 
Yokina Joe Monave 
Nosi Yosa Kari 
Timothy Obuva 
David Aurika 
Okua Yasina 
Korak Korae Yasona 
Jondally Yane 
Aita Ivarato 
Allan Ilakuwayo 
Noel Monde 
Amos Olake Namani 
Job Hodimi 
Philip Pairen Tandagu 
Wato Maive Avinaga 
Jerry Kusa 
Lawrance P Oentuma 
Abe Wainama 
Ovavo Oriva Iki 
Willie Kemi 
Abundi Ende 
Terry Ugi Isagimo 
Castan Marbo Maibawa 
Jonah Enoch Yabakasu 
Felix Wakire Kauvianda 
Peter Malo 
Rex Pakoro Igimo 
Opi Otulamo Hahato 
Pais Yebure Paiya 
Russell Keller Aiso 
Benjamin Benun Kabulo 
Robert Aneavu 
Robert Osa 
Oscar Kosindo Kapi 
Bonny Oveyara 
Peter Asada Umoro 
Peter Akori Kivi 
Terry Huo’o Umolo 
Paruku Joel Kia 
Tom Amukele 
Nosare Maika Eno Imao
Independent
MPP
People’s Action Party 
PDM
PNG National Party 
TPP
Independent
TPP
Independent
National Alliance
Independent
Independent
MPP
PDM
Independent
National Front
Independent
People’s Labour Party
Independent
PNG Country Party
URP
Independent
EEP
Advance PNG Party
Independent
United party
Independent
Independent
SPP
Independent
Independent
RPP
Independent 
PNG Labour Party 
HRPP 
NTP
People’s Progress party
PDDP
Independent
Independent
Independent
PANGU
PWP
Independent
PMCP
Independent
PFP
PHP
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Way a Babona Masogopi 
Aiso Omuga Kepi 
Joseph Bibeli Koko 
Wevin Hofa Seiyu 
Layman Julius Ozena 
Menu Fessma Tairo 
Erie Ovako Juvire
Unggai-Bena Open
Babe Hue Yabi Lesa
Papaso Ivefa
Oscar Okesa Oksap
Naomi Lolu Rumbia
Robin Ugere Oruda
Apaso Winch Lee Oibotee
Momoto Bobby Sogavo
Francis Mipomofa
Telia Bundiloe Loie
Malo Keniafa
Tau Tute Farokave
Jeff Baiyer Jacko
Nicky Sio Lopafae
Davis Umeri Gunurei
Samuel Isove Lio
Michael Galem Gofi
Hagen Mogonitopa
Kevin Masive
Benny Tipot Allan
Phillip Lomutopa
Holu Kepsy
Tius John Sepeyae
Kelly Tulip Inae
Benais Sabumei
Abe Kanakoe
Lawrence Acanufa
James Melegepa
Lobuna Umanda
Mossman Hofimugupa Uvovo
Tom W Moliki
Martin Seve
Walter Inagafa
Nigel Moriki Hune
John Ekapa Tonny
Wesley Bire
Andrew Otacave Lelemitoe 
Nelson Sabumei 
Kiatro Abisinito 
Peter Avoreke Kare 
Ark Auwo Ketauwo 
Harry Amakure Landu
PNGFP
People’s national Congress 
PNGRP
PNG National Party 
NVHP 
Independent 
Independent
NTP
United Party
PMCP
Independent
Independent
Independent
MPP
Independent
Independent
Independent
TPP
Independent
Independent
People’s National Congress 
People’s Labour Party 
CDP
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
PDDP
MLP
PNG National Party
Independent
PSP
Independent
Independent
Independent
People’s Progress Party
PNG Labour Party
PRAP
PWP
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
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Jacob Nagamisovo 
Damson Lafana 
Sogerifa Kelly Lutogo.
GULF
Gulf Provincial
Aiki Hamora 
George Lori 
Abel Koivi 
Tolao Putu 
Ope Oeaka 
Lemek Kum 
Havila Kavo 
Elijah Timothy 
Celcius Kose 
Haro Sarufa 
Memafu Malara 
Mark
Joe Dodobai 
Fred Airi 
Jacob Kairi 
Simon I Kendolo 
To’ope Loki Ivora 
Philip Sivi Oaveu 
Haha Feareka 
Daniel Kake Meara 
Joseph Kariko Meata 
John Toivita 
Tete Keko
Robin Koeakera Heoeahiki Lavuru
Mu Reareka
Maea Ita Emui Kaumi
Evera Meakoro
John T Poha
Christopher Seseve Haiveta 
Joe Ehava Karava 
Gabriel Sivi Maroa
Kerema Open
Albert Kose Milala 
Eric Parapa 
Lalatute Avosa Saea 
Harry Bitmead Moroko 
Marcellus Tiomdi Winaio 
Philip Ipiona 
Konsie Kovitoru Larea 
Greg Ivosa 
Camilo K Ekari
PFP
PDM
PNG Country party
NVHP
EEP
PNGRP
PDDP
Independent
People’s Action Party
People’s National Congress
People’s Labour Party
National Alliance
YRP
Independent
Independent
Independent
MPP
Independent
PNGFP
PFRP
People’s Progress Party
PNGIP
Independent
PNG Labour Party
Independent
Independent
MLP
Independent
Independent
PNG Country Party
PFCP
PANGU
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
MAP
PNGRP
United Party
Independent
MLP
Independent
Independent
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Sarea Soi
Kei Karava Haiveta 
Thaddeus Ehava Seoka 
Lama Haia 
A ’aron Noaio 
Joseph Mangabi 
John Haromairi 
Joe Mando Turia 
Dan Fareapo Maravila 
David Lari Oaseoka 
Michael Maki Maera 
Jack T Name 
Peter Mero Eka 
Pitom Titus Bombom 
Howard Pouta 
Sivore Lakou 
Roddy Hilla Koaru 
Dm Samson Torreys Maora 
Adamson Yavako 
David L Memafu 
Ekis Ropenu 
Rodney Horou Tom 
Joseph Morehari Maroa 
Joel Steven Nawi Paitho 
Lei Lokoloko 
Charlie Sari Moi 
Edward Evoa Sarufa 
Hasu Tore Lokoloko 
Tom Koraea 
Japhet Kaiae Itaupe 
Joseph Kaivauka Maroa 
Meakoro Opa 
Allan Auharai Fae 
Hosea Anpainat 
Mathew Donaipa 
Sari Maso 
Tony Auvita 
Polmek Akika 
Priscilla Opa Kare 
Peter Oakiva Lei 
Samuel Yuwi Kamiaeto 
Jackson W Pari 
Ivan Hullah
Kikori Open
Mark Ivi Maipakai 
Esara Alberts Kerut 
Thomas Kekeao 
Peter Bauo Koiviapa 
Harry H Omohae
PDM
Independent
NFP
PRAP
PSP
Independent
PNGIP
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
People’s Progress Party
PNGFP
Independent
PFCP
EEP
PDP
Independent
Independent
People’s Labour Party
NTP
SPP
Independent
Independent
People’s National Congress
Independent
Independent
PANGU
MPP
YRP
Independent
Independent
Independent
Independent
National Alliance
URP
Independent 
PNG Labour Party 
PNGGP
People’s Action Party
Independent
LP
People’s Progress Party 
Independent 
Independent 
Independent 
National Alliance
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Aukiri Airia 
Allan Ebu Marai 
John Haro Koia 
Samuel Kaii 
Aumari Omae 
John Eipe Maruru 
Akai Kairi
Memehere Memehere 
Evara Horepa 
Ridler Dorobe Kimave 
Roy Evara 
Michael Korah 
Kevin Kevau Ivape 
Isaac Morimai 
Daniel Kairi Mai lau 
Jeffery Kaipu Vaieke 
Prosey K Mai lau 
Jimmy Kinobu
NIP
People’s Labour Party
EEP
PFCP
PNG Labour Party 
Independent 
Independent 
PRAP
People’s Action Party
PANGU
PSP
MPP
PNGFP
PNGRP
Independent
People’s National Congress
Independent
Independent
Source: PNG Electoral Commission 2002
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